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In order to understand the nature of a given linguistic phenomena in the adult grammar, 
language acquisition research explores how children’s competence with respect to such a 
phenomena develops. However, diagnosing competence can be challenging because it is 
not directly observable. Researchers only have access to performance, which is mediated 
by additional factors and is not a direct reflection of competence. In this dissertation, I 
explore a case study of children’s early syntactic knowledge. My in-depth analysis of 
Principle C at 30 months provides novel insights into diagnostics for underlying 
competence by utilizing two distinct methods of analysis. The first analysis explores 
alternative mechanisms that have been proposed to account for early Principle C effects. 
By comparing across multiple linguistic contexts, I show that Principle C knowledge is 
the only mechanism which can account for all observed performance. The second 
analysis explores the deployment processes that are required to implement competence in 
performance. I present a novel analytic approach to identifying underlying knowledge 
which utilizes independent measures of these deployment processes. I show that 
individual differences in syntactic processing predict individual differences in 
interpretation, implicating syntactic processing in Principle C performance at 30 months. 
Together, these findings extend our knowledge of the developmental pattern that 
characterizes Principle C, which can contribute to debates about the origin of this 
constraint as part of the grammar. This research provides new depth to investigations of 
children’s early syntactic knowledge by highlighting new methods for diagnosing 
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Learning a native language is a challenge that dominates the first few years of a 
child’s life. And yet, with little to no explicit instruction, children are able to achieve 
adult-like proficiency with seeming ease. Somehow, working only with subconscious, 
internal cognitive systems and partial, incomplete evidence about their language from the 
environment around them, children form generalizations about the workings of their 
language that largely match the adult grammatical system by the time they are about 3. 
The ease with which this acquisition takes place is particularly noticeable when we 
compare the challenge grammarians face in finding the most accurate way to describe 
this internal grammatical system; many researchers have spent large portions of their 
career identifying, specifying, and revising generalizations to account for some set of 
linguistic facts. In language acquisition research, we face the challenge of explaining 
children’s seemingly effortless acquisition of a system when we know (often firsthand) 
that finding the right generalization to account for the facts can be surprisingly difficult. 
One primary challenge to identifying children’s acquisition is the asymmetry 
between grammatical competence and performance. As acquisitionists, our goal is to 
diagnose linguistic competence, that is, underlying knowledge of a particular linguistic 
phenomenon. However, we cannot directly observe or measure a child’s competence. 
What we have access to is children’s performance, their behavioral response to a given 
linguistic stimulus. We face a challenge here in that performance is not a direct reflection 
of competence, because it is influenced by additional factors. If we observe children’s 
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response to a linguistic stimulus to be non-adultlike, it could be due to children lacking 
the necessary grammatical knowledge to drive adult-like performance. Alternatively, 
children could in fact have the underlying competence, but some aspect of the 
deployment processes required to implement this knowledge is lacking. Since we are 
only able to see the end result of performance, we can’t straightforwardly identify what’s 
causing the non-adult performance. Somewhat less often discussed is the same problem 
on the opposite end of the scale-- where we observe children’s performance to be adult-
like. Here, it could be that children have the underlying competence, but it could also 
stem from a non-adult heuristic strategy which produces the same performance as adult 
knowledge. The challenge we face is to find ways to accurately diagnose syntactic 
competence while it is mediated by performance.  
In identifying the acquisition of syntactic competence, it is important not only to 
diagnose children’s underlying knowledge, but also how this knowledge changes over 
time. For a given linguistic phenomenon, we can conceive of the competence for that 
phenomenon developing in two ways. The first type of development can be thought of as 
growth of knowledge- that is, children go through stages where they have incomplete or 
imperfect knowledge, which approximates the adult system to some extent but is not fully 
parallel the adult grammar. In this case, acquisition of knowledge occurs via 
representational change; each stage of imperfect knowledge is like stepping stones that 
get closer and closer to the adult system. The second type of development can be thought 
of as a process of recognition rather than change of the representational system. In this 
case, children have some underlying understanding of the representational vocabulary of 
the grammatical system, and development consists of identification of the mapping 
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between strings in the child’s language and representations.  Once the child has enough 
information about the structure of the language they are learning, they will be able to 
apply their pre-existing knowledge.  
Identifying the type of developmental pattern for a given linguistic phenomenon 
is critical to our understanding of the nature of the linguistic system. However, the 
imperfect relation between competence and performance once again adds a challenge: 
since we cannot directly measure a child’s knowledge state, inferences about the pattern 
of development are drawn from children’s behavior. This indirect inference can often 
mask the pattern of development. 
Throughout this investigation, I focus on one test case for emerging syntactic 
competence in young children: Principle C. As discussed in the following section in more 
detail, Principle C is a syntactic restriction on the set of possible interpretations of R-
expressions. The acquisition of Principle C knowledge provides an ideal test case for 
exploring development of competence. As a constraint, Principle C is a generalization 
about what a sentence cannot mean. As such, children receive no positive evidence in the 
data that would help them arrive at this generalization. This illustrates the classic Poverty 
of the Stimulus problem identified by acquisitionists.  
The problem in fact is twofold. First, there are countless generalizations one 
might make to account for the facts that Principle C does; many will account for a large 
subset of these facts, but only Principle C accounts for all of them. This challenge was 
illustrated by grammarians as they sought to describe the linguistic system. Various 
generalizations were put forth to account for the restrictions on interpretation of reference 
in some sentences. Each increasingly complex generalization was designed to account for 
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as many of the available facts as possible. As counter-examples arose, modified 
generalizations were put forward to account for them. But it was not until the correct 
generalization for Principle C was identified that a generalization could be shown to 
account for all of the available facts. Thus it is clear that finding the one right 
generalization among many can be challenging. The second problem faced in Poverty of 
the Stimulus cases is that the input available to child language learners is often largely 
consistent with many of these wrong generalizations.  
As a classic Poverty of the Stimulus case, Principle C is in fact an ideal test case 
for examining the development of syntactic competence. To identify the developmental 
pattern as knowledge recognition or knowledge growth, I examine whether children 
utilize any alternative generalizations for interpretation before attuning to the correct one. 
This exploration of alternative interpretive strategies which account for some (but not all) 
Principle C effects also yields one strategy for inferring competence from performance. 
By comparing across multiple linguistic contexts, we can identify which underlying 
knowledge state can account for all observed performance. Results show that across 
linguistic contexts, knowledge of Principle C is the only interpretive strategy which 
correctly predicts all behavior. This line of research provides a key insight to the 
developmental pattern of Principle C. Results suggest that children do not ‘try out’ 
alternative generalizations for interpretation, but rather seem to be adult-like at the 
earliest studied age point. These findings fit more with a developmental pattern where 
knowledge is recognized rather than knowledge growth. These findings have implications 
for debates over the nature of Principle C in terms of both whether it is learned or 
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innately specified as part of UG, as well as whether it could be derived from pragmatic 
principles. 
Another critical contribution of this work is a novel analytic approach which 
utilizes measures of the processes required to implement grammatical knowledge as 
predictors of individual variation in performance. Recall that one of the primary 
challenges we face is inferring competence based solely on performance, when multiple 
knowledge states are compatible with the same pattern of performance. In this research, I 
create measures of several different processes required to deploy different types of 
grammatical knowledge. Different types of knowledge will require different processes for 
that knowledge to be implemented in interpretation. By identifying different deployment 
processes and determining which contribute to changes in performance, we are able to 
narrow in on the onset of Principle C knowledge in development. This is some of the first 
work which allows us to target and separate out the effects of performance factors, and 
actually use measures of performance as a way to recognize the state of the underlying 
knowledge. Rather than ignoring or attempting to minimize the performance effects in a 
task, we employ variation in performance as a diagnostic to identify the corresponding 
variation in deployment of grammatical knowledge. This, in turn, allows us to make 
inferences about the type of grammatical knowledge being deployed. 
In the remainder of this Introduction, I specify our description of Principle C and 
the relevant terminology, review previous findings of Principle C effects in acquisition, 




1.1 Grammatical Restrictions on Reference Relations 
Principle C is part of Binding Theory, a set of three structure-dependent 
constraints on the interpretive relations between nominal elements in a sentence. These 
constraints are defined in (1) as specific restrictions on where anaphora between two NPs 
can and cannot occur. Necessary terminology of binding and c-command are defined in 
(2) and (3), respectively. Principle A governs the use of anaphors (reflexive pronouns and 
reciprocals), Principle B governs the use of pronominals (non-reflexive pronouns), and 
Principle C (1c) governs the use of R-expressions, i.e. those NPs that are not subject to 
Principles A or B (e.g. the cat, cookies, Jennifer, every student). The constraints of 
Binding Theory have been proposed to account for a wide range of facts about the types 
of sentences where coreference does and does not appear to be possible (e.g. Langacker, 
1966; Ross, 1967; Lakoff, 1968; Lasnik, 1976; Chomsky, 1981). 
 
(1) a. Principle A: an anaphor must be bound in its governing category. 
 b. Principle B: a pronoun must be free in its governing category. 
 c. Principle C: an R-expression must be free. 
(2) A node ! binds a node " iff: 
 a. ! and " are co-indexed, 
 b. ! c-commands ". 
(3) A node ! c-commands a node " iff 
 a. neither node dominates the other 
 b. the first branching node dominating ! dominates ". 
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As stated in (1c), Principle C restricts the set of possible interpretations available 
for sentences containing an R-expression. Specifically, it blocks a coreferential 
interpretation when an R-expression occurs within the c-command domain of another 
NP1. In (4-6), the NP Katie does not occur within the c-command domain of the pronoun 
she.  
 
(4) While Katie1 was in the kitchen, she1/2 baked cookies. 
(5) While she1/2 was in the kitchen, Katie2 baked cookies. 
(6) Katie1 baked cookies while she1/2 was in the kitchen. 
(7) She1/*2 baked cookies while Katie2 was in the kitchen. 
 
Consequently, co-indexation between these two NPs does not yield a binding 
relation and so Principle C is satisfied. In (7), however, the NP Katie does occur within 
the c-command domain of the pronoun she, and so if these NPs are coindexed, Principle 
C is violated. Thus, she and Katie must be interpreted as disjoint in reference.   
The specification of c-command as the correct syntactic relation for defining 
binding is discussed at length in Reinhart 1976 (see also Fiengo 1977, Chomsky 1981, 
Chomsky 1986). Under this analysis, interpretation of possible coreference relations 
between NPs inherently requires a representation of the hierarchical structure of 
sentences. The implication for acquisition, then, is that children must have an adequate 
understanding of the phrase structure of their native language in order to be able to 
                                                
1 My examples will primarily deal with pronouns in a potentially c-commanding position, 
but note that the restriction Principle C places on coreference extends to other NPs as 
well. 
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interpret relations between NPs in an adult-like manner. (As noted above, it can be 
challenging to distinguish this behavior driven by adult-like grammatical knowledge from 
behavior driven by a non-adult mechanism used as an initial interpretive strategy before 
adult grammatical knowledge is achieved. We explore this challenge in detail below.) 
 
1.2 Principle C in Acquisition 
Acquisition research provides critical insight into the nature of Principle C, and as 
such has received considerable attention, for a number of reasons. First, the constraint is 
stable cross-linguistically; every language displays its effects, though in some languages 
these may be masked by independent features of the language (Baker 1991, 2001; 
Phillips 2004). Further, work with 3-5 year olds on Principle C has shown children to 
have fairly early and robust knowledge of the constraint (for a review, see Lust, Eisele & 
Mazuka 1992). Crain & McKee (1985) presented children with a short story, acted out 
with toys, followed by sentences like (8-10). In each case, the coreferential interpretation 
of the sentence was true given the story context and the disjoint interpretation was false. 
Children were asked to say whether the sentence was an accurate description of the story. 
Crain & McKee report that 3-year-old children accept sentences like (8-9), showing a 
coreferential interpretation, only 12% of the time, while they accept sentences like (10) 
73% of the time. This pattern of restricted pronominal interpretations in Principle C 
contexts has been widely replicated in 3-5 year olds across a number of languages 
(Grimshaw & Rosen, 1990; Eisele & Lust, 1996; Guasti & Chierchia, 1999/2000; 




(8) He washed Luke Skywalker. 
(9) He ate the hamburger when the Smurf was in the fence. 
(10) When she was outside playing, Strawberry Shortcake ate an ice cream cone. 
 
While the findings that children obey Principle C by 3-5 years of age is important, 
such work leaves open the question of how learners come to know this constraint, as well 
as what the developmental trajectory (if any) of this knowledge is. Recent research has 
shown that children as young as 30 months are able to interpret sentences in one Principle 
C context in an adult-like manner (Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz, 2014). This research 
does not conclusively demonstrate knowledge of Principle C by 30 months, as there are 
numerous other interpretive strategies that could yield the same result (we will discuss 
these strategies at length in the next section). However, it does show that by 30 months 
interpretation in a Principle C context is restricted to the disjoint interpretation, which is 
at least consistent with adult-like interpretation via Principle C. 
Research by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014) sought to determine the earliest 
point in development at which children’s interpretations are consistent with Principle C 
restrictions, in order to further investigate how Principle C emerges in development. LCL 
targeted performance at 28-32 months. At such young ages, children generally do not 
have the metalinguistic abilities to make an explicit judgment about the appropriateness 
of a sentence as a description of a complex chain of events, as is required in Truth Value 
Judgment Tasks commonly used to assess interpretations in Principle C contexts in 
preschool children. In lieu of an explicit-choice task, LCL utilized an Intermodal 
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Preferential Looking Paradigm (IPLP)2, in which children are presented with two images 
on a television screen accompanied by an utterance of a test sentence. This paradigm is 
based on the finding that children attend more to an image that matches their 
interpretation of audio that they hear than to one that does not (Spelke, 1979; Hirsh-Pasek 
& Golinkoff, 1996).  
The IPLP provides an ideal method for probing complex linguistic knowledge in 
very young children in several ways. First, it requires no conscious action from the 
participants, as pointing or act-out tasks do; such requirements can be cognitively 
demanding and have the potential to obscure underlying understanding (Hamburger & 
Crain 1982). Additionally, this paradigm requires fewer memory and recall capabilities 
than other paradigms such as truth value judgment tasks, where children must remember 
what happened during a story in order to accurately respond during test. Finally, unlike 
picture matching tasks, the IPLP allows for the use of video rather than static images as a 
representation of dynamic events; the use of dynamic events may be ideal for research in 
syntactic comprehension because sentences describe events (Waxman, Lidz, Braun & 
Lavin 2009). In these ways, the IPLP offers a method that may more accurately capture 
syntactic knowledge in young children than many other paradigms; further, its decreased 
demands on the child allow for use with much younger children, making it ideal for 
testing early syntactic knowledge. 
LCL presented children with pairs of images depicting self-directed events (e.g. 
Figure 1, left image, girl A patting herself) and other-directed events (e.g. Figure 1, right 
image, girl B patting girl A). Children were presented with a sentence whose direct object 
                                                
2 This paradigm has also been referred to as the “looking while listening” procedure by 
Fernald and colleagues (Fernald et al. 2008). 
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was either a name, as in (11), or a reflexive pronoun, as in (12). Each sentence was 
therefore a good description of only one of the two events (given the adult grammar). 
 
 
Figure 1 Principle C Task sample array from Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014) 
 
(11) She’s patting Katie! 
(12) She’s patting herself! 
 
LCL found that upon hearing (11), children looked significantly more to the 
other-directed action, suggesting that by 30 months children have some constraint on 
possible interpretations of pronouns. Further, this result was shown to be mediated by 
children’s vocabulary size: children with larger vocabularies looked more to the other-
directed event in Principle C contexts than those with smaller vocabularies. While no 
overall effect was found for reflexive sentences, a similar vocabulary effect was found, 
showing that children with larger vocabularies look more to a self-directed event upon 
hearing (12). 
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As we interpret these results, it is important to note a concern that some 
researchers have raised about the strength of the conclusion that can be inferred from 
implicit tasks such as the IPLP, which rely on measures of attention. In more explicit 
tasks, such as TVJTs, children’s response is taken to be an explicit reflection of their 
interpretation of the target sentence. Comparatively, tasks based in attentional measures 
are not able to give evidence about which interpretations aren’t available, only those that 
are. When children hear (11) and look more to an other-directed event, we cannot 
determine whether children’s grammar only generates one possible interpretation, or 
generates multiple interpretations that children preferentially select between. The 
predicted looking behavior for each of these possible states of the grammar is identical. 
Looking more to an other-directed event in the context of a sentence constrained by 
Principle C indicates that children prefer to interpret such a sentence as disjoint rather 
than coreferential (for a critique of methodologies which rely attentional measures, see 
Crain & Thornton, 1998:55). However, it is important to note that even for explicit tasks 
like TVJTs, the strongest licensed claim that can be made is that children preferentially 
access one interpretation of the test sentence and respond to the test sentence based on 
that interpretation; it is virtually impossible to assure that a given interpretation is 
completely unavailable, irrespective of the methodology used (Musolino & Lidz, 2006; 
Conroy et al., 2009; Syrett & Lidz, 2011).  
The preference for a disjoint interpretation in Principle C contexts shown by LCL 
mirrors effects shown in older children and adults. This research is some of the first 
evidence that children younger than 3 years old reliably show the same restricted set of 
interpretations in binding environments as adults do. 
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1.3 Goals of this Dissertation. 
 Given the findings on children’s early interpretations in Principle C contexts, my 
primary goal in this dissertation is to characterize more explicitly the onset of knowledge 
of Principle C in children’s grammar. To accomplish this, I address several questions 
which explore children’s early behavior as a means to identify the nature of the 
underlying knowledge. 
 
Question 1: At what point in development are Principle C effects observable in children’s 
behavior?  
My initial investigation will explore children’s performance in Principle C 
contexts at increasingly early ages so as to determine the earliest stage at which we 
observe a restriction on interpretation. In order to characterize the developmental 
trajectory of Principle C performance, we need to identify the onset of such behavior. 
Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014) have extended the age of onset down to 30 months, 
showing that Principle C behavior is in place at this point. I will investigate children at 
even earlier ages to determine the contrast point when children do not evidence a 
restriction on interpretation in Principle C contexts.  
 
Question 2: Are early Principle C effects attributable to knowledge of Principle C, or 
does this early behavior arise from an alternative interpretive mechanism?  
While LCL showed that at 30 months children’s interpretations are consistent 
with knowledge of Principle C, this is not equivalent to showing that children have 
knowledge of Principle C at 30 months. While these results are consistent with behavior 
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driven by Principle C, they are also consistent with behavior driven by a number of non-
adult constraints on interpretation. From the current data, it is not possible to distinguish 
the exact nature of the underlying constraint motivating children’s preferences. Listed in 
(13) are several possible constraints on pronoun interpretation, all of which could yield 
identical behavior in this initial task.  
 
(13) A pronoun may not co-refer with… 
 a. any NP in the same sentence. 
 b. any NP that it precedes. 
 c. any NP that it precedes in the minimal clause containing it. 
 d. any NP in the minimal clause containing it. 
 e. any NP within its c-command domain. 
 
In the minimal sentence structure utilized by LCL (e.g. She’s patting Katie), all of 
the options listed in (13) are equally satisfied. LCL’s findings definitely indicate that 
children have some constraint on pronoun interpretation by 30 months. However, the data 
are consistent with myriad interpretive constraints, only one of which corresponds to 
adult-like Principle C knowledge. Alternatively, children could have no constraint on 
pronoun interpretation, but independent features of how children understand sentences 
could create preferences for particular interpretations. 
To narrow in on the nature of the knowledge that drives children’s early 
interpretations in Principle C contexts, I utilize two approaches. The first is to identify 
specific alternative interpretive strategies that have been proposed to account for early 
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Principle C effects and explore performance in linguistic contexts where knowledge of 
Principle C and knowledge based in this interpretive strategy predict differing 
performance. The second approach is to take advantage of the inherent dependency 
between grammatical knowledge and the deployment processes required to implement 
this knowledge; recognition of this dependency allows us to generate predictions about 
variance in behavior based on variance in implementation. We can draw conclusions 
about children’s grammar by acknowledging that differing knowledge states will require 
different mechanisms for implementing that knowledge, and by finding ways of explicitly 
measuring the online implementation of such knowledge. 
 
Question 3: What are the processing mechanisms through which children’s knowledge is 
deployed? 
 As identified above, understanding what factors contribute to the deployment of 
children’s knowledge will allow us to infer the nature of that knowledge. I explore 
multiple measures of children’s speed of processing information in order to identify 
which type(s) of processing contribute to explaining performance. From this relation 
between deployment processes and performance, I then make inferences about what the 
underlying knowledge state might be. 
 
Question 4: How did children arrive at the knowledge state that drives their early 
Principle C effects? Can we contribute to the innate vs. learned debate? 
Although behavior consistent with adult-like interpretation is evident by 30 
months of age, a constraint on possible interpretations such as Principle C poses an 
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interesting learnability problem. Positive evidence for a constraint is not possible- there 
will be no sentences produced by adults that explicitly exhibit the fact that a sentence 
cannot have a particular meaning. Additionally, evidence for a constraint on 
interpretations would require recognition not only of the particular sentence forms that 
are implicated, but also the meaning attached to a particular form. Because sentences 
over which Principle C applies are acceptable with disjoint reference, the necessary 
evidence that Principle C exists would have to come as indirect negative evidence that 
coreferential interpretations are blocked (Lidz, 2007). In general, the evidence for 
Principle C’s universality across languages and robust effects in young children (along 
with the assumption that the input is not sufficient for the acquisition of such a constraint) 
have been considered evidence that Principle C is innately specified as part of Universal 
Grammar (UG) (Crain, 1991). Crain (1991) identifies these aspects of Principle C as 
“hallmarks of innateness” and has argued that by its very nature as a constraint, Principle 
C must be innate.  
While the research presented here does not directly contribute to the debate 
surrounding the nature of such constraints, it does provide evidence about two aspects of 
the acquisition pattern which could potentially further restrict a learning account of 
Principle C knowledge. First, this work continues to extend downward the age at which 
Principle C effects have successfully been demonstrated to even younger children than 
the majority of previous research. This narrowing of the age range when Principle C may 
become active in the child grammar effectively serves to limit the amount of time across 
development in which the constraint could be learned. Second, this research explores the 
mechanisms by which children at these youngest ages implement the knowledge 
 17 
responsible for their interpretations, with the aim to diagnose early Principle C behavior 
as stemming from knowledge of Principle C rather than an alternate interpretive heuristic. 
In this way, demonstration of children’s early accurate interpretations in Principle C 
contexts could serve to constrain the amount and type of data available to drive learning, 
and hence place some empirical bounds on arguments for or against its innateness. 
 
Question 5: Do children’s early Principle C effects contribute to identifying the nature of 
Principle C as a primitive of grammar? 
 While Principle C is commonly identified as a primitive of grammar, alternative 
approaches to account for Principle C effects have proposed that the restriction on 
interpretations derive from discourse pragmatic principles (Reinhart, 1983; Grodzinsky & 
Reinhart, 1993; Ambridge, Pine & Lieven, in press). The results of our explorations of 
children’s early interpretation in Principle C contexts are relevant to this debate in that 
whatever pragmatic competence is required for such interpretive processes to be 
implemented must necessarily be available to children by 30 months. We discuss the 
likelihood of this possibility given current findings on children’s early abilities in the 
relevant pragmatic domains. 
 
1.4 Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 examines the possibility that children’s early interpretations in Principle 
C contexts could be attributable to heuristics for interpreting transitive structures rather 
than to knowledge of Principle C. Research in the word-learning domain suggests that 
children utilize cues from argument structure to identify a novel verb’s possible 
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interpretations. This interpretive strategy from word learning provides an alternative 
mechanism to Principle C by which children could develop a preference for disjoint 
interpretations in simple Principle C contexts. In two preferential looking tasks, I explore 
performance by 24 and 30 month-olds to diagnose the interpretive strategy responsible 
for early Principle C effects. I utilize a novel linguistic context where knowledge of 
Principle C and a transitivity bias predict differing performance. 
The results contribute two significant findings. First, I confirm that the youngest 
age at which Principle C effects are observable in children’s behavior is 30 months; no 
significant restrictions on interpretation are evident at 24 months. Second, I show that in a 
new context where Principle C and a bias based in transitivity predict differing 
performance, behavior is more consistent with Principle C. This suggests that early 
Principle C effects are not attributable to an alternative interpretive strategy based in 
transitivity. 
 Chapter 3 explores the possibility that children’s early interpretations in Principle 
C contests could be attributable to a mechanism that relies on the linear order in which a 
pronoun and an R-expression occur. One possibility is that children could begin with a 
grammatical rule which disallows all cases of backward anaphora as an initial attempt at 
interpreting reference relations. There are many possible generalizations about licensed 
interpretations Principle C contexts which account for most of the facts (although, as 
noted above, only one that accounts for all of the facts). A bias based in the linear order 
of nominal expressions is one example of a wrong generalization which can account for 
interpretations of most of the simple sentences children hear. As such, it provides an 
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excellent test case to help determine whether children test out alternative generalizations 
before settling on the correct generalization (i.e. Principle C).  
In Chapter 3 I compare 30 month-olds’ interpretations of two types of sentences 
where a linear bias forms different predictions than does Principle C. I utilize backward 
anaphoric sentences where a pronoun c-commands its potential antecedent and a 
coreferential interpretation is blocked by Principle C, and backward anaphoric sentences 
where this c-command relation does not obtain, and thus a coreferential interpretation is 
grammatically available. Children’s performance is consistent with knowledge of 
Principle C, and not a linear bias, in these more complex frames. This shows that even at 
increasingly young ages, children do not utilize alternative interpretive mechanisms. 
Chapter 4 examines a novel analytic approach to identifying characteristics of 
knowledge underlying behavior. I utilize independent measurements of processes that 
may be implicated in deployment of knowledge in order to determine the nature of the 
knowledge that is being deployed. I exploit the predicted dependency between children’s 
speed of processing syntactic information and their speed of interpreting sentences in 
Principle C contexts. In three preferential looking tasks, I use measures of processing at 
the lexical and syntactic levels to compare to performance on a Principle C task. I show 
that individual variation in the speed of interpretation in Principle C contexts is predicted 
by individual variation in syntactic processing speed. This finding suggests that the 
mechanism responsible for interpretation in Principle C contexts is dependent on 
syntactic composition. 
 Chapter 5 summarizes the findings identified in Chapters 2-4 and explains how 
these findings answer the questions posed in this Introduction. I discuss how the research 
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presented in this dissertation has strengthened our understanding of the developmental 
pattern of Principle C in acquisition. I examine how these findings serve to constrain any 
proposed learning account of Principle C, and provide an initial investigation of 
children’s language input to evaluate the plausibility of learning from such input. I also 
explore several interpretive mechanisms based in discourse pragmatics which have been 
proposed as alternatives to Principle C, and I examine the efficacy of these interpretive 
mechanisms in light of the findings presented herein. 
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2 Heuristics for Interpreting Transitive Syntax are Not Sufficient 
 
 
2.1  Outline 
Chapter 2 examines the possibility that children’s early interpretations in Principle 
C contexts could be attributable to heuristics for interpreting transitive structures rather 
than to knowledge of Principle C. Research in the word-learning domain suggests that 
children utilize cues from argument structure to identify a novel verb’s possible 
interpretations. This interpretive strategy from word learning provides an alternative 
mechanism to Principle C by which children could develop a preference for disjoint 
interpretations in simple Principle C contexts. 
This chapter addresses two primary questions. First, what is the youngest point in 
development when children exhibit Principle C effects? In order to develop a complete 
understanding of the learning profile of this constraint, it is imperative to establish when 
performance is consistent with the constraint. Second, are these apparent Principle C 
effects driven by knowledge of Principle C at this earliest point in development, or might 
another mechanism be responsible for this behavior? Findings suggest that the onset of 
Principle C behavior appears sometime between 24 and 30 months, and is in place by 30 
months. 
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2.2  Introduction 
Children’s treatment of simple sentences such as (14) have been shown to mirror 
adults’ in disallowing a coreferential interpretation as young as 30 months. (Lukyanenko, 
Conroy & Lidz, 2014). 
 
(14) She’s patting Katie. 
 
Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014) interpret this behavior as suggestive that 
children have a syntactic constraint on interpretation such as Principle C, which prohibits 
coreference between an R-expression and a c-commanding pronoun. However, it is 
important to remember that observed behavior is not a direct reflection of the underlying 
knowledge driving that behavior. While this behavior pattern is consistent with children 
having adult-like knowledge of Principle C, it is equally consistent with numerous other 
potential strategies for interpretation. Recall that there are myriad alternative 
generalizations one might make which can account for most of the interpretive facts 
which Principle C correctly captures. These alternative generalizations only approximate 
the interpretive mechanism available in the adult grammar, not being able to account for 
all of the data. However given the simple single clause structures used by LCL, they are 
just as accurate at driving a disjoint interpretation as Principle C. Thus even in the 
absence of understanding the correct restrictions on reference relations which are 
employed by the adult grammar, children would have access to a wealth of mechanisms 
that could drive their early interpretations. 
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In this chapter I examine children’s early interpretations of similar sentences as 
observed in word learning tasks, and identify a pattern that has been attested in this 
literature which suggests a possible alternative mechanism by which children could 
formulate a preference for a disjoint interpretation to sentences like (14). Studies of 
syntactic bootstrapping in young children have shown that children routinely exhibit two 
critical expectations about the type of event that corresponds to a sentence given its 
structure. First, children expect the number of arguments in a clause to be matched to the 
number of participants in the event. Second, children expect that a sentence with a 
transitive frame will correspond to an event with a causal interpretation. Together, these 
two interpretive biases exhibited by young word learners could yield a disjoint 
interpretation in the case of sentences like (14) just as easily as adult grammatical 
knowledge of binding constraints. In the simple context of sentences with a X VERBs Y 
form, both of these interpretive mechanisms are equally consistent with the behavior 
observed in 30 month-olds. 
This chapter explores the nature of the underlying knowledge that yields disjoint 
interpretations of sentences like (14) at 30 months. In order to determine which 
mechanism is responsible for interpretation, I compare performance predicted by adult-
like understanding of Principle C and an alternative strategy based in biases for transitive 
syntax. Given the findings identified above, I specify two possible variants of a bias that 
relates transitive structures to two-participant events. While these mechanisms predict 
identical performance for simple sentences like (14), I utilize a linguistic context in which 
each mechanism predicts a different performance pattern in order to identify which is 
responsible for children’s behavior. I take advantage of a critical difference between 
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these interpretive mechanisms- the relevance of the type of nominal element of each 
argument. Interpretation via Binding Theory varies given the type of nominal elements in 
each argument. Unlike Binding Theory, however, a Transitivity Bias does not 
differentiate between nominal types, depending only on number of arguments. I therefore 
compare children’s interpretations for sentences like (15) and (16).  
 
(15) She’s patting Katie’s head. 
(16) She’s patting her head. 
 
Because they do not differentiate between NPs with a phrasal possessor and NPs 
with a pronominal possessor, both versions of a bias in transitive clauses predict 
interpretations to be identical across both sentence types. However, because Principle C 
is formulated with respect to the distribution of R-expressions, it applies only to (15) and 
therefore only predicts a restriction on interpretation in one case. 
In the current study I compare children’s responses to sentences like (15) and 
(16). An asymmetry in interpretations of these two sentence types is expected by 
Principle C but not by either formulation of a transitivity bias. I show that children’s 
response patterns differ to each of these sentences, suggesting that an interpretive strategy 
based in transitivity could not account for the performance exhibited here and is thus not 
likely to be the knowledge driving behavior in these contexts.  
For the remainder of this chapter, I will begin by identifying relevant observations 
from previous research on syntactic bootstrapping and describe two possible formulations 
of an interpretive strategy based on the biases identified in the literature. I will then 
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present an overview of the current study which was designed to address the contribution 
of the knowledge driving performance to simple sentences in Principle C contexts. 
 
Interpretive strategies for transitive structures 
One mechanism that has been shown to drive children’s interpretations of 
sentences similar in form to (14) has been suggested in the word learning literature. 
Given that children must form an interpretation of a sentence with a verb they have not 
heard before in order to learn the meaning of the verb, researchers have suggested that 
word learners use the argument structure to make inferences about the possible meaning; 
this process is called syntactic bootstrapping (Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Gleitman, 
1990). Syntactic bootstrapping inferences rely on the fact that there is a systematic 
relation between the types of syntactic structures a verb may be used in and the types of 
meanings a verb may have (Fisher, Gleitman & Gleitman, 1991; Jackendoff, 1983, 1990; 
Levin, 1993; Naigles, Gleitman & Gleitman, 1993, inter alia). Categories of verbs can be 
described by the number and type of participants a verb specifies. For example, verbs that 
describe one individual’s action on another are likely to appear in a transitive syntactic 
frame with two NP arguments, and unlikely to appear with a sentential complement, as 
this is not a role licensed by the verb category. We may recognize numerous systematic 
generalizations about the set of frames that a verb can occur in and the meaning of the 
verb. It is this systematic relation between the semantic type of a verb and the set of 
syntactic structures it licenses which is responsible for the intuition that the novel verb 
blick in (17) below is describes some asymmetric action of one participant on another and 
the novel verb frump in (18) is describes a mental state. 
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(17) John blicked Bill. 
(18) Mary frumped that Bill was asleep. 
 
Investigations into children’s ability to utilize syntactic bootstrapping as a 
mechanism for learning novel verbs has shown that children use syntactic information to 
classify verbs from very early ages- beginning even before their second birthday 
(Arunachalam et al., 2013; Gertner, Fisher & Eisengart, 2006; Naigles, 1990). Further, 
children have been shown to use a number of different syntactic cues as a means of 
interpreting sentences with novel verbs. By 28 months, children predict a match between 
the numbers of syntactic arguments licensed by a verb and participants involved in a 
corresponding event. They interpret novel verbs presented in transitive frames as 
referring to two-participant events and verbs presented in intransitive frames as referring 
to one-participant events (Yuan & Fisher, 2009). 21 month-olds have been shown to link 
the agent role of an event to the subject position of a sentence, reliably interpreting 
sentences with transitive frames as referring to events where the depicted agent matched 
the NP subject (Gertner, Fisher & Eisengart, 2006). As children develop, they are able to 
use the animacy of a subject as a cue to the causative nature of a novel verb. Both causal 
alternation verbs like break and unspecified object verbs like clean can appear in the 
same syntactic frames, as in (19-20); however, the verb types differ in which semantic 
role is assigned to the subject in intransitive frames.  
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(19) a. Anna broke the lamp. 
 b. It broke. 
(20) a. Anna cleaned the lamp. 
 b. Anna cleaned. 
 
By 28 months, children familiarized with novel verbs with animate intransitive 
subjects interpret the novel verb as referring to a causative event while those familiarized 
with inanimate intransitive subjects interpret the verb as referring to a non-causative 
event (Bunger & Lidz, 2004, 2006; Scott & Fisher, 2009). 
Most relevant to our concerns here are the findings which have shown that 
children form an early link between transitive syntax and two-participant events. Naigles 
(1990) pioneered the exploration of this link in 24 month-olds. After familiarization to a 
two-participant event that had both an asymmetric component (one participant acting on 
another- a duck pushing a bunny into a squatting position) and a simultaneous component 
(two participants performing the same action at the same time- the duck and bunny 
waving their arms), children were presented with two events simultaneously which 
depicted each component of the familiarization event separately. Results showed that 
children who heard a description of the familiarization event with a transitive frame as in 
(21) interpreted the novel verb as referring to the asymmetric component during test, 
while children who heard a description with an intransitive frame as in (22) interpreted 
the verb as referring to the simultaneous component.  
 
(21) Oh look! The duck is gorping the bunny! 
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(22) Oh look! The duck and the bunny are gorping! 
 
Children consistently expect a verb presented with transitive syntax to refer to a 
two-participant event. This pattern has been robustly attested throughout the verb-
learning literature (Arunachalam & Waxman, 2010; Arunachalam et al. 2012; Hirsh-
Pasek & Golinkoff, 1996; Naigles, 1990; Naigles & Kako, 1993; Noble, Rowland, & 
Pine, 2011; Yuan & Fisher, 2009; inter alia). 
The bias for children to assume a causative interpretation for transitive syntax has 
been shown to pervade cross-linguistically, even when it is not the most reliable cue to 
causativity. Lidz, Gleitman & Gleitman (2003) demonstrated that Kannada-speaking 
children utilize the cross-linguistic cue of the number of overt arguments more readily 
than a language-specific causative morpheme, even though the latter is statistically a 
better predictor of a causative interpretation. Kannada, a Dravidian language of 
southwestern India, exhibits a causative morpheme that obligatorily occurs in any 
sentence where a causal interpretation is intended, with the exception of a limited set of 
verbs that allow causativity to be expressed lexically. Lidz, Gleitman & Gleitman 
presented Kannada-speaking children aged 3;6 with known motion verbs which occurred 
in transitive frames but lacked the obligatory causative morpheme (which yields such 
sentences to be considered ungrammatical by adult speakers). They showed that children 
infer a causal interpretation for these motion verbs when presented in transitive syntax.3 
Thus cues such as the number of arguments in a structure seem to be one highly salient 
                                                
3 Note that ‘transitive syntax’ in this context refers to the number of arguments present in 
the sentence, although the verbs used in this study were intransitive verbs marked with 
causative syntax, e.g. of the form X Y fall-caus to give the interpretation that X caused Y 
to fall. 
 29 
cue to a causal interpretation to young children, even when it is to the apparent detriment 
to adult-like judgments of Principle C contexts. 
We may conclude from these findings that from a very young age, children use 
cues from verb syntax as mechanisms for interpreting sentences and relating them to 
events. Specifically, children recognize from an early age that the number of NP 
arguments (usually) matches the number of event participants. This link between 
arguments and participants biases children to treat transitive sentences of the form X 
VERBs Y as referring to a particular type of event, namely one where an agent X 
performs an (asymmetric) action on a patient Y. 
These early transitive syntax biases present a potential challenge to the 
conclusions drawn by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014). Because the simple sentences 
used in their experiment are of this same X VERBs Y form, it is possible that the 
behavioral patterns exhibited could be the result of an interpretive strategy that relies on 
these transitive syntax biases, rather than adult-like interpretation based in constraints on 
the reference relations between the R-expression and a c-commanding pronoun. That is, 
while knowledge of Principle C predicts a disjoint interpretation in Principle C contexts 
like those tested by LCL, the fact that the observed behavior is consistent with predicted 
behavior of this hypothesis is not sufficient to conclude that Principle C is the mechanism 
that drives interpretation at 30 months.  
Consider the alternative: that children have no structural constraint on 
interpretation of R-expressions. In order to choose between two possible interpretations 
of a sentence normally constrained by Principle C, children could potentially turn to a 
non-structural mechanism that restricts interpretations. The simple clause structure tested 
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by LCL is identical to that in which the transitivity bias is most useful. When children 
hear the string she’s patting Katie, they could be responding to the transitivity of the verb 
rather than the structure of the clause. If children applied the bias for interpreting 
transitive clauses here, then this string would be interpreted as corresponding to an event 
of one girl patting another. In the minimal visual context provided by LCL, this 
interpretation matches the other-directed action but not the self-directed action. So in this 
simple context, a bias to interpret transitive structures as referring to two participant 
events predicts a disjoint interpretation just as well as Principle C knowledge would. 
Given the simple linguistic context utilized by LCL, we are unable to differentiate 
between these two hypotheses, as the observed interpretations are equally consistent with 
either of these possible underlying knowledge states. 
Beyond recognizing this alternative account for this behavioral pattern, we might 
also consider that children might in fact be likely to employ biases if they lack some other 
mechanism for choosing an interpretation, such as Principle C restrictions. Children have 
been shown to rely on the clause structure, even over prior knowledge of a verb’s 
distribution, as late as 3;6-- far later than LCL’s observations of 30 month-olds (Naigles, 
Gleitman & Gleitman, 1993; Lidz, Gleitman & Gleitman 2003, 2004). Thus treating all 
transitive syntax as relating to two-participant events is an inherently strong bias, and 
definitely a live option as an interpretive strategy for LCL’s simple sentences in the 
absence of another mechanism which restricts interpretation.  
In the present study, I address the question of whether a disjoint interpretation for 
sentences in Principle C contexts could be the result of an alternative mechanism for 
interpreting transitive syntax. In order to identify which underlying mechanism drives 
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this behavior, it is necessary to identify contexts in which the two mechanisms we wish to 
compare would predict differing performance. To specify such contexts, I will first 
concretize our descriptions of the alternative mechanism we have hypothesized so that 
the predictions such a mechanism might make are clear. 
I consider two primary ways in which a bias that results in causative 
interpretations for transitive clauses might be formalized (although there could certainly 
be others). The difference between these mechanisms can be thought of as a difference in 
the precise nature of the expectation children exhibit. One possibility is that children form 
an expectation about the relation between argument structure and event structure; I will 
refer to this as the Event-level Transitivity Bias, defined in (25). Given this representation 
of the bias, children expect the number of arguments in a clause to have a 1:1 match to 
the number of participants in an event described by that clause. In the case of a transitive 
clause, this bias would cause children to predict an event depicted with two participants, 
one for each of the two syntactic arguments in the transitive clause. Another possibility is 
that children form an expectation that each NP in a clause refers to distinct entities, and 
this expectation manifests in their interpretation and mapping to event structure; I will 
refer to this as the Sentence-level Transitivity Bias, defined in (26). This specification of 
the bias results in the same predictions for a transitive clause; children would expect that 
the entity denoted by the subject and the object are distinct, and thus (assuming both 
participant roles corresponding to these arguments are represented in the event) predict an 
event with two participants.  
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(25) Event-level Transitivity Bias: the number of arguments in a clause must exactly 
match the number of unique participants in an event described by that clause. 
(26) Sentence-level Transitivity Bias: the arguments in a clause must each refer to 
distinct entities. 
 
So although each of these representations of an interpretive bias for transitive 
syntax4 manifest in the same expectation that the syntactic arguments and the event 
participants are in a 1:1 relation, they arise from different sources. The Event-level 
Transitivity Bias would arise from an assumption about how event participants relate to 
the syntactic arguments they are described by, and the Sentence-level Transitivity Bias 
would arise from an assumption about how syntactic arguments relate to each other. 
Having defined our two formulizations of a transitivity bias, we can identify how 
they might predict performance in contexts such as those tested by Lukyanenko, Conroy 
& Lidz (2014). Recall that children were presented with sentences such as (27), along 
with two scenes that corresponded to a coreferential and disjoint interpretation of the 
sentence; in this case, children saw a scene where Katie was patting herself, and one 
where Anna was patting Katie. 
 
(27) She’s patting Katie. 
                                                
4 While I have been discussing these interpretive strategies in terms of their relating to 
their use with transitive clauses, it should be evident that in fact these strategies are 
equally applicable to the interpretation of intransitive clauses, and the predicted 
performance is consistent with the findings for intransitive structures discussed above. 
The focus on transitive syntax and the application therein is simply due to this being the 
type of structure in which Principle C effects are observed, and thus where the 
comparison is relevant. 
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 Using the Event-level Transitivity Bias, children would recognize that the clause 
contains two arguments- she and Katie. The Event-level Transitivity Bias would prompt a 
search for a representation of the event which contained two corresponding participants. 
In this case, the scene where Anna and Katie are both participants in the patting event is a 
more appropriate match. The Event-level Transitivity Bias predicts a preference for the 
scene where Anna is patting Katie- the disjoint interpretation. 
 Using the Sentence-level Transitivity Bias, children would recognize that the 
clause contains two arguments- she and Katie. These two NPs are recognized as both 
referring to individuals; the Sentence-level Transitivity Bias dictates that they must refer 
to distinct individuals, so the event described must contain two distinct participants. 
Given the scenes presented, the one where Anna and Katie are both participants in the 
event is therefore the best match to the description. The Sentence-level Transitivity Bias 
predicts a preference for the scene where Anna is patting Katie- the disjoint 
interpretation. 
Now that we have specified exactly what the mechanistic process might be for 
each of these interpretive strategies, it is clear that the predicted behavior for both is 
consistent with the behavior observed by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014). Given a 
simple transitive clause such as (27), both versions of a Transitivity Bias expect a 
preference for the disjoint interpretation. In this context, a generalization which stems 
from verb transitivity accounts for the data just as well as adult grammatical knowledge. 
Thus either of these alternative interpretive strategies could be the source of a disjoint 
interpretation for these simple sentences in Principle C contexts, rather than knowledge 
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of Principle C itself. An exploration of the developmental pattern of Principle C effects 
will allow us to determine whether children can be shown to employ alternative 
generalizations before hitting on Principle C. 
As we discuss these alternative interpretive strategies, it is important to recognize 
that while these biases predict the correct interpretation a large portion of the time, they 
are by no means effective in every circumstance in leading children to an accurate 
interpretation. These alternative generalizations approximate the adult grammar, but 
cannot account for all the data that Principle C does. The bias to interpret transitive 
syntax as corresponding to an event which includes two participants is one that will lead 
to an accurate interpretation most of the time, and thus is statistically reliable enough to 
be an effective strategy employed in the context of narrowing the field for the identifying 
the meaning of a novel verb or the meaning of a clause. However, there will be a certain 
amount of the data for which this simplistic heuristic is not accurate.  
Sentences with reflexive pronouns, like (28) present a challenge, because their 
meaning is determined through coreference with another argument within the clause.  
 
(28) She’s patting herself. 
 
The coreferential interpretation intended with reflexive pronouns directly 
contradicts the Sentence-level Transitivity Bias, which predicts that all arguments will 
refer to distinct entities. Accurate interpretation of reflexive pronouns using an Event-
level Transitivity Bias would require children to recognize that a single entity could 
satisfy multiple participant roles (for example, that one individual is both the agent and 
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patient of a washing event in a sentence like the girl washed herself). However, this 
exception contradicts the cue of a 1:1 mapping between arguments in a clause and 
participants in an event (and individuals represented in a visual portrayal of that event) 
which makes this bias such a strong interpretive mechanism. Under either specification of 
a transitivity bias, reflexive pronouns are a challenge to relying only on this interpretive 
strategy.  
Additionally, to achieve the adult-like behavioral pattern observed by LCL would 
require that children recognize reflexive pronouns as the critical cue to this doubling-up 
of thematic roles. Recall that LCL found distinctly different response patterns to 
sentences like (27) and (28): children looked more to an event of another character 
patting Katie when hearing (27), and more to an event of Katie patting herself when 
hearing (28). This asymmetry in responses to two types of transitive sentences suggests 
that a transitivity bias alone could not account for these results. While some form of a 
transitivity bias could be used to arrive at the interpretation for sentences like (28), we 
cannot account for the behavior shown in interpreting reflexives without some additional 
interpretive mechanism. Children would necessarily need some understanding of 
reflexive pronouns and the fact that transitive sentences with reflexive pronouns differ in 
terms of the way in which participant roles are parceled out in the corresponding 
sentence.  
Another challenge to interpretation via these mechanisms relates to the notion of 
event participants and the mapping between arguments and participants. Research by He 
and colleagues has identified several cases where the 1:1 match between NP arguments in 
a clause and understood participants in an event does not hold. If the 1:1 match for 
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arguments and participants does not hold universally, then it becomes a less effective 
interpretive strategy. Thus exploration of these cases is critical to understanding the 
strength of these interpretive mechanisms. In one case, He et al. (2014) showed that 10 
month-old infants represent an instrument used in an opening event as a privileged event 
participant. However, most words that could be used to describe such an event (e.g. the 
girl opened the box) do not express the instrument as an argument. Another case in which 
intuitive event participants are not represented in argument structure is evidenced in 
resultative constructions of Mandarin, in which the patient of an event is not expressed 
syntactically by an argument (e.g. John wiped the cloth dirty, meaning that John wiped 
something with a cloth until the cloth became dirty). Mandarin children accurately 
represent this interpretation by 2;6 (He et al., 2014). In order to determine whether these 
cases of an apparent lack of the 1:1 match are problematic, the notion of event participant 
will need to be more carefully specified. 
 
The present study 
 The goal of the current study is to identify and test a context in which the 
transitivity biases predict differing behavior than knowledge of Principle C, so that we 
may be able to diagnose which of these sources is responsible for interpretations of 
sentences like (27) at 30 months. Separating out behavior from the source of knowledge 
driving that behavior is critical to building an accurate understanding of the 
developmental pattern of Principle C. Should the results suggest that performance is most 
consistent with utilizing this transitivity bias strategy, then it suggests necessarily that 
adequate knowledge of Principle C is either as-of-yet unavailable to children at 30 
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months or that some aspect of the task precludes their ability to effectively deploy this 
knowledge for use in interpretation.  This research seeks to identify whether children 
begin with an initial interpretive strategy besides knowledge of Principle C for computing 
reference relations. A better understanding of this developmental pattern will be one of 
the first steps to identifying the source of Principle C knowledge as a component of the 
grammar. 
Now that we have specified two mechanisms by which this transitivity bias might 
be formed, we can narrow in on contexts in which they might predict non-adult behavior. 
In order to identify the knowledge which drives interpretation of simple transitive 
sentences in Principle C contexts at 30 months, I will examine two types of transitive 
sentences, identified in (29) and (30) below.  
 
(29) She’s patting Katie’s head. 
(30) She’s patting her head. 
 
Two properties of these sentences will allow us to distinguish between the 
interpretive strategy which yields behavior in young children. First, the transitive syntax 
which drives interpretation via a transitivity bias is held constant across both sentences. 
Because of this, either specification of the transitivity bias should predict identical 
performance across both sentences. However, the arguments in the clause are 
manipulated such that Principle C applies in the case of (29) but not (30); if Principle C is 
the interpretive mechanism driving performance, it predicts a divergence in performance 
between these sentence types. Thus recognizing whether performance varies with 
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sentence type should allow us to distinguish between the use of a transitivity bias or 
Principle C as the interpretive mechanism. (Although there are certainly other alternative 
mechanisms for interpreting such sentences than simply these two options, as I will 
discuss in Chapter 3, I will consider Principle C as the primary alternative to the 
transitivity bias for simplicity here.)  
The second property of these two sentences, which will allow us to distinguish 
between predictions made by each version of the transitivity bias, is the types of entities 
that each argument refers to. The subject in both cases is the pronoun she, which can be 
taken to refer to an individual; alternatively, the object of both sentences refers to a 
component of an individual- a body part. Only one of the two formulations (the Sentence-
level Transitivity Bias) takes into account the relation that the syntactic arguments bear to 
each other. The overall behavioral response to both of these sentences should therefore 
allow us to identify whether the relation of the arguments to each other is acknowledged 
in interpretation or not, identifying which formulation of the transitivity bias drives 
interpretation (if indeed either does). I will now consider each of these interpretive 
strategies individually to lay out the predictions that it makes for each sentence.  
 Beginning with Principle C, we can identify immediately that it will not apply in 
the case of a sentence like (30), as there is no R-expression to apply to. This is consistent 
with adult’s intuition that the subject pronoun she could refer to any salient female (in the 
contexts relevant here, it could refer to the patient of the patting event, denoting a self-
directed action, or another girl, denoting an other-directed action). However, given the 
structure in (31) for the string in (29), we can see that the R-expression Katie is contained 





Given that c-command obtains, Principle C restricts she from being co-indexed 
with Katie, resulting in the constraint against a co-referential interpretation. This 
corresponds to the intuition that a sentence like (29) cannot reasonably describe a self-
directed action of Katie patting her own head. Therefore if Principle C is the knowledge 
driving children’s interpretation of such sentences at 30 months, we predict a preference 
for a disjoint interpretation of (29), and no restriction of interpretation for (30). 
The Event-level Transitivity Bias formulated in (25) above restricts 
interpretations of sentences to those where the number of arguments in the clause 
matches the number of unique participants in the described event. Given the transitive 
frame used in (29) and (30), which has a subject and an object argument, such a bias 
would predict a preference for an interpretation of a two-participant event.  
Critically, we have chosen a context where the Event-level and Sentence-level 
formations of a transitivity bias might manifest themselves differently, due to the nature 
of the relation that entities denoted by the subject and object in each sentence bear to one 
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another. Recall that the Sentence-level Transitivity Bias restricts the interpretation of the 
arguments from referring to the same entity; however, in the case of (29) and (30), the 
pronoun subject refers to an individual and the object NP refers to a body part 
(someone’s head).  Given the nature of the subject and object arguments as inherently 
referring to distinct entities, for both (29) and (30) the Sentence-level Transitivity Bias 
can be considered to be vacuously satisfied. As such, this bias makes no restriction on 
interpretation. 
With only two sentence types, we will be able to recognize a distinct behavioral 
pattern for three different interpretive strategies. A transitivity bias predicts the same 
behavior across conditions- the Event-level Transitivity Bias predicts a restriction on 
interpretation in both cases, and the Sentence-level Transitivity Bias predicts no 
restriction in either case. Alternatively, accurate application of Principle C predicts a 
restriction on interpretation only in the case where a c-commanded R-expression is 
present, in (29) but not (30).  
 
Overview of the Experiments 
The goal of the current study is to answer two questions. First, what is the earliest 
point in development at which children exhibit Principle C effects? Second, at the earliest 
stage where Principle C effects are exhibited, is performance more consistent with an 
underlying bias in interpreting transitive structures, or with accurate knowledge of 
Principle C? Experiment 1 examines 30 month-olds’ performance in a preferential 
looking paradigm which presents visual arrays corresponding to events depicting a 
coreferential and a disjoint interpretation of sentences such as (29) and (30). I compared 
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attention following the onset of the object noun phrase to determine whether children 
exhibited a preference for the disjoint interpretation in response to either sentence type. 
The results demonstrate that 30 month-old children exhibit a preference for the disjoint 
interpretation in response to sentences like (29) but not (30); this performance is expected 
only if Principle C is the source of knowledge driving interpretation, and cannot be 
accounted for by appealing to a transitivity bias. Experiment 2 was conducted as a 
follow-up on 24 month-old infants with the same procedure, in order to determine 
whether the same pattern is exhibited at an even younger age, and if so whether the 
knowledge driving that behavior is similar or could instead be attributable to a transitivity 
bias. Results show that children exhibit no systematic preference for a disjoint 
interpretation in any pattern that is predicted by our interpretive strategies. Performance 
at 24 months is therefore likely attributable to chance.  
 
2.3 Experiment 1 
2.3.1 Method 
Participants 
32 30 month-olds (16 males) with a mean age of 30;11 (range 28;3 to 31;30) were 
included in the final sample. An additional 2 children were excluded due to experimenter 
error when running subjects. Participants were recruited through the University of 
Maryland Infant and Child Studies Database from the College Park, MD area. Children 
participated on a volunteer basis, and were given a small gift for participating. All 
participants were learning English at home, and English input constituted at least 80% of 
their language input. Parents filled out a MacArthur Communicative Development 
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Inventory: Words and Sentences questionnaire (Fenson et al., 1994). Mean productive 
MCDI vocabulary was 560 words (range: 295-680 of 680 possible). 
 
Materials & Design 
Visual stimuli were identical to those utilized by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz 
(2014). All video was presented on a 51” plasma TV screen. Videos were edited together 
to create the sequence of events outlined in the Design section below. A full schematic of 
the events children see throughout the video can be found in Appendix A. Single videos 
were presented in the center of the screen and were sized between 18-20 inches wide and 
20-24 inches tall. Videos presented together in preferential looking format were always 
identical in size and scale, measuring 16 inches wide and 18 inches tall, with a 7 inch 
span between the inside edges of the two images. 
Audio stimuli was recorded in a sound-proofed room by a female native speaker 
of American English using intonation common in Child Directed Speech. Recordings 
were edited and combined with the visual stimuli.  
During the Character Introduction phase, children were presented with video clips 
(3.5-6.5 seconds each) describing and naming individually each of two characters (Katie 
and Anna), who later performed all the actions during test. In addition to occurring at the 
beginning of the sequence, several Character Introduction clips were placed throughout 
the video to provide filler material between test trials as well as to further remind children 
of the character names. Following the Character Introduction phase, children received six 
Face Check sequences (6.5 seconds each), which presented these two characters on 
opposite sides of the screen in a preferential looking paradigm, along with a sentence 
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asking them to find one of the characters (e.g. Where’s Katie? Do you see Katie?). These 
Face Check sequences ensured that the children were adequately mapping the names they 
heard in the introductory clips to the accompanying faces and could distinguish the two 
characters from one another5. Additionally, these Face Checks also served to prepare 
children for the test trials, where they would be required to preferentially attend to one of 
two images on the screen. Target character and the side of the screen on which the target 
character appeared were counterbalanced across Face Check trials. Order of Face Check 
trials was counterbalanced across subjects.  
Figure 2 presents a schematic of a typical Familiarization and Test phase 
sequence. Events depicted in familiarization and test trials were all continuous actions, 
performed with both characters on the screen (even if only one character was a 
participant in the event). Self-directed actions consisted of scenes with one character 
performing an action on herself (e.g. Figure 2 leftmost image, Katie patting her own 
head), with the other character present but not interacting. Other-directed actions 
consisted of similar scenes, with one character performing the same action on the other 
character (e.g. Figure 2 center image, Anna patting Katie’s head).  
 
                                                
5 Although note that, strictly speaking, given the specific types of sentences used in the 
test phase and the visual context in which they were presented, knowing the characters’ 
names was not crucial to forming an interpretation. Thus these ‘face checks’ primarily 
served to facilitate processing of subsequent sentences. 
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Figure 2 Schematic of Familiarization and Test phase sequence in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Immediately preceding each test trial, children were presented with a 
Familiarization phase. In two video clips (6 seconds each), the test events were presented 
one at a time, with audio which described the action and the patient of the event, but 
which did not uniquely identify the agent of the described event, as in (32) below. This 
was to allow either the self-directed or the other-directed events to be a possible 
representation of the test sentences. Order in which the Familiarization events appeared 
was counterbalanced across trials. 
 
(32) Wow! There’s Anna and Katie! It looks like Katie’s head is being patted! 
 Oh look! There they are again! Katie’s head is being patted again! 
 
The Test phase (12 seconds each) immediately followed with the same two event 
videos as shown in the Familiarization phase presented side by side simultaneously (e.g. 
Figure 2, rightmost image). An attention-getting filler phrase (Oh look- now they’re 
different!) introduced the events. Test audio consisted of two instances of the test 





(33) She’s patting Katie’s head! Find the one where she’s patting Katie’s head. 
(34)  She’s patting her head! Find the one where she’s patting her head. 
 
Children were presented with a total of 8 test trials in a between subjects design: 
half of the subjects heard NAME condition sentences as in (33) for all trials, and half heard 
all PRONOUN condition sentences as in (34)6. Trial order and the side of the screen each 
video appeared on was counterbalanced across subjects. 
For each iteration of the test sentence, the audio was aligned by the onset of the 
object NP for later analysis, as this is the critical point when an interpretation strategy 
based in Principle C could begin to identify the intended interpretation of the sentence. 
This resulted in a 2 (Condition) X 2 (Window) design; the dependent measure was the 
proportion looking time attending to the other-directed action. 
In addition to the phases described above, children also saw 4 filler video clips (7 
seconds each) spaced throughout the video. These clips depicted children’s toys 
presented with classical music, and were used to attract children’s attention to the screen, 
as well as to provide a ‘mental break’ between the more challenging test trial sequences. 
For all video clips, there was 1 second black screen between each clip, and the first audio 
clip began 20 frames (.67 seconds) after the visual stimuli appeared on the screen. 
 
                                                
6 This change from the within-subjects design used by LCL was made after researchers 
found children to respond more consistently in an IPLP task probing syntactic 
competence when they are presented with the same structure across trials than when 
presented with multiple sentence types (Gagliardi, Mease & Lidz, submitted). 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested individually, sitting either in a high chair or on their 
parent’s lap in front of the television screen. A camera mounted above the television 
recorded participants’ eye movements during the videos, allowing more precise offline 
coding. Data was coded frame-by-frame using SuperCoder software (Hollich, 2005), 
indicating whether children were attending to the left or right side of the screen, or not at 
all. Coders were trained researchers who were blind to condition and could not hear the 
auditory stimuli. 10% of the data was coded by both coders to ensure accuracy and 
reliability across coders; inter-coder reliability was high: across three coders, percent 
agreement was above 90% in all cases, with Cohen’s kappa scores of .85 and above. 
 
Analyses & Predictions 
Performance is measured over the first 3000 ms following the disambiguation 
point, when children’s behavior is most indicative of response to the linguistic stimulus 
(Fernald et al., 2008). As children heard two iterations of the test sentence, we form two 
corresponding windows of analysis for 3000 ms after the disambiguation point in each 
iteration of the sentence. In all cases, the disambiguation point has been shifted forward 
in time 300 ms, to account for time it takes young children to plan an eye saccade, 
ensuring that all responses are responses to the target audio (Fernald et al., 2008). Trials 
where children were attending to the screen less than 60% of the time were eliminated 
from the analysis. To analyze the data I used empirical logit mixed effects models, fit in 
R (R Core Team, 2013) with the lmer() function of the lme4 library (Bates, Maechler & 
Bolker, 2013). The dependent measure in the models was the empirical logit transform of 
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the proportion of time spent looking to the other-directed action. Variables included in 
the analysis were fixed effects of participants’ age and MCDI vocabulary score, as well 
as fixed effects of window (first or second iteration of the test sentence) and condition 
(NAME condition as in (29) and PRONOUN condition as in (30)), and all interactions, and 
random effects for participant and item. 
As noted above, the three different interpretive strategies identified here predict 
three distinct response patterns. Knowledge of Principle C predicts a preference for the 
other-directed action in response to (29) but no preference for either image in response to 
(30). This would surface as a main effect of condition. Both interpretive strategies based 
in a transitivity bias predict the behavior to be stable across condition, which would show 
as a lack of a main effect of condition. The Event-level Transitivity Bias predicts a 
preference for the other-directed action in both cases, corresponding performance 
significantly higher than chance in both conditions. The Sentence-level Transitivity Bias 
predicts no preference for either event in both cases, corresponding to chance 
performance in both conditions. 
 
2.3.2 Results 
While the preliminary model included participants’ age and MCDI vocabulary 
score, I compared this model to those where these terms were absent in order to 
determine whether they contributed to model fit. Model fit was not significantly 
improved by including either Age (#2(8)=9.83, p=.277) or MCDI Vocabulary score 
(#2(8)=13.79, p=.087), and these terms were subsequently dropped from the remainders 
of the analyses. 
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 Figure 3 shows the mean proportion of looking to the other-directed event across 
the timecourse of the trial. Windows of analysis are identified by the outlined boxes 
super-imposed over the graph. Prior to hearing the disambiguating object NP, children do 
not look preferentially to either event. However, during the critical windows following 
the object NP, children looked significantly more to the other-directed action in the NAME 
condition, while showing no preference in the PRONOUN condition. This performance is 
maintained across both windows of analysis. There is a significant main effect of 
Condition (#2(1)=4.92, p<0.05), no effect of Window (#2(1)=0.232, p=0.63), and no 
interaction (#2(1)=0.094, p=0.759). 
 
Figure 3 Looking behavior in Experiment 1. Outlined boxes represent critical windows 
for analysis (3000ms following the onset of the disambiguating object NP in two 
iterations of the test sentence). 
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
 The results from Experiment 1 showed that at 30 months, children’s 
interpretations of sentences like (29) and (30), repeated here as (35) and (36), show a 






























corresponding to a disjoint interpretation (an other-directed action), while they have no 
preference for interpreting (36) as disjoint or coreferential. This behavioral pattern cannot 
be accounted for with either formulations of a transitivity bias. 
 
(35) She’s patting Katie’s head. 
(36) She’s patting her head. 
 
One additional finding worth consideration at this time is the non-effect of 
Vocabulary size. In the comparison of model fit, MCDI vocabulary size was shown not to 
improve model fit, meaning that it did not contribute to explaining variation between 
subjects in this task. Interestingly, this is a non-replication of the findings of LCL, who 
demonstrated that children with higher vocabulary scores showed stronger preferences 
for a disjoint interpretation in Principle C contexts. The results presented here, however, 
show no significant mediation by vocabulary size. This divergence from the findings of 
LCL could stem from several possible factors. First, it could be the result of less variation 
in Vocabulary size in our sample than in LCL’s. The mean Vocabulary score in our 
sample was 560 (of 680) compared to 446 as reported by LCL. One may note that this 
age range is at (and extending beyond) the upper limit of the age range on which the 
MCDI is used. In effect, this measure may be hitting a ceiling. It is possible that we may 
see an effect of vocabulary size if we had another way to measure it; something more 
extensive than the MCDI. Future research could benefit from further exploration of 
vocabulary measures and their connection to grammatical competence. 
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Alternatively, our findings may differ from LCL with respect to a Vocabulary 
effect due to methodological differences, in two ways. It could be that the Vocabulary 
effect observed by LCL was driven by their analysis of the data over a large time 
window; recall that Lukyanenko et al. compared performance before and after hearing the 
first repetition of the test sentence. The post-utterance window was 9 seconds long. It 
may be that a similar pattern is present in their data, and simply gets washed out in such a 
large window of time. That is, it could be that even low vocabulary children could be 
shown to succeed on LCL’s task in a smaller time window but this effect is masked over 
the long window of analysis. This non-replication could also arise due to differing subject 
designs: while LCL used a within-subjects design, meaning that children heard four trials 
with each sentence type, I used a between-subjects design, where children heard eight 
trials all with one sentence type. Having to interpret multiple sentence types in LCL’s 
could have obscured some children’s ability to demonstrate their knowledge, resulting in 
a difference in performance across Vocabulary score. I further explore vocabulary size 
and its possible effects on the acquisition of Principle C in Chapter 4. 
 Experiment 1 does replicate LCL’s primary finding of observing so-called 
‘Principle C effects’- preferences for a disjoint interpretation in Principle C contexts- at 
30 months. Further, comparison to similar transitive sentences which are not subject to 
Principle C showed that this behavior is in fact more consistent with interpretation via 
Principle C than interpretation via a bias found in interpreting transitive syntax. However, 
the question remains as to whether this is the youngest age at which this restriction on 
interpretations might be observed. In Experiment 2, I explore children’s performance at 
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24 months in the same contexts as that of Experiment 1 in order to identify the lower 
bound on observable Principle C effect behavior. 
 
2.4 Experiment 2 
To my knowledge, as of this writing, the findings of LCL and those presented in 
this dissertation provide the only data points for comprehension in Principle C contexts at 
30 months, and no known studies have probed any younger. LCL argued that low-
vocabulary children in their sample failing to exhibit a restriction in interpretation in 
these contexts was potentially suggestive that this age marks the onset of Principle C 
effect behavior. However, given that we find no mediation of vocabulary size in 
Experiment 1 (a non-replication of LCL’s result), I consider here the possibility that 
Principle C effects could be observed even younger than 30 months. 
How likely are children at 24 months to be able to perform in this task? There are 
a few aspects of the task that we may consider here. As a method of analyzing children’s 
interpretations, preferential looking is used as young as 2 months of age (Kuhl & 
Meltzoff, 1982; Baier, Idsardi & Lidz, 2007). In terms of the syntax of the test sentences, 
children have been shown to recognize sentences with similar transitive structures in 
preferential looking contexts as early as 21 months (Gertner, Fisher & Eisengart, 2006). 
Possessive inflection, relevant for comprehension of the possessive object NP, is among 
the earliest morphemes in children’s acquisition (Brown, 1973), and while this inflection 
does not emerge in children’s speech until around 3 years old, children as young as 2 
years have been reported to produce possessive structures with the inflectional 
morphology omitted, as in (37) (Radford & Galasso, 1998).  
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(37) a. “That Mommy car.” 
 b. “It Daddy bike.” 
 
As comprehension has been robustly shown to outstrip production in language 
acquisition, we can be reasonably certain that possessive nominal structures should pose 
no problem for children’s comprehension by 24 months. 
Although it seems likely that children will be able to form an interpretation of our 
test sentences by 24 months, how likely is it that children will exhibit a restriction on 
interpretation at this age? Given that transitive syntax is a strong cue to interpretation in 
word-learning contexts well earlier than the second birthday (as young as 19 months), it 
is also likely that children have at least one possible mechanism for narrowing 
interpretations in this context; even if this age precedes the onset of Principle C, we could 
still find evidence of Principle C effects driven by a transitivity bias. While Experiment 1 
demonstrated that behavior at 30 months is not consistent with a transitivity bias 
interpretive strategy, this does not preclude the possibility that such a strategy could be 
the primary mechanism for interpretation at an earlier stage in development. Experiment 




48 24 month-olds (24 males) with a mean age of 24;10 (range 23;3 to 24;24) were 
included in the final sample. An additional 2 children were excluded due to equipment 
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As in Experiment 1, Age and MCDI Vocabulary score were included in a 
preliminary model, then this model was compared to those where these terms were absent 
in order to determine whether they contributed to model fit. Model fit was not 
significantly improved by including either Age (#2(8)=2.69, p=.953) or MCDI 
Vocabulary score (#2(8)=11.17, p=.192), and these terms were subsequently dropped 
from the remainders of the analyses. 
Figure 4 shows the mean proportion of looking to the other-directed event across 
the timecourse of the trial. Windows of analysis are identified by the outlined boxes 
super-imposed over the graph. Children do not have a significant preference for either 
event prior to hearing the disambiguating object NP; however, unlike 30 month-olds, the 
disambiguating point does not provoke a strong preference for either interpretation in 
either condition. Looking behavior oscillates near chance throughout the trial, with a 
slight increase in attention to the self-directed event preceding the first window of 
analysis, and a preference for the other-directed event during the first window. This 
preference for the other-directed event in the first window is realized as a significant 
main effect of Window (#2(1)=6.779, p<0.01), no effect of Condition (#2(1)=0.017, 
p=0.898), and no interaction (#2(1)=1.768, p=0.184). Planned comparisons reveal that 
looking in the pronoun condition is significantly different than chance (t(22)=3.392, 
p<0.01); children prefer the other-directed action for sentences like (23) upon first 
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hearing this sentence. No other looking patterns in the critical windows differ 
significantly from chance. 
 
 
Figure 4 Looking behavior in Experiment 2. Outlined boxes represent critical windows 
for analysis (3000ms following the onset of the disambiguating object NP in two 
iterations of the test sentence). 
 
2.4.3 Discussion 
Results from Experiment 2 suggest that children do not exhibit classic Principle C 
effects at 24 months. While children do show a preference for the other-directed action, 
corresponding to a disjoint interpretation, following the first test sentence iteration, this 
effect is carried by performance in the PRONOUN condition. Performance in the NAME 
condition, where Principle C effects would be most expected, is not different from 
chance. This behavioral pattern is not predicted by Principle C, nor either of the versions 
of a transitivity bias specified here. Upon examining the graph more closely, it is evident 

























Initial Results at 24 Months (n=48)
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arises well before the critical window (approximately near the beginning of the first test 
sentence). Recall that this window begins at the onset of the object NP, i.e. the point at 
which the sentence is disambiguated between two possible interpretations. Thus it seems 
like the sole effect observed here cannot be directly attributed as a response to the 
linguistic stimuli of the task. From this result we can conclude that children’s 
performance is not consistent with either knowledge of Principle C or with a strong 
preference driven by a bias in transitive structures. 
 
2.5  General Discussion 
 Two experiments demonstrated that the earliest restrictions on interpretations in 
Principle C contexts are in place by 30 months, and further that these restrictions are 
more consistent with accurate knowledge of Principle C than with an interpretive bias in 
transitive clauses. In fact, barring the unlikely possibility that children rapidly move 
through an intermediary stage in the three months between the 23-25 month and the 28-
32 month ranges tested in these two experiments, it seems to be the case that children 
never utilize this interpretive strategy to resolve reference, although it is robustly utilized 
in verb learning contexts.. 
We might consider this possibly surprising non-finding at this point: for all the 
robust findings on the bias to treat transitive structures as involving two participants, why 
don’t we find evidence of this? Given the strength of transitive syntax as a cue to 
particular meanings, as evidenced by myriad syntactic bootstrapping studies, one might 
be surprised that such cues do not seem to be used here. If these biases are so pervasive, 
why are they not shown to be utilized in our task?  
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For the case of 30 month-olds, it seems likely that children have access to a better 
interpretive mechanism. One possibility is that by this age children have successfully 
acquired and put into use accurate knowledge of Principle C. However, this is not the 
only possibility; in Chapter 3, we will discuss another alternative interpretive strategy 
that is consistent with all behavior observed thus far.  
Irrespective of what interpretive mechanism 30 month-olds are using, they are 
likely not using a bias based in verb transitivity because although they share the same 
syntax, this is a different type of interpretive uncertainty than what children face in 
bootstrapping tasks. In tasks where transitivity has been shown to be a successful cue to 
interpretation, such as bootstrapping tasks, the uncertainty children face is in the 
interpretation of the verb. In Principle C contexts, however, the uncertainty is related to 
the interpretation of reference relations- an entirely different task. In this context, 
transitivity is not a reliable cue to interpretation and thus children are unlikely to 
implement this interpretive strategy. This reasoning could also account for the behavioral 
pattern at 24 months, where performance is largely chance-like. Even in the absence of 
another consistent strategy, children do not implement a transitivity bias because they 
recognize that it is not the applicable context. 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
 Children have been shown to utilize argument structure of sentences as a strong 
cue to the types of interpretations those sentences will have. These findings suggest a 
possible mechanism for interpretation that children could use to interpret simple 
transitive sentences in Principle C contexts. In simple sentences and contexts like those 
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tested by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014), such a transitivity bias predicts the same 
behavior as knowledge of Principle C.  
In this chapter, I sought to answer two questions. First, what is the lower bound 
for observing Principle C effects in children? Is 30 months really the onset of Principle C 
behavior? Second, at the youngest age at which children exhibit Principle C effects, what 
underlying knowledge drives this behavior? Is performance more consistent with 
knowledge of Principle C, or a bias to treat transitive structures as always involving two 
participants?  
In Experiment 2, I demonstrated that 24 month-olds do not consistently exhibit Principle 
C effects- behavior in Principle C contexts is not different from chance. This finding 
serves to answer our first question: the onset of behavior consistent with knowledge of 
Principle C occurs between 24 and 30 months of age. In Experiment 1, I found that across 
multiple contexts, 30 month-olds interpretations are more consistent with knowledge of 
Principle C than with a transitivity bias. Neither formulation of a bias in interpreting 
transitive structures is able to account for children’s responses to all sentence types. 
Together, these results suggest that even at the earliest point when restricted 
interpretations in Principle C contexts are observed, children never utilize a heuristic 
based in transitivity to interpret sentences in Principle C contexts. 
 58 
3 A Bias Against Backward Anaphora is Not Sufficient 
 
 
3.1  Outline 
Chapter 3 examines the possibility that children’s early interpretations in Principle 
C contexts could be attributed to an interpretive strategy which favors a disjoint 
interpretation in all cases of backward anaphoric structures, rather than relying on 
structural knowledge of Principle C. Research in children’s early interpretation of 
sentences has suggested that children utilize linear order as part of a reduced 
representation before they are able to access a full structural representation. This suggests 
that children could potentially hypothesize an initial grammatical rule to account for the 
pattern of reference relations by appealing to linear order. Research in child and adult 
interpretations of backward anaphoric structures have also shown them to be subject to 
discourse conditions. When the appropriate context is not met, a disjoint interpretation is 
preferred for all cases regardless of structure. This suggests children could utilize a 
simple general preference for disjoint interpretations in all cases of backward anaphora. 
Both of these possible linear mechanisms provide an alternative to Principle C by which 
children could show a preference for disjoint interpretations in simple Principle C 
contexts. 
This chapter provides a novel exploration of 30 month-olds interpretations of 
backward anaphoric structures where a pronoun precedes but does not c-command an R-
expression, and thus a coreferential interpretation is grammatically available. Comparison 
to interpretations of minimally different sentences which are constrained by Principle C 
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effects shows that all backward anaphoric interpretations are not blocked at 30 months. 
Findings suggest that an overall bias for disjoint interpretation of backward anaphoric 
structures cannot account for interpretations across these contexts. 
 
3.2  Introduction 
Children have been shown to interpret simple sentences like (38) similarly to 
adults- disallowing a coreferential interpretation- by 30 months of age.  
 
(38) She’s patting Katie. 
 
While Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014) suggest that this result is likely 
indicative of children having in place a structural constraint against coreference in these 
cases, it is important to remember that this is not the only explanation for such behavior. 
Although this behavior pattern is consistent with children using knowledge of Principle C 
to form interpretations, this alone is not sufficient to attribute knowledge of Principle C. 
A preference for a disjoint interpretation for sentences like (38) is equally consistent with 
numerous other mechanisms that could drive identical behavior. 
 Chapter 2 examined one such potential mechanism- a bias to interpret arguments 
in transitive clauses as disjoint in reference. The results of Experiment 1 suggested that 
such a bias could not account for behavior across all contexts of 30 month-olds’ 
performance. This chapter examines another possible interpretive strategy: a bias to 
interpret all backward anaphoric structures as disjoint in reference. In this chapter I 
review evidence from child and adult interpretations of backward anaphoric structures, 
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showing that an overall bias is exhibited even in ambiguous contexts, where a 
coreferential interpretation is grammatically available. In simple single-clause structures 
such as those tested by LCL, such a bias predicts the same performance as knowledge of 
Principle C. These findings suggest that a bias for backward anaphoric structures could 
account for the preference for a disjoint interpretation for (38) exhibited by 30 month-
olds. 
 The research presented here seeks to examine the nature of the knowledge state 
driving interpretations of sentences like (38) at 30 months. I compare performance 
predicted by adult-like grammatical knowledge of Principle C and an alternative bias to 
interpret all backward anaphoric sentences as disjoint. These two possible mechanisms 
for interpretation predict identical performance for simple sentences like (38), used in 
LCL’s task and Experiments 1 and 2. Here, I utilize the context of backward anaphoric 
structures where c-command relations between a pronoun and R-expression vary in order 
to identify which mechanism is responsible for children’s interpretations. I examine 
interpretations of two backward anaphoric structures, identified in sentences (39) and 
(40) below. Because the linear order of the nominal elements is maintained in both 
sentences, a bias to interpret all backward anaphoric sentences as disjoint in reference 
predicts the same performance for each sentence. However, because binding obtains in 
(39) but not (40), Principle C predicts a restriction on interpretation only in one case. 
 
(39) She’s painting the house that’s in Katie’s lap. 
(40) The house that she’s painting is in Katie’s lap. 
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 In the current study I compare children’s responses to sentences like (39) and 
(40). An asymmetry in the available interpretations is expected by Principle C but not by 
a broader bias applying to all backward anaphoric sentences. I show that children’s 
response patterns to such sentence types differ; this finding suggests that a broad bias for 
all backward anaphoric sentences cannot account for children’s behavior, and is thus not 
likely to be the mechanism driving children’s interpretations. In the remainder of this 
introduction, I recognize findings suggesting that linear order of string elements is a 
pervasive cue that children recognize from early ages, and identify observations from 
child and adult research on backward anaphoric structures suggesting an overall bias for 
interpretation exists. I then present an overview of the current study which was designed 
to test 30 month-olds’ interpretations in similar backward anaphoric contexts. 
 
Linear order and directionality effects in early interpretation 
 Linear order of elements in a string is an inherently prevalent source of 
information; the modality (or modalities, when considering signed language systems) in 
which language is expressed requires that only one unit can be expressed at a time, and 
thus linguistic elements are inherently ordered in time with respect to one another.  
Knowledge of word order and its effect on the meaning of sentences has been 
shown to be present in children as young as 16 months. Golinkoff et al. (1987) presented 
children with images of events matching the scenes described in (41) and (42). They 
found that by 16 months, children attend more to the event that matches the description 
they hear, suggesting that they recognize the links between word order and thematic 
interpretations in their language. 
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(41) Cookie Monster is tickling Big Bird. 
(42) Big Bird is tickling Cookie Monster. 
  
Linear order of words in a string is clearly a cue that children have access to from 
very early stages of development. Further, it seems that children may rely on linear order 
for interpretation before they have access to accurate representations of the structure of 
sentences. Gertner & Fisher (2012) found that 21 month-olds begin to interpret sentences 
by assigning thematic roles based on the order in which nouns appear. They presented 
children with conjoined-subject intransitive sentences such as (43), along with events that 
depicted an asymmetric action (e.g. boy spinning girl in a chair) and a simultaneous 
action (e.g. boy and girl both waving wands).  
 
(43) The boy and the girl are gorping! 
  
Recall from our discussion in Chapter 2 that by 24 months, children interpret such 
sentences as reflecting a simultaneous action (Naigles, 1990). Gertner & Fisher, however, 
found that at 21 months, children interpret sentences like (43) as corresponding to an 
asymmetric action. Their results suggest that children initially rely on partial 
representations utilizing the number and order of nouns to assign thematic roles. Thus it 
seems that linear order is a potential source of interpretation, and could be used in 
children’s early interpretation of reference relations. 
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Many of the cases where a pronoun precedes its potential antecedent are also 
those where it c-commands it and Principle C applies to restrict interpretation. Because 
we know that children’s initial interpretations rely on linear order, it is possible that 
children could develop an initial strategy for interpreting reference relations that relies on 
linear order rather than structural restrictions like Principle C. While this bias only 
approximates Principle C and cannot account for interpretations in all cases, however 
linear order and c-command in large part co-occur. Thus one possibility for attributing 
early Principle C effects to a linear order interpretive strategy is that children have 
encoded a grammatical rule based in linear order as an initial generalization before 
identifying the correct rule. 
A second possibility as a way that linear order could affect interpretation in 30 
month-olds is suggested by the findings that backward anaphoric structures are subject to 
strict discourse conditions. Consider the set of sentences in (44-47).  
 
(44) While Katie1 was in the kitchen, she1/2 baked cookies. 
(45) While she1/2 was in the kitchen, Katie2 baked cookies. 
(46) Katie1 baked cookies while she1/2 was in the kitchen. 
(47) She1/*2 baked cookies while Katie2 was in the kitchen. 
 
The pronoun she can derive its reference either anaphorically by relating to 
another nominal element, or deictically by referring directly to an individual. In sentences 
such as (44) and (45), the pronoun follows the R-expression antecedent Katie; this 
directional relation is referred to as anaphoric or forward anaphoric. In sentences such as 
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(46) and (47), the pronoun precedes the R-expression; this relation is referred to as 
cataphoric or backward anaphoric. Binding constraints only place a restriction on 
interpretation in the case of (47), where she c-commands the R-expression Katie and thus 
Principle C disallows a coreferential interpretation.  
By age 3, children have been shown to accept coreferential interpretations for 
backward anaphoric sentences like (46) significantly more often than they do for 
sentences like (47), where a coreferential interpretation would be grammatically 
unavailable for adults. Many studies additionally report a preference for a disjoint 
interpretation for all cases of backward anaphora, including those where a coreferential 
interpretation is grammatically available (see Lust, Eisele & Masuka 1993 for a review of 
these findings). However, this effect may be the result of the discourse conditions for a 
backward anaphoric (i.e. coreferential) interpretation not being appropriately satisfied in 
these tasks. For example, Lust, Loveland & Kornet (1980) explored children’s 
comprehension of sentences similar to (45), and report an average of 29% coreferential 
interpretations. However, when they included a pragmatic lead which introduces the 
potential antecedent as a discourse element, coreferential interpretations jumped to 59%. 
Studies that have reported similarly low rates of coreferential interpretations (e.g. Eisele 
(1988); Eisele & Lust (1990)) have not included such introductory sentences. This failure 
to satisfy discourse conditions could explain the preference for disjoint interpretations 
over coreferential interpretations. 
This preference for a disjoint interpretation in backward anaphoric sentences 
where coreference is grammatically available has also been attested in adults. Gordon & 
Hendrick (1997) showed that adults reject a coreferential interpretation for single clause 
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backward anaphoric sentences like both (48) and (49), irrespective of which 
interpretation(s) the syntax makes available. Again, however, this effect was only 
pervasive when no context was supplied; availability of the coreferential interpretation 
was shown for (48) to increase when context was provided.  
 
(48) His roommates met John at the restaurant. 
(49) He met John’s roommates at the restaurant. 
 
 These findings suggest another way in which linear order could affect 
interpretation in young children. Rather than a grammatically specified rule as an initial 
interpretive mechanism, children could alternatively have a preference for disjoint 
interpretations which is derived from the same source that makes backward anaphoric 
sentences subject to strict discourse contexts in adults.  
 There are therefore at least two ways in which linear order could be used as a cue 
for interpretation instead of knowledge of Principle C. However, both a grammatical rule 
encoded as an initial interpretive strategy and a pragmatically-induced bias predict 
exactly the same behavior: preference for a disjoint interpretation whenever a pronoun 
precedes an R-expression. Because we cannot distinguish between behavior caused by 
one or the other, I will collapse across these possibilities for the remainder of this 
discussion and refer to the effects of both as coming from a ‘Linear Bias’ (defined 
below). 
The Linear Bias poses a potential challenge for the conclusion that LCL’s 
findings are indicative of knowledge of Principle C at 30 months. Because the simple 
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sentences tested by LCL are exactly those in which a bias against backward anaphora 
would apply, it is possible that the behavior patterns exhibited by 30 month-olds could be 
a more general response to backward anaphoric sentences, rather than adult-like 
interpretation based in structural constraints on reference relations.  
 
The present study 
 In the present study, I address the question of whether a disjoint interpretation for 
sentences in Principle C contexts could be the result of an alternative mechanism for 
interpreting all backward anaphoric structures as disjoint in reference. We can formalize 
such a bias by appealing to linear order between an R-expression and other nominal 
elements within a sentence, as in (50): 
 
(50) Linear Bias: a pronoun cannot precede its antecedent. 
 
Because linear order and c-command relations are confounded in English, this 
Linear Bias will predict the same disjoint interpretation as adult grammatical knowledge 
would in all cases where Principle C applies, including sentences like (38) tested by LCL. 
In order to identify the mechanism that drives interpretation at 30 months, it is necessary 
to identify contexts in which these mechanisms would predict differing performance. The 
critical distinction between a Linear Bias and knowledge of Principle C are cases where a 
pronoun linearly precedes but does not c-command an R-expression; in such cases, 
Principle C does not apply and thus does not restrict interpretation. However, because 
children and adults have been shown to exhibit a preference for disjoint interpretations 
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even in these cases where the coreferential interpretation is grammatically available, it 
will be necessary to compare performance across minimally different sentence types, 
where c-command does and does not obtain, to determine whether performance varies 
with binding conditions. While Principle C predicts a stronger preference for the disjoint 
interpretation in cases where c-command of a pronoun over an R-expression obtains, a 
Linear Bias predicts performance to be uniform across all cases of backward anaphoric 
structures.  
Adjunct clauses such as those in (44-47) above can be used to vary c-command 
relations while maintaining linear order between nominal expressions, and indeed these 
structures are commonly used to test the interpretations available to children (and adults), 
with methodologies such as the Truth Value Judgment Task. Experiments employing this 
methodology typically present a subject with a short story, following which a description 
of the story is given; the subject’s task is to identify whether the sentence is an accurate 
description of the story. To test whether the coreferential interpretation is made available 
by the grammar for a given structure, the disjoint interpretation of the test sentence is 
made false in the context of the story, and the coreferential interpretation is true by the 
context. The TVJT design is based on the claim that if all else is equal, subjects will obey 
the ‘Principle of Charity,’ assenting to the truth of a sentence if they can, that is, if any 
possible interpretation is both available by the grammar and true by the context7 (Crain & 
Thornton, 1998). Thus if children judge the target sentence to be false, this can be taken 
                                                
7 However, rarely is all else equal- the preference to respond to an interpretation made 
true by the context is shown to have been overridden in a number of contexts (Gualmini 
et al., 2008; Conroy et al., 2009; Viau, Lidz & Musolino, 2010; Syrett & Lidz, 2011). 
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as evidence that the interpretation which is true by the context (the coreferential 
interpretation) is not available in the child’s grammar.  
While adjunct structures are thus ideal for testing the application of constraints 
with such TVJ tasks, this methodology is not effective for testing children at 30 months, 
due to the extra-linguistic requirements of such a task. In order to respond accurately 
during test, children must remember a series of actions which took place in the story, 
which may be beyond the memory and recall capabilities of children this young. 
Additionally, the requirement to make an overt choice or response can be cognitively 
demanding and has the potential to obscure underlying understanding (Hamburger & 
Crain, 1982). Because of the complexity of the scenes that would be required to represent 
the interpretations of such sentences, adjunct clauses are less than ideal for testing in a 
Preferential Looking paradigm.  
Take, for example, the set of events which would be needed to represent the 
coreferential and the disjoint interpretation of a sentence such as (51) or (52). Each event 
would require two characters- Susan and another girl- and two actions- eating breakfast 
and reading a book. While Susan reads a book in both scenes, in one event, the breakfast-
eating would be done by Susan, and in the other it would be done by the second girl. 
Such scenes would inherently need a large amount of information to be conveyed in order 
to appropriately represent the sentence interpretations. Representing this all in two 
simultaneously-presented scenes could easily be too overwhelming for 30 month-olds to 
be able to appropriately map their interpretation of the sentence to the visual scene.  
 
(51) While she ate breakfast, Susan read a book. 
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(52) She ate breakfast while Susan read a book. 
 
 Another structure that allows for the manipulation of c-command relations is 
possessive structures, as in (48) and (49) above. However, these structures are not ideal 
for our purposes for two reasons. First, single-clause backward anaphoric structures such 
as these are those that have been shown to be most affected by discourse context; these 
cases require very specific discourse conditions to be licensed. Additionally, they have 
the challenge of not being representable across the sentence types by the same two 
events. Consider (53) and (54) below; the two potential interpretations of (53) correspond 
to events where Susan’s mother or another girl’s mother hugs Susan. The potential 
interpretations of (54) correspond to events where Susan or another girl hug Susan’s 
mother. 
 
(53) Her mother hugged Susan. 
(54) She hugged Susan’s mother. 
 
An ideal case for comparing children’s interpretations in backward anaphoric 
sentences within a Preferential Looking Paradigm would contain a minimal number of 
actions to be represented in the visual scenes, as well as allowing comparison of 
interpretations of the two sentence types to be diagnosed with the same set of two events. 
In the present study, I compare performance to sentences with relative clauses, as in (55) 
and (56) below.  
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(55) She’s painting the house that’s in Katie’s lap. 
(56)  The house that she’s painting is in Katie’s lap. 
 
In requiring only one action to be performed and in allowing the disjoint and 
coreferential interpretations of each sentence type to be represented by the same events, 
these structures present an ideal case for testing in a Preferential Looking Paradigm. 
Like adjuncts and possessive structures, these relative clause structures also allow 
the manipulation of c-command relations while maintaining linear order. Because only 
one of the two interpretive mechanisms under consideration here takes c-command 
relations into account, the response pattern across these two types of sentences should 
allow us to identify whether c-command relations affect interpretation, identifying which 
of these mechanisms is driving interpretation. I will now consider each of these 
interpretive strategies individually to lay out the predictions that it makes for each 
sentence.  
Given the structure in (57) for the string in (55), the R-expression Katie is 
contained within the c-command domain of the pronoun she. As such, Principle C 
disallows co-indexing of she and Katie, blocking the coreferential interpretation for (55). 
However, given the structure in (58) for (56), c-command does not obtain in the same 
manner. Because the pronoun she is embedded within the relative clause, its c-command 
domain is limited to [I’ is painting]. Thus even if she and Katie are co-indexed, no 
binding relation could hold between them and Principle C would be satisfied. (56) can 
have either a coreferential or a disjoint interpretation. Therefore if Principle C is the 
mechanism which drives children’s interpretation of such sentences at 30 months, we 
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predict a preference for a disjoint interpretation of (55), and no grammatical restriction of 
interpretation for (56). However, recall that previous research has found an overall 
discourse preference for a disjoint interpretation in backward anaphoric sentences. 
Because of this, it is possible that children may exhibit such a preference for both 
sentence types. To avert this effect, the present study will be designed to bias as much as 
possible toward a coreferential interpretation (while still allowing the disjoint 
interpretation to be plausible), so that if a disjoint preference for either sentence type is 
observed, it is because the coreferential interpretation is grammatically unavailable. 







Notice however that the pronoun linearly precedes the R-expression in both 
sentence types. A Linear Bias as stated in (50) predicts a lack of a coreferential 
interpretation for both cases. Thus if interpretations are driven by a Linear Bias at 30 
months, we predict a preference for the disjoint interpretation to be exhibited uniformly 
across both sentence types. 
Experiment 3 examines 30 month-olds’ performance in a preferential looking 
paradigm which presented arrays corresponding to the coreferential and disjoint 
interpretations of sentences like (55) and (56). I compared attention following the test 
sentence to determine whether children exhibited a preference for the disjoint 
interpretation in response to either sentence type. The results demonstrate that 30 month-
old children exhibit a preference for the disjoint interpretation in response to sentences 
like (55) but not (56); this performance is expected only if Principle C is the source of 
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knowledge driving interpretation, and cannot be accounted for by appealing only to a 
linear bias. 
 
3.3 Experiment 3 
3.3.1 Method 
Participants 
52 30 month-olds (26 males) with a mean age of 30;10 (range 28;6 to 31;27) were 
included in the final sample. An additional 15 children were excluded from the final 
sample for the following reasons: equipment failure/ experimenter error (n=12), failure to 
complete the task (n=1), failure to meet language input criterion (n=2). Participants were 
recruited through the University of Maryland Infant and Child Studies Database from the 
College Park, MD area. Children participated on a volunteer basis, and were given a 
small gift for participating. All participants were learning English at home, and English 
input constituted at least 80% of their language input.  
 
Materials & Design 
Visual stimuli were designed similarly to those presented in Experiments 1 and 2. 
All video was presented on a 51” plasma TV screen. Videos were edited together to 
create the sequence of events outlined in the Design section below. A full schematic of 
the events children see throughout the video can be found in Appendix B. Single videos 
were presented in the center of the screen and were sized 18 inches wide and 29 inches 
tall. Videos presented together in preferential looking format were always identical in 
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size and scale, measuring 16 inches wide and 11 inches tall, with a 10.5 inch span 
between the inside edges of the two images. 
Audio stimuli was recorded in a sound-proofed room by a female native speaker 
of American English using intonation common in Child Directed Speech. Recordings 
were edited and combined with the visual stimuli.  
The components of the video mirrored those of the task utilized by LCL and 
presented in Experiments 1 and 2. A Character Introduction phase first familiarized 
children to the two characters through short video clips (3.5-6.5 seconds each), which 
named each character (Anna and Katie) individually and described them doing simple 
actions. In addition to occurring at the beginning of the sequence, several Character 
Introduction clips were placed throughout the video to provide filler material between test 
trials as well as to further remind children of the character names. Following the 
Character Introduction phase, children received six Face Check sequences, which tested 
children’s memory of the character names to facilitate comprehension during test, as well 
as preparing children for the preferential looking format of the test trials. During the Face 
Check sequences (6 seconds each), the two characters were presented in separate videos 
simultaneously in a preferential looking paradigm while a sentence asked children to find 
one of the two characters (e.g. Where’s Katie? Do you see Katie?). Target character and 
the side of the screen on which the target character appeared were counterbalanced across 
Face Check trials. Order of Face Check trials was counterbalanced across subjects. 
Figure 5 presents a schematic of a typical Familiarization and Test phase 
sequence. Events depicted in the familiarization and test trials were all continuous or 
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Figure 5 Schematic of Familiarization and Test phase sequence in Experiment 3. 
 
Actions were chosen to correspond to transitive verbs that are the most commonly 
produced by children at 30 months. All verbs were reported to be produced by at least 
70% of children at this age (with the majority produced by over 90% of children). 
Objects used as the patient of the event were common household objects and animal 
puppets, the names for which are reported to be used by 85% or more of children at 30 
months. The scenes for a given test trial consisted of two versions of an event in which 
each character acted upon the object. For both scenes, the object was placed in the lap or 
the hand of one of the characters- this location remained constant across both scenes. In 
each scene, one of the two characters performed an action on the object. Both characters 
were always present in both scenes, even if one of the characters did not participate in the 
action or in holding the object.  
Immediately preceding each test trial, children were presented with a 
Familiarization phase. In two video clips (6 seconds each), the test events were presented 
one at a time. Audio described the event by identifying which character was performing 





(59) Wow! There’s Anna and Katie! Anna’s painting a house! 
 Oh look! There they are again! Now Katie’s painting the house! 
 
Because children (and adults) show an overall bias toward a disjoint interpretation 
of ambiguous backward anaphoric structures, we aimed to make the coreferential 
interpretation as available and prominent as possible (while still making the disjoint 
interpretation a plausible interpretation). This coreferential bias was included so that if a 
preference for the disjoint interpretation was observed, it would be more likely to be 
caused by a constraint against a coreferential interpretation exhibited in the grammar, 
rather than a more general preference for interpretation. To this end, the event which 
corresponded to the coreferential interpretation was always shown second, immediately 
preceding the test trial. This served to make this event more prominent, as well as making 
the character named in this familiarization more accessible in the discourse, promoting 
interpretation of any following pronouns as referring to this character if possible.  
The Test phase (12 seconds each) immediately followed with the same two event 
videos as shown in the Familiarization phase presented side by side simultaneously. An 
attention-getting filler phrase (What’s happening now?) introduced the events. Test audio 
consisted of two repetitions of the test sentence. Children were presented with a total of 8 
test trials in a between subjects design: half of the subjects heard MATRIX PRONOUN 
condition sentences as in (60) for all trials, and half heard all EMBEDDED PRONOUN 
condition sentences as in (61). Trial order and the side of the screen each video appeared 
on was counterbalanced across subjects. 
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(60) She’s painting the house that’s in Katie’s lap! 
(61) The house that she’s painting is in Katie’s lap! 
 
In addition to the phases described above, children also saw 4 filler video clips (7 
seconds each) spaced throughout the video. These clips depicted children’s toys 
presented with classical music, and were used to attract children’s attention to the screen, 
as well as to provide a ‘mental break’ between the more challenging test trial sequences. 
For all video clips, there was 1 second black screen between each clip, and the first audio 
clip began 20 frames (.67 seconds) after the visual stimuli appeared on the screen. 
 
Procedure 
Procedure for running subjects was identical to that of Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Analyses & Predictions 
We expect children’s response pattern to differ substantially in terms of the 
timecourse of response as compared to that observed by LCL or in Experiment 1 for two 
reasons. The first is that the sentence is much more complex than the single clause 
structures used in those studies. Because there is significantly more structure to parse 
through8, arriving at an interpretation may take longer. The second reason we expect a 
response delay is that the visual array is also more complex; whereas LCL and 
                                                
8 This is the case even if children are using a Linear Bias to interpret the reference 
relations within the sentence- they still need to use some form of a parsing strategy to 
interpret the remainder of the structure of the sentence to arrive at an interpretation. 
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Experiment 1 had two images which each included two characters and an action, this 
study incorporates an additional object into each scene. Because there is more visual 
information to keep track of, children may need to perform more ‘check-back’ looks, 
where they re-orient to a distractor image to confirm that it does not match their 
interpretation. 
For these reasons, the window of analysis in this experiment is identified as the 
first 3000ms following the onset of the second repetition of the test sentence9. This 
should allow enough time for children to work through the structure and also the visual 
array; additionally, the onset of the second test sentence iteration may focus children’s 
attention on their chosen interpretation. 
The last trial was excluded from analysis for failure to meet the criterion for 
attentiveness (85%). To analyze the data I used empirical logit mixed effects models, fit 
in R (R Core Team, 2013) with the lmer() function of the lme4 library (Bates, Maechler 
& Bolker, 2013). The dependent measure in the models was the empirical logit transform 
of the proportion of time spent looking to the disjoint interpretation action (defined as the 
event where the character holding onto the object was not the one acting on the object). 
As noted above, performance will be examined for a main effect of condition, to signal a 
difference in interpretation across these sentence types. Knowledge of Principle C 
predicts a preference for a disjoint interpretation in response to (60) but not (61), whereas 
a Linear Bias predicts a preference for a disjoint interpretation in response to both (60) 
and (61) equally.  
 
                                                
9 As with Experiments 1 and 2, the disambiguation point has been shifted forward 300 ms 
to account for saccade time (Fernald et al., 2008). 
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3.3.2 Results 
Figure 6 shows the mean proportion of looking to the disjoint interpretation event 
across the timecourse of the trial.  
 
 
Figure 6 Looking behavior in Experiment 1. Outlined box represents critical windows 
for analysis 
 
During the critical window following the onset of the second test sentence, 
children looked significantly more to the disjoint interpretation action in the MATRIX 
PRONOUN condition, while showing no preference in the EMBEDDED PRONOUN condition. 
This performance is reflected by a significant main effect of condition ("=0.08165, 
SE=0.03965, p<0.05). Planned comparisons within each condition show that looking to 
the disjoint interpretation event is significantly greater than chance in the MATRIX 
PRONOUN CONDITION (t(25)=2.4, p<0.05), but is not different from chance in the 
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3.3.3 Discussion 
 The results from Experiment 3 showed that at 30 months, children’s 
interpretations of sentences like (39) and (40), repeated here as (62) and (63), show a 
consistent asymmetry. Children prefer to interpret (62) as referring to an event 
corresponding to a disjoint interpretation, while they have no preference for interpreting 
(63) as disjoint or coreferential. This behavioral pattern cannot be accounted for with 
only a bias against all cases of backward anaphora. 
 
(62) She’s painting the house that’s on Katie’s lap. 
(63) The house that she’s painting is in Katie’s lap. 
 
One additional aspect of performance is worth mentioning here. Notice that in the 
first 3-4 seconds of the trial, there is a sizable asymmetry in looking between conditions: 
children in the MATRIX PRONOUN condition show an initial preference for the coreferential 
interpretation, while those in the EMBEDDED PRONOUN condition show no early 
preference. Given that this is the exact opposite performance than what we predict for the 
critical window, this may at first glance be concerning. However, given our efforts to bias 
toward a coreferential interpretation and findings from adult sentence comprehension, 
this may not be entirely surprising. Adults have been shown to prefer interpreting a 
pronoun in the subject position as coreferential with the subject of the previous sentence 
(Arnold et al., 2000; Crawley & Stevenson, 1990; Gordon et al., 1993; Stevenson, Nelson 
& Stenning, 1995). Recall that the subject of the previous sentence in this case would be 
the character who is mentioned in the test sentence (corresponding to a coreferential 
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interpretation). Given that the subject of the test sentence is a pronoun in the matrix 
pronoun condition but not in the embedded pronoun condition, the preference to initially 
interpret this subject pronoun as referring to the most recently mentioned character and 
respond in looking to the coreferential interpretation event is in fact expected. One might 
imagine that the fact that this initial interpretation is later overridden, as shown in the 
critical window of analysis, makes the contrast between performance for these two 
sentence types all the more apparent. 
These results replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and extend those of 
Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014), showing children to exhibit ‘Principle C effects’- 
preferences for disjoint interpretation in Principle C contexts- at 30 months. Further, the 
results of Experiment 3 extend these findings to show that children do not exhibit such 
behavior to all backward anaphoric structures. This suggests that children’s performance 
is more consistent with knowledge of Principle C than it is with an interpretive bias based 
in the linear order of nominal elements. 
 
3.4  General Discussion 
 Experiment 3 further supports the conclusion that restrictions on interpretations in 
Principle C contexts are in place by 30 months, and additionally presents new evidence 
that interpretations are not uniform across all backward anaphoric contexts. As such, 
these restrictions are more consistent with accurate knowledge of Principle C than with 
an interpretive bias based in linear order of nominal elements. However, two possible 
challenges may be raised to offer alternative accounts for such results; I examine each of 
these challenges in turn here. 
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 One challenge in interpreting the results of Experiment 3 is that an additional 
asymmetry between the sentence types exists beyond the c-command relations between 
the pronoun and the R-expression. There is also an asymmetry in the type of relative 
clause exhibited in each sentence type. Subject gap relative clauses are those where the 
filler, the head of the relative, is displaced from the subject position of the embedded 
clause, as in (64); the ‘gap site’ from which the filler is displaced is identified by ‘___’. 
Object gap relative clauses, similarly, are those where the filler is displaced from the 
object position of the embedded clause, as in (65). 
 
(64) I saw the boy that ___ kissed the girl. 
(65) I saw the boy that the girl kissed ___. 
 
 Research on parsing of filler gap dependencies such as those exhibited in relative 
clauses has shown that even adults exhibit a significant slow-down in interpretation of 
object gap structures in comparison to subject gap structures (Gibson, 1998; Gordon, 
Hendrick & Johnson, 2001). When this finding is applied to the asymmetry in responses 
to sentences like (39) and (40), repeated here with the gap sites included as (66) and (67), 
an alternative explanation for the response pattern is evident.  
 
(66) She’s painting the house that ___ ‘s in Katie’s lap. 
(67) The house that she’s painting ___ is in Katie’s lap. 
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Chance performance in the case of (32), which exhibits an object gap relative 
clause, could be accounted for by a delay (or complete absence) of successful 
interpretation of the relative clause, rather than a successful interpretation in an 
unconstrained context. However, Kidd et al. (2007) show that 3-4 year old children seem 
to find object relatives with a pronoun in the subject position of the relative just as easy 
as subject relatives. Roland et al. (2012) find similar effect in adults, showing that given 
the appropriate discourse context, object relatives are no more difficult to parse than 
subject relatives. 
While children have been shown to be capable of appropriately computing 
interpretations for relative clauses by 30 months (Lidz & Gagliardi, 2010), this 
competence is fragile (Gagliardi, Mease & Lidz, submitted) and deployment of this 
underlying competence could potentially be interrupted by additional processing 
demands, such as the reference resolution requirements present in (66) and (67). Future 
research will therefore explore alternative contexts in which c-command can be 
manipulated across backward anaphoric structures. 
 
3.5  Conclusion 
 Children have been shown to utilize linear order of words to interpret sentences at 
early stages of language development. This suggests that children could in principle 
hypothesize a linear constraint on anaphora as a means to approximate Principle C. 
Additionally, backward anaphoric structures have been shown to be held to strict 
discourse conditions. This suggests that children could potentially have an initial overall 
preference for disjoint interpretation in backward anaphoric contexts that masks Principle 
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C effects. Either of these interpretations of a possible Linear Bias predicts identical 
performance to adult-like knowledge of Principle C in the case of simple single clause 
structures like those tested by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014). 
 In this chapter, I sought to further address the question of what interpretive 
mechanism drives children’s early interpretations in Principle C contexts. I explored 30 
month-olds’ interpretations of backward anaphoric sentences which are unconstrained by 
Principle C, making both a coreferential and disjoint interpretation available. The results 
of Experiment 3 demonstrated that when Principle C blocks a coreferential interpretation, 
children exhibit a preference for a disjoint interpretation, but in backward anaphoric 
contexts where Principle C does not restrict interpretation, children show no preference 
for either interpretation. A bias to interpret all cases of backward anaphoric structures as 
disjoint in reference is not able to account for children’s asymmetric responses across 
these sentence types. This experiment is the first exploration of 30 month-olds’ 
interpretations of backward anaphoric structures that are unconstrained by Principle C, 
and the results suggest that interpretation even at this young age is more consistent with 
knowledge of Principle C than a simple bias based in linear order.  
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4 Identifying Knowledge Through the Contribution of Processing 
 
 
4.1  Outline 
Chapter 4 examines a novel analytic approach to identifying characteristics of 
knowledge underlying behavior. I utilize independent measurements of processes that 
may be implicated in deployment of knowledge in order to determine the nature of the 
knowledge that is being deployed. I exploit the predicted dependency between children’s 
speed of processing syntactic information and their speed of interpreting sentences in 
Principle C contexts. In three preferential looking tasks, I use measures of processing at 
the lexical and syntactic levels to compare to performance on a Principle C task. I show 
that individual variation in the speed of interpretation in Principle C contexts is predicted 
by individual variation in syntactic processing speed. This finding suggests that the 




So far, we’ve discussed explorations of early Principle C effects which seek to 
identify the underlying knowledge by comparing differing predictions about behavior 
made by possible interpretive strategies. In Chapter 2, we explored a linguistic context in 
which Principle C and a bias for interpretation in transitive clauses predicted differing 
performance, and showed that children’s behavior is more consistent with knowledge of 
Principle C than with a transitivity bias. In Chapter 3, we explored a context in which 
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Principle C and a linear order interpretive strategy predict differing performance, and 
showed that children’s behavior is more consistent with knowledge of Principle C than 
with a linear interpretive strategy. While this method of comparison is effective for ruling 
out individual mechanisms that have been proposed as alternatives to knowledge of 
Principle C, it fails to directly implicate knowledge of Principle C. In other words, I have 
so far been able to what 30 month-olds’ interpretive strategy is not; nothing in the 
findings thus far directly identifies what the interpretive mechanism is. In this chapter, I 
take a different approach in order to more closely identify specific characteristics of the 
underlying knowledge that drives behavior. Specifically, I explore the inherent 
dependency between grammatical knowledge and the deployment processes required to 
implement this knowledge; recognition of this dependency allow us to generate 
predictions about variance in behavior based on variance in implementation. We can 
draw conclusions about children’s grammar by acknowledging that differing knowledge 
states will require different mechanisms for implementing that knowledge, and by finding 
ways of explicitly measuring the online implementation of such knowledge.  
This research also serves a second goal, which is to understand more about the 
developmental trajectory of Principle C knowledge in children by identifying what 
factors beyond simply knowledge of the constraint contribute to interpretation in 
Principle C contexts. Even if Principle C is innately specified, for it to be implemented in 
the interpretation of a particular sentence children have to have learned enough about 
their native language to be able to identify which structures it will apply over. 
Understanding which factors affect early Principle C effects is important to 
understanding what aspects of grammatical competence are implicated in interpretation. 
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The research presented here explores the development of children’s 
interpretations of sentences in Principle C contexts, demonstrating that individual 
variation in performance is predicted by variation in speed of processing at the syntactic, 
but not the lexical level. This relation between structural processing and interpretation in 
Principle C contexts suggests that children’s comprehension is dependent on parsing of 
hierarchical structure. Because this correlation is not predicted by non-structural 
interpretive mechanisms, these findings suggest that children’s knowledge of Principle C 
is in place by as young as 30 months of age. This work serves to demonstrate that 
investigation of individual differences at the processing level can be used as a probe into 
similarities across children at the knowledge level. 
 
Measuring interpretation at the individual level 
In this chapter, I explore individual differences in interpretation as a means of 
identifying the mechanism driving this interpretation. Specifically, I take advantage of 
the fact that different interpretive strategies will require different processes in order for 
interpretation to occur. Depending on how the restriction on interpretation is defined in 
children’s grammar, different components will be necessary for applying that restriction 
to a given sentence. For example, if Principle C is the mechanism that drives the 
restriction on interpretation, the ability to compute c-command relations between an R-
expression and c-commanding nominal expressions is necessary to be able to apply 
Principle C knowledge to interpreting a sentence. If, however, the mechanism driving 
interpretation were instead a linear order strategy, computing c-command relations would 
not be relevant to interpretation.  
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The question that arises is how we might identify differences in interpretation at 
the individual level, in order to identify whether differences in the interpretive process are 
explained by differences in the various implementation factors. The primary measure of 
interpretation in Preferential Looking tasks is defined by the proportion of looking time 
spent attending to a target image, which corresponds to a particular interpretation of a 
sentence. While proportional measures are useful for looking at the data in aggregate, the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the results are in some sense limited. Whether 
children reliably attend more to one image than another across a span of time can be 
taken as an indication that they have or lack some ability to comprehend a linguistic 
stimulus. However, this type of measure says nothing about which components of 
linguistic processing are implicated in allowing children to arrive at the interpretation 
they do. Further, this type of measure is unable to distinguish the type of knowledge 
driving this behavior; rather it can only show that children arrive at a certain type of 
interpretation, without directly identifying the knowledge that drives that interpretation.  
A more effective measurement of individual differences in interpretation for our 
purposes is the speed with which an individual child arrives at a particular interpretation. 
Because we can identify the point at which children have all the information they need 
from the input sentence to begin to process the restriction on interpretation, we can 
identify how long after that point interpretation occurs. In essence, we are deriving a 
reaction time measurement that identifies the speed with which interpretation of a 
sentence is restricted to one of two possible meanings.  
In order to derive a reaction time measure from Preferential Looking Paradigm 
data, we turn to research in the field of word recognition and word learning. Fine-grained 
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temporal analysis of PLP data has largely been developed by Anne Fernald and 
colleagues, in their research probing young children’s developing abilities in online word 
recognition. This research does not measure children’s syntactic knowledge, but it has 
provided a system of analysis of the fine-grained temporal structure of children’s 
responses.  
Fernald et al. (1998) first explored the timing implications of children’s online 
comprehension of linguistic information by probing the change in recognition of object 
names across the second year of life. Children were presented with two familiar objects 
and a sentence that asked children two find one of the two objects (e.g. where’s the 
ball?). Fernald et al. found that while all children were able to find the target item, the 
efficiency with which children did so varied by age, with the oldest children being able to 
attend to the target object even before word offset.  
Swingley, Pinto & Fernald (1999) extended this result by focusing on word 
processing at 24 months and utilizing a dependent measure that takes individual shifts in 
attention into account. The task design was the same as Fernald et al. (1998), except that 
in one condition, the object names had an initial phonological overlap (e.g. doggie/doll), 
while in the other they did not (e.g. doggie/tree). Swingley et al. measured children’s 
reaction time by focusing on trials where the child was attending to the distractor image 
at the onset of the target word; from these trials it is possible to measure the exact time it 
takes for the child to revert attention to the target image (see Fernald et al. 2008 for a 
detailed explanation PLP tasks designed to utilize online measures). Results showed that 
response latency was significantly longer in the overlap condition, suggesting that even 
very young children process speech incrementally, and adjust their attention accordingly. 
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I extend these results here to show that this incremental processing can be scaled up to 
the level of incremental syntactic composition and interpretation. I utilize the latency 
measure identified by Swingley et al. to compare speed of interpretation in Principle C 
contexts at the individual level. 
 
Factors affecting interpretation 
This timecourse analysis allows us to capture the speed of interpretation in 
Principle C contexts, which we can use to infer the underlying computations required to 
form such interpretations. We have noted already that due to the indirect relation of 
observed behavior to the knowledge that motivates that behavior, it is challenging to 
reason directly from performance about the nature of children’s grammatical knowledge. 
However, it is possible to take advantage of the mediating effect of the processes required 
to deploy grammatical knowledge, by making predictions about how different knowledge 
states will be deployed. Depending on children’s developing syntactic knowledge, they 
may arrive at an interpretation for a sentence in a number of different ways. As adults, the 
primary mechanism for such interpretation will be syntactic composition, however it’s 
possible that children may be able to form an interpretation via non-structural methods 
(such as mechanisms similar to those discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). If children have 
adult-like grammatical knowledge of Principle C, their interpretation in Principle C 
contexts is restricted by recognition of the c-command relation between an R-expression 
and another nominal element. If c-command holds, any interpretation where an NP is co-
indexed with the relevant R-expression is illicit. However, if children derive a preference 
for disjoint interpretations in such contexts via a non-Principle C mechanism, then the 
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deployment of their final interpretation will not be inherently tied to syntactic processing 
as it would be with the structural computation inherent in c-command relations.  
Because each type of interpretive mechanism will require different processes to 
deploy interpretation, we can make predictions about the relationship between children’s 
behavior and identifiable processing mechanisms. Specifically, we predict children’s 
behavior to be subject to their syntactic processing abilities only if they derive an 
interpretation by syntactic means. This dependency, schematized in Table 1, allows us to 
form concrete predictions about children’s performance. We expect that children’s 
performance in Principle C contexts will be predicted by their overall abilities in 
processing hierarchical structure, but only if the knowledge driving interpretation in 
Principle C contexts is syntactic in nature. 
 
Knowledge Principle C constraint Alternative interpretive constraints 
Deployment Dependent on ability to  process hierarchical structure 
Independent of ability to  
process hierarchical structure 
Behavior Variation predicted by variation in syntactic processing speed 
Variation independent of variation in 
syntactic processing speed 
 
Table 1 Predicted dependencies between deployment processes and observed behavior 
by hypothesized interpretive mechanisms. 
 
In this chapter, I explore several possibilities for factors relevant to implementing 
interpretations. First, as it has been identified to affect children’s performance in 
Principle C contexts (at least in some results), is vocabulary size. One of Lukyanenko et 
al.’s chief findings was that the size of children’s productive vocabulary predicted 
performance in Principle C and reflexive contexts. The results presented in Chapters 2 
and 3 found no overall effect of vocabulary size on performance, however it could be the 
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case that methodological differences between these tasks allowed the effect of vocabulary 
to be shown in the results of LCL but masked the effect in our follow-up studies. 
Therefore we include the measure of MCDI vocabulary score as one potential factor that 
could affect children’s interpretation in Principle C contexts. 
It is as of yet unclear the exact role of vocabulary as a predictor of performance. 
No account predicts that vocabulary itself should directly affect the acquisition of 
Principle C10; it is unclear how the size of a child’s lexicon would bear any direct relation 
to constraints on anaphora. For this reason, it seems that vocabulary may be the surface 
index of a different underlying mechanism (or mechanisms), for which variability more 
straightforwardly predicts variability in performance with Principle C. LCL suggest two 
possibilities. One is that vocabulary could reflect some aspect of children’s grammatical 
development, such that the absence of Principle C effects in the low vocabulary children 
stems from their lacking some aspect of grammatical competence which allows 
successful application of the constraint. For example, if children with smaller 
vocabularies do not yet command the structure of transitive clauses, then they will be 
unable to successfully build a structure for the sentences and compute c-command 
relations to determine if binding conditions hold. The possibility that the vocabulary 
effect stems from different levels of grammatical development is supported by research 
showing vocabulary to be indicative of children’s grammatical development (Marchman 
& Bates, 1994; Dale et al. 2000; Devescovi et al., 2005). A second possibility is that 
                                                
10 One exception would be that low vocabulary children could be predicted to fail on such 
a task if they do not know the verbs that were used in Lukyanenko et al.’s sentences; 
however this seems unlikely, both because the verbs used were highly common actions 
(cover, dry, fan, paint, pat, spin, squeeze, wash), and each action was introduced 
separately prior to the test phase. 
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vocabulary is an index of children’s speed of processing, such that the failure of low 
vocabulary children to show Principle C effects in LCL’s results is a result of their 
inability to complete the interpretation and mapping processes quickly enough for this 
task. This possibility is supported by research in the word recognition domain, showing 
that vocabulary is related to children’s speed of processing (Fernald, Perfors & 
Marchman, 2006 and Hurtado, Marchman & Fernald, 2008, among others)11. 
The second factor that I consider as possibly having an effect on interpretation is 
that of processing speed. The concept in itself is vague; I will first consider the term as it 
is utilized in the word recognition domain, as defined in Swingley et al (1999). In the 
context of a task which presents two common objects and a sentence which asks children 
to find one of the objects, a measure of response latency can be seen as measuring the 
speed of interpreting the target noun and mapping that interpretation onto the 
corresponding visual scene. In effect, this measure can be understood as a measure of 
children’s early speed of lexical access. I will this refer to this measure in the remainder 
of the chapter as Lexical Access Speed (LAS). While lexical access will inherently be 
required for any method of interpreting sentences in Principle C contexts, individual 
variation with respect to LAS is a factor that is more likely to explain variance in speed 
of interpretation only if it is one of the primary components contributing to interpretation. 
That is, we expect processing of syntactic information (such as the relevant c-command 
relations) to be most critical to interpretation with knowledge of Principle C; however, 
                                                
11 However, these findings are not entirely uncontroversial; several studies have found 
little or no evidence for a significant relation between vocabulary and processing speed. 
Appendix D summarizes studies that report the significance of vocabulary size on 
response latency. Note that even within studies, results can vary by age.  
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processing of lexical information could be most critical to interpretation with an 
alternative non-structural mechanism. 
Because we expect processing at the syntactic level to be inherently important for 
interpretation under a Principle C account of performance, I also consider syntactic 
processing speed as a potential factor affecting interpretation. While the processing speed 
measure derived from the LAS task is widely utilized in word recognition research, a 
comparable standard measure for syntactic processing speed does not yet exist; I have 
therefore designed a Phrase Structure Integration Speed (PSIS) task in order to generate 
such a measure. The goal in creating a measure of children’s PSIS was to present a 
linguistic context representable in PLP format which would require children to compute 
the hierarchical structure of a phrase in order to be able to identify the intended meaning, 
rather than being about to rely on lexical information alone. To accomplish this, I utilize 
superlative constructions as in (68), with a corresponding visual array as in Figure 7. 
 
(68) Where’s the biggest red train? 
 
 
Figure 7 Sample visual array for Phrase Structure Integration Speed task. Largest item is 
yellow; smaller two items are red. 
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 Given the visual array presented in Figure 7, it is clear that there is no one item 
that could be identified as the target by simply identifying the relevant features in absence 
of a structured representation. Let us consider how interpretation would occur if no 




If children do not attribute hierarchical structure to the phrase, then each element 
would be interpreted conjunctively, and the target item would be identified as one which 
satisfies the combination biggest + red + train. None of the three items pictured satisfies 
all of the features biggest + red + train, because the item that is globally biggest does not 
satisfy the feature red, and the items that are red cannot be interpreted as satisfying the 
feature biggest. In order to arrive at an adult-like interpretation of (68), children would 





 Given this hierarchical structure, the phrase [red train] can be interpreted as a unit 
to which the superlative biggest applies. With this interpretation, the biggest item in the 
set satisfied by the features red + train is the target. Thus with this superlative 
construction, we are able to identify a simple case in which accurate interpretation can be 
attributable to the use of hierarchical structure. In this way, the speed of interpretation on 
this task can be considered a measure of processing syntactic information. 
 
The current study 
As identified above, the goal of this study was to compare individual variation in 
various independent measures of linguistic ability to the individual variation in speed of 
interpretation in Principle C contexts. We predict that if the knowledge driving behavior 
is Principle C, then speed of interpretation should be predicted by speed of processing 
syntactic information. 
The research presented here is composed of three tasks that allow us to test this 
prediction. A Principle C task like that of Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014) determines 
children’s interpretations in Principle C contexts. The remaining two tasks have been 
designed to measure children’s processing speed, in order to compare this to children’s 
performance on the Principle C task. The first is a task modeled off those used in word 
recognition research, which generate measures of lexical processing speed. The second is 





4.3 Experiment 4 
4.3.1 Method 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
We tested 64 English-speaking children (32 males) 28-32 months of age (range = 
28;2-31;28; median = 30;7; mean = 30;6) recruited through the University of Maryland 
Infant and Child Studies Database. Six additional children were tested but were excluded 
from the final sample for the following reasons: failure to complete all three tasks (n=2); 
equipment failure/ experimenter error (n = 4).  
MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory (MCDI) Words and 
Sentences long forms were collected for each child, revealing a range of vocabulary sizes 
from 99 to 680 words (median = 562; mean = 514). With the goal of comparing 
individual performance across tasks, each participant was tested on each of the three tasks 
described below. Tasks were completed in one session that lasted around 30 minutes 
(including play breaks between tasks when needed). 
 
4.3.1.2 Materials & Design 
Task 1: Principle C Task 
The task designed to test interpretations in Principle C contexts used identical 
stimuli and design to that of Experiments 1 and 2, with the exception of audio stimuli. 
See Section 2.3.1 for a description of the task design and visual stimuli. Audio stimuli 
followed that used by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014). During the Familiarization 
phase, children heard audio which described the action, but was ambiguous as to the 
 98 
agent and patient of the event, as in (71). This was to allow either the self-directed or 
other-directed events to be a possible representation of the test sentences. 
 
(71) Wow! There’s Anna and Katie! It looks like somebody’s getting patted! 
 Oh look! There they are again! Somebody’s getting patted again! 
 
 During the Test phase, children heard three repetitions of the test sentence in 
different frames, as in (72) and (73) below. 
 
(72) She’s patting Katie! Do you see the one where she’s patting Katie? Find the one 
where she’s patting Katie! 
(73) She’s patting Katie! Do you see the one where she’s patting Katie? Find the one 
where she’s patting Katie! 
 
 Children were presented with a total of 8 test trials in a between subjects design: 
half of the subjects heard name condition sentences as in (72) for all trials, and half heard 
reflexive condition sentences as in (73). For each iteration of the test sentence, the audio 
was aligned by the onset of the object NP for later analysis, as this is the critical point 
when an interpretation strategy based in Principle C could begin to identify the intended 





Task 2: Lexical Access Speed Task 
In addition to a task probing interpretations in Principle C contexts, we included 
two additional tasks designed to elicit measures of participants’ lexical and syntactic 
processing speed. The Lexical Access Speed (LAS) task, which generated measures of 
each child’s lexical processing speed, was a word-object mapping task modeled after that 
of Swingley, Pinto & Fernald (1999). Children were presented with two images of 
common objects, and a sentence which then directed children to find one of the two 
objects. Objects presented were chosen from the most common nouns in young children’s 
vocabularies (all words, listed in Appendix C, are reported to be said by at least 90% of 
30 month old children). Figure 8 presents a sample array. After observing the images in 
silence for approximately 1 second, children heard two instances of the test sentence, 
naming one of the two items, as in (74).  
 
 
Figure 8 Experiment 4 Lexical Access Speed Task sample array 
 
(74) Where’s the train? See the train? 
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Each of the 8 trials lasted a total of 5 seconds. Position of the target object was 
counterbalanced across trials; target object and order of presentation (2 possible lists) 
were counterbalanced across subjects. 
Reaction time (RT) was calculated by determining the latency to attend to the 
target image on distractor-initial trials (i.e. those trials where the child was attending to 
the distractor image at the onset of the target word). These RT values were then averaged 
across trials to derive a LAS measure for each participant. 
 
Task 3: Phrase Structure Integration Speed Task 
While the processing speed measure derived from the LAS task is widely utilized 
in word recognition research, a comparable standard measure for syntactic processing 
speed does not yet exist; we have therefore designed a Phrase Structure Integration Speed 
(PSIS) task in order to generate such a measure. We maintained the word-object mapping 
task design in order to keep task demands as comparable as possible to the LAS task. The 
visual array included three objects instead of two, which required a complex NP as the 
description of the target object. As discussed in Section 4.2 above, children must treat the 
NP as hierarchically structured to accurately interpret the description and locate the 
correct object; in this way, this new task allows for a measure of the speed of processing 
syntactic structure. Children were presented with three images of all the same kind (e.g. 
three trains); objects were again drawn from the most commonly known nouns (see 
Appendix C). The three objects in each set varied in size and color, with the two smaller 
items being colored the same. See Figure 7 above for a sample array. Each of 24 arrays 
contained a different set of objects. A constant size ratio of 3 : 4.5 : 7.5 was maintained 
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between the smallest, medium, and largest item. This ratio was chosen so that the 
smallest item was not so small as to not be easily identifiable, so that the largest item was 
contained within its quadrant of the screen (to facilitate accurate coding), and so that the 
medium item was differentiable from the smallest item, yet significantly smaller than the 
largest item so that it could not be considered big by itself. After observing each array in 
silence for approximately 1 second, children heard an introductory sentence which 
identified the type of objects in the array (e.g. Oh look! Now there are some trains!).12 
Children were then presented with the test sentence. In 12 of 24 trials, the sentence 
contained the superlative biggest but no color adjective, as in (75), indicating the globally 
largest item. In 12 trials, the sentence contained a color adjective, as in (76), indicating 
the larger item in the subset of the two similarly colored items. SUPERLATIVE trials were 
8.37 seconds long; SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE trials were 8.77 seconds long. Order of 
item presentation was counterbalanced across subjects. Position of the target item, color 
of the target and distractor items, and sentence type (SUPERLATIVE or SUPERLATIVE + 
ADJECTIVE) were counterbalanced across trials. Additionally, each of these factors was 
varied pseudo-randomly and interspersed throughout the task relatively evenly, to avoid 
results driven by task effects13. Reaction times were calculated in the same way as for the 
LAS task to derive PSIS measures for each participant. 
                                                
12 Fernald, Thorpe & Marchman (2010) showed high rates of ‘false alarming’ shifts to the 
distractor image when 30 month-old children were presented with two objects of the 
same kind and an adjective + noun phrase picking out one of the items (e.g. where’s the 
blue car in the context of a blue and a red car). Therefore we included this introductory 
sentence to help ameliorate processing of the target noun. 
 
13 The target item never occurred in the same position on consecutive trials. The same 
sentence type occurred in no more than two consecutive trials. The same color was 
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(75) Where’s the biggest train? 
(76) Where’s the biggest red train? 
 
A size adjective was used because it allowed the strict controlling of the ratio 
between the three objects in the array, and across trials, which is less feasible with other 
adjectives (e.g. specifying levels of fuzziness for the fuzziest blue cat). The particular size 
adjective biggest was used because big has been found to be the most frequently used 
base form for both comparatives and superlatives in young children’s production (Layton 
& Stick, 1979). This coincides with data from the MCDI Lexical Norms Database 
showing big to be one of the earliest prominent adjectives in young children’s expressive 
and receptive lexicons (Dale & Fenson, 1996). We avoided using smallest due to research 
showing that children acquire the positive dimensional adjectives before the 
corresponding negative adjective (Donaldson & Balfour, 1968; Ehri, 1977). The color 
words red, blue, yellow, and green were used due to their being the most common color 
words in children’s productive vocabularies by this age (with the exception of orange, 
which was not used because of the potential confounding of the color name with the 
noun).  
In considering individual differences in processing at the syntactic level, it is 
important to recognize that children may differ in two aspects required for processing and 
interpreting structural information. First, they may differ simply in how quickly they are 
able to integrate new lexical information into the structure they have begun to build 
                                                
presented in no more than three consecutive trials, or presented in the same position in no 
more than two consecutive trials. 
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(Fernald, Thorpe & Marchman, 2010). This integration aspect can be thought of as the 
level of incrementality with which children parse a structure; children who are faster at 
incorporating new lexical items into their structure will be those who are more efficient in 
either generating new structural elements or slotting lexical information into predicted 
structure (or both).  
An additional aspect critical to syntactic processing is children’s ability to deal 
with new lexical information that doesn’t fit into their predicted structure. If children 
incrementally incorporate information into a structure and predict the most likely 
completion of such a structure, they may boggle when confronted with new lexical 
information that does not fit into the structure they have predicted (Trueswell et al., 1999; 
Snedeker & Trueswell 2004; Lidz, White & Baier, submitted). At this point, children will 
be required to alter their predicted structure to accommodate the new information. So in 
addition to differing simply in their ability to generate structure and incorporate 
information into a structure, children may also differ in their ability to accommodate 
information that is in conflict with their initial interpretation. Crucially, this additional 
revision aspect may affect children differentially, depending on their overall abilities at 
building and interpreting structure: children who are slower overall to incorporate 
information into a structure may be less efficient at predicting likely completions of the 
structure, and therefore may be less likely to even need to revise such predictions. 
Contrastively, children who are quicker to integrate new lexical information may be those 
who use a more predictive strategy, and may be more prone to have to revise an initial 
interpretation.  
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Given that speed of processing syntactic information comprises two distinct 
capabilities, our PSIS task allows us to measure each of them. Consider first the 
SUPERLATIVE condition sentences like (75). Assuming an incremental parsing strategy, 
children hear the superlative biggest, access the lexical entry, and begin to build a 
structure, even without all the information they will need to complete it. They will then 
assign an interpretation over this incomplete structure, predicting it to be referring to the 
biggest item in the set, which can be mapped to the visual array to pick out the biggest 
item. When they hear train, they will update their interpretation to finding the biggest 
item in the set of trains. This picks out the same item in the array, so their original 
interpretation and mapping will be confirmed as correct.  
Alternatively, if children are less incremental in parsing, they may wait until 
they’ve built the full structure before interpretation. This will result in the same behavior 
as more incremental parsers but with a possibly different timecourse. Thus differences in 
speed may reflect differences in the incrementality with which children perform the 
interpretive process.  
In the SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE condition, as in (76), these two parsing strategies are 
more distinct in the behavior they predict. In these trials, incremental parsers will again 
assign an initial interpretation that picks out the biggest item upon hearing the word 
biggest. However, because the following word is a color adjective, such as red, children 
who are parsing incrementally will have to revise the initial interpretation to one which 
picks out the largest item from the subset of red items, which will map to the larger of the 
two red items. Thus there is a crucial difference between the processes required in these 
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two conditions of the PSIS task, in that the SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE condition 
potentially requires this revision of the initial interpretation. 
 
4.3.1.3 Procedure 
Procedure for running subjects was identical to that of Experiments 1-3, with one 
exception. In coding the data from the PSIS task, data was coded to indicate whether 
children were attending to the left, right, top center, or not at all. Inter-coder reliability 
remained high; across three coders, percent agreement was above 97% in all cases, with 
Cohen’s kappa scores of .95 and above. 
 
4.3.1.4 Analyses & Predictions 
The analyses presented below are designed to address a series of questions about 
children’s performance, outlined below. Given the range of effects we wish to explore, 
these questions are answered through several different types of analyses, described in the 
following sections. 
(Q1) Do children successfully distinguish interpretations in Principle C and reflexive 
contexts? 
 Addressed by Timecourse Analyses 
(Q2) To what can the vocabulary effect observed by LCL be attributed: grammatical 
knowledge, processing speed, or experimental design? 
 Addressed by Timecourse Analyses and Processing Speed Analyses 
(Q3)  Do children successfully interpret hierarchical structure in the PSIS task? 
 Addressed by Timecourse Analyses 
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(Q4) Does our new measure of syntactic processing speed capture something distinct 
from the (lexical) processing speed measure formalized by Swingley, Pinto & 
Fernald (1999)? 
 Addressed by Processing Speed Analyses 
(Q5) Which of these factors, if any, predict performance in Principle C contexts? What 
inferences can we therefore make about the mechanism driving Principle C 
effects? 
 Addressed by Growth Curve Analyses 
 
Timecourse Analyses 
The majority of the analyses presented here compare looking behavior across the 
timecourse of the test trial in each task. Performance is measured over the first 2 seconds 
following the disambiguation point. In the Principle C task, where children hear three 
repetitions of the test sentence, we form three corresponding windows of analysis 
comprising 2 seconds after the disambiguation point in each iteration of the sentence. 
Analysis of overall performance on the Principle C task will address the main 
concern of children’s interpretations in each condition. Before the point of 
disambiguation, we expect that in both conditions children should attend to the reflexive 
and non-reflexive events roughly evenly; by that point they will not have received any 
information about the interpretation of the test sentence. Following the disambiguation, 
we predict performance to vary depending on the interpretation children assign to the test 
sentence. In the REFLEXIVE condition, if children have an adult-like understanding of 
reflexives, we predict decreased looking to the non-reflexive event (corresponding to 
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increased looking to the reflexive event), indicating a reflexive interpretation of the 
sentence. In the NAME condition, if children have knowledge of Principle C, we predict 
increased looking to the non-reflexive event, indicating a non-reflexive interpretation of 
the sentence.  
Finally, a comparison of performance by vocabulary score will address more 
closely the vocabulary effect observed by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz (2014), in order 
to determine whether vocabulary is indicative of having or lacking a particular 
component of grammatical knowledge, as suggested by LCL. If this is the case, we 
predict performance for low vocabulary children to be at chance in both conditions, with 
performance for high vocabulary children significantly different. 
 
 
Processing Speed Analyses 
The main purpose of the LAS and PSIS tasks was to gain a measure of individual 
children’s LAS, the ‘processing speed’ measure utilized in the word-learning literature, 
and PSIS, a processing measure more closely tied to interpreting structural rather than 
lexical information, as measures with which to compare children’s Principle C behavior 
and hence evaluate the mechanisms engaged in comprehending sentences exhibiting 
Principle C effects. Additionally, comparisons to these measures allow us to determine 
whether either of these mechanisms could account for the vocabulary effect behavior 
observed by LCL. The speed measure standardly used in word-learning literature 
corresponds to the mean latency after the onset of the disambiguating word to re-orient to 
the target image on distractor-initial trials. In a preferential looking task, behavior upon 
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hearing the target lexical item depends on which image the child happens to be attending 
to at that moment. If the child is already attending to the target image, then ‘correct’ 
performance consists of maintaining this fixation; alternatively, if the child is attending to 
the distractor image when the sentence is disambiguated, then ‘correct’ performance 
requires shifting fixation toward the target image. Because a shift in attention is only 
necessary (or appropriate) on distractor-initial trials, it is from this subset of the data that 
our measure is derived. The point of disambiguation for each sentence type is defined as 
the point at which children have enough information to form an accurate interpretation of 
the sentence. In the LAS task, this point is the onset of the target noun. We formed two 
measures of Phrase Structure Integration Speed (PSIS): one measure over the 
SUPERLATIVE trials, and one over the SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE trials. In the PSIS task, 
for SUPERLATIVE condition sentences, like in the LAS task, the disambiguation occurs at 
the target noun. In the SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE condition sentences, the disambiguation 
occurs at the color adjective14. A final value for each individual child was made for each 
of these three measures by taking the average latency on all distractor-initial trials.  
To assess relations between these processing speed measures (as well as their 
relation to the vocabulary measure), we compared each participant’s vocabulary, LAS, 
PSIS SUPERLATIVE, and PSIS SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE values and measured correlation 
coefficients between the values for each pair of measures. Previous research on 
individual differences has also sometimes treated measures such as vocabulary as a group 
distinction, rather than analyzing values as a continuous measure (akin to LCL’s 
comparison of performance by high vs. low vocabulary children). For this reason, we also 
                                                
14 As in Experiments 1-3, the disambiguation point has been shifted forward 300 ms to 
account for saccade time (Fernald et al., 2008). 
 109 
analyze values on each measure as separated into two groups, defined by the median 
value for that measure. We then compare distributions of participants by median split 
groups, to determine whether children consistently fall into above-median or below-
median groups across multiple measures. The comparisons of each of these measures will 
allow us to identify whether they are independent effects, so that we can use each 
independently to probe performance with respect to Principle C. 
 
Growth Curve Analyses 
The primary objective of the research presented here is to examine the predicted 
dependency between individual variation in speed of syntactic computation and variation 
in performance with respect to Principle C. If one component of the mechanisms engaged 
for interpreting sentences in Principle C contexts involves structure building, then we 
expect our measures of structure building (PSIS measures) to be correlated to 
performance in the Principle C task. In order to more closely investigate individual 
differences in response latency, we employ statistical analysis of growth curve modeling 
(Mirman, Dixon & Magnuson, 2008).  
Common practice in the analysis of timecourse data such as that gained from 
preferential looking tasks has generally been to collapse across time for a given window 
of analysis; this practice yields proportions of a looking time measure over which 
ANOVA or t-test can be performed (indeed, we employ such methods here in the 
majority of our general analysis). However, this practice effectively wipes out the fine 
granularity of time course data; as our primary concern is the precise timecourse of 
children’s interpretation, such methods are not ideal. Growth curve analysis is a statistical 
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method specifically designed to assess change over time (originally employed to analyze 
data from longitudinal studies, although the same methods can be used on a much smaller 
timescale).  
This growth curve modeling approach is based on the assumption that observed 
fixation proportions reflect an underlying probability distribution of fixations. Two 
hierarchically related sub-models are employed to capture the observed fixation pattern. 
The level-1 sub-model captures the effect of time, and the level-2 sub-model captures the 
effect of individual variation. (77) presents an equation of the form y = ax + b 
representative of a level-1 model15. This gives a value for the dependent measure Y 
(proportion of trials where looking was to the non-reflexive event) for a particular child i 
at time point j. In this model we have an intercept term !, a slope term ", and an error 
term $. Both the intercept and slope terms vary across individuals, as captured in the 
corresponding level-2 model for each term, illustrated in (78a-b). In each of these 
equations, the first variable % corresponds to the structural components (the value 
averaged across participants), while the second variable & corresponds to the stochastic 
components (the deviation of the individual’s value from the average value). The 
subscripts on these terms correspond to the order of polynomial term to which the 
variable relates (0 referring to components of the intercept term and 1 referring to 
                                                
15 An equation such as this would capture a linear increase in looking; more variation in 
the form of looking pattern (in other words, the shape of the fixation curve) can be 
captured with the inclusion of higher order polynomial terms; however, it is likely that 
this level of model will be appropriate for our analysis. Recall that we aim to capture the 
behavior corresponding to children’s first shift in attention to the target event after the 
onset of the disambiguating word in the sentence. Correspondingly, a single shift in 
fixation will likely be best captured by a first-order (linear) polynomial. 
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components of the slope term). Thus the corresponding level-2 model can be defined as 
in (79). 
 
(77) Yij = !ij + "ij * timeij + $ij 
 (78) a. !0i = %00 + &0i 
b. "1i = %10 + &1i 
(79) Yij = (%00 + &0i) + (%10 + &1i) * timeij + $ij 
 
This multi-level modeling approach allows us to capture both effects across time 
and across individuals; this analysis thus permits investigation of individual variation in 
response latency on the Principle C task, to determine if this variation relates to those 
individuals’ values on our measures of syntactic processing speed, gathered in the PSIS 
task. The effect of these processing speed measures is evaluated by including them in the 
level-2 model, as shown below in (80). The terms %0S and %1S here index the effect of our 
values of processing speed (represented here as S) on the intercept and linear terms. 
 
 (80) Yij = (%00 + %0S * S + &0i) + (%10 + %1S * S + &1i) * timeij + $ij 
 
In addition to comparing our measures of syntactic processing speed, we also 
considered our measure of LAS as well as measures of MCDI vocabulary. If children’s 
behavior in Principle C contexts is driven by adult-like knowledge of Principle C and 
hence requires building a hierarchical syntactic representation, then deployment of their 
knowledge will depend on the speed with which children process syntactic information. 
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Similarly, adult-like interpretation with respect to sentences containing reflexives will 
also require structural computation in order to confirm a binding relation between the 
reflexive and its antecedent. If children rely on knowledge of phrase structure to interpret 
sentences, then the speed with which they interpret sentences will be dependent on the 
speed with which they deploy their structural knowledge. In this way, we predict 
individual differences in response latency in the Principle C task to be predicted by 
individual differences in syntactic processing speed, as measured by our two PSIS 
measures. Alternatively, if children rely on non-structural cues such as lexical 
information to interpret such sentences, then their speed of interpretation will instead be 
dependent on the speed with which they access lexical items. In this case, we predict 
response latency to be predicted by lexical processing speed, measured by the LAS 
measure. While a non-speed measure such as vocabulary size does not offer as 
straightforward a prediction, we may expect vocabulary to affect children’s ability to 
access particular lexical items, especially those utilized in the test sentences. In this case, 
either the LAS measure or MCDI vocabulary could predict speed of interpretation. 
  
4.3.2 Results & Discussion 
Principle C Task 
Questions Addressed 
(Q1) Do children successfully distinguish interpretations in Principle C and reflexive 
contexts? 
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(Q2) To what can the vocabulary effect observed by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz 
(2014) be attributed: grammatical knowledge, processing speed, or experimental 
design? 
Figure 916 presents the results of the Principle C task for each condition. Before 
the point of disambiguation, behavior does not differ across conditions (F(1,63)=0.6155, 
p>0.1). Following disambiguation, we analyzed 2000 ms windows after the onset of the 
disambiguating word in each repetition of the test sentence (as indicated on the graph by 
the black boxes). A 2 (condition) x 3 (window) ANOVA reveals a main effect of 
condition (F(1,63)=24.07, p<0.001) a marginally significant main effect of window 
(F(2,63)=2.329, p=0.0978), and no interaction. Planned comparisons of behavior within 
each window show that looking to the non-reflexive image is significantly different from 
chance in the first and second windows for the NAME condition (t(31)=4.475, p<0.001; 
t(31)=2.821, p<0.01; t(31)=0.9976, p>0.1 for each window respectively), but only in the 
second window for the reflexive condition (t(31)=-0.3637, p>0.5; t(31)=-2.411, p<0.05; 
t(31)=-1.388, p>0.1 for each window respectively). 
 
                                                
16 All graphs were generated using the ggplot2 library (Wickham, 2009) in R (R 
Development Core Team, 2010). 
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Figure 9 Looking behavior in Experiment 4 Principle C Task. Outlined boxes represent 
critical windows for analysis (2000ms following the onset of the disambiguating object 
NP in three iterations of the test sentence). 
 
 These results replicate the finding of LCL as well as those of Experiments 1 and 3 
that by 30 months, children demonstrate a constraint on pronoun interpretation in 
Principle C contexts, looking preferentially to a disjoint rather than a coreferential 
interpretation. 
Questions Answered: 
(Q1) Do children successfully distinguish interpretations in Principle C and reflexive 
contexts? 
(A1) Yes 
To further explore the vocabulary effect observed by Lukyanenko et al., we 
analyzed performance by comparing behavior based on MCDI vocabulary. Figure 10 




























A 2 (condition) x 2 (vocabulary) x 3 (window) shows a significant effect of condition 
(F(1,63)=24.12, p<0.001) and a marginal effect of window (F(2,63)=2.324, p=0.0982), as 
well as a marginal effect of vocabulary (F(1,63)=3.154, p=0.0759). Additionally, we find 
an interaction between vocabulary and condition (F(1,63)=3.928, p<0.05). Comparisons 
within condition to explore the interaction term show a main effect of vocabulary in the 




Figure 10 Looking behavior in Experiment 4 Principle C task by MCDI Vocabulary 
Score median split groups 
 
 The fact that we find an effect of vocabulary size in the REFLEXIVE condition but 
not the NAME condition is a partial replication of LCL’s observed vocabulary effect. It 

































Experiment 1. Overall, this result allows us to interpret LCL’s finding in a new light. It 
seems that their vocabulary effect in the NAME condition could have been a spurious task-
driven effect. As discussed in Chapter 2, this may represent a difference arising due to 
differing subject designs: while LCL used a within-subjects design, meaning that children 
heard four trials with each sentence type, we used a between-subjects design, where 
children heard eight trials all with one sentence type. Having to interpret multiple 
sentence types could have masked knowledge in the results of Lukyanenko et al., which 
becomes more pronounced when children are presented with only one sentence type 
across trials. However, the fact that the vocabulary effect maintains in the REFLEXIVE 
condition suggests that LCL’s vocabulary result in the REFLEXIVE condition was not 
driven merely by a task effect; this result may relate to reflexive knowledge depending 
closely on children’s ability to recognize reflexive lexical items. 
Questions Answered:  
(Q2) To what can the vocabulary effect observed by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz 
(2014) be attributed: grammatical knowledge, processing speed, or experimental 
design? 
(A2) The effect in the NAME condition can be attributed to a task effect. The effect in 
the REFLEXIVE condition remains to be interpreted. 
 
Lexical Access Speed Task 
Figure 11 shows children’s overall performance on the Lexical Access Speed 
task. Children were overwhelmingly successful in attending to the target object upon 
hearing the target word, as indicated by the sharp increase in the proportion of looking to 
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the target after 2300 ms, when the onset of the target word occurred (marked by the 
leftmost edge of the window). This looking behavior is significantly different from 
chance (t(63)=17.58, p<0.001). By 30 months, this type of task is exceedingly easy for 
children in general, but differences in the speed with which children orient to the target 
image are indicative of individual variation in speed of lexical processing.  
 
 
Figure 11 Looking behavior in Experiment 4 Lexical Access Speed Task. Outlined box 
represents critical window for analysis (2000ms following the onset of the 
disambiguating NP). 
 
As noted above, the measure gathered from the LAS task was each child’s mean 
latency to shift to the target image on distractor-initial trials17. LAS values ranged from 
                                                
17 All response latency measures are taken relative to 300 ms following the raw 
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100.1 to 989.99 ms, with a median LAS of 329.496 ms (mean = 385.29)18; this suggests 
that at 30 months, children’s speed of processing even at the lexical level is still quite 
varied. 
 
Phrase Structure Integration Speed Task 
Questions Addressed 
(Q3)  Do children successfully interpret hierarchical structure in the PSIS task? 
Figures 12-13 present the results for the Phrase Structure Integration task by 
condition. Because the visual array in this case consists of a target item and two 
distractors, the graph in these cases shows the proportion looking to each item (rather 
than the binary distinction of looking to target vs. away from target to the distractor 
presented in previous figures). Because there are three possible items to attend to, chance 
is estimated at 33.3%, rather than 50%. Recall that in the SUPERLATIVE condition, where 
children hear sentences like where’s the biggest train, the target item will be the large 
item, while in the SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE condition, where children hear sentences 
like where’s the biggest red train, the target will be the medium item (corresponding to 
the larger of the two similarly colored items). One obvious effect in both conditions is an 
overall bias to look at the largest item; looking to the largest item is significantly higher 
than chance in both conditions (SUPERLATIVE condition: t(63)=16.1, p<0.001; 
                                                
18 Because the Principle C task is a between-subjects design, we computed separate 
median values for children who were run on each condition of the Principle C task. LAS 
values for children in the REFLEXIVE condition had a median of 333.67 ms (range = 
100.1-989.99 ms, mean = 417.75 ms); LAS values for children in the name condition had 
a median of 300.3 ms (range = 122.36-934.27 ms, mean = 352.99 ms). LAS values did 
not differ significantly across conditions (t(63)=-1.176, p>0.5), so in the following 
analyses of the task, median split groups correspond to two separate median splits, one 
for each condition of the Principle C task. 
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SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE condition: t(63)=13.02, p<0.001). For this reason, we compare 
performance in the window of analysis to pre-disambiguation looking behavior as a 
baseline. Behavior following the disambiguation point differs by condition. A 2 
(condition) x 2 (probe- pre-disambiguation vs. critical window) ANOVA reveals a main 
effect of condition (F(1,63)=111.3, p<0.001), no main effect of probe (F(1,63)=0.5487, 
p>0.1), and a highly significant interaction between condition and probe (F(1,63=66.2, 
p<0.001). Comparisons to investigate the interaction term show that looking to the largest 
item is significantly higher than pre-disambiguation performance in the SUPERLATIVE 
condition (t(63)=-4.864, p<0.001), but significantly lower in the SUPERLATIVE + 
ADJECTIVE condition (t(63)=6.832, p<0.001). 
 
 
Figure 12 Looking behavior in Experiment 4 Phrase Structure Integration Speed Task 































Figure 13 Looking behavior in Experiment 4 Phrase Structure Integration Speed Task 
SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE condition. Outlined box represents critical window for 
analysis (2000ms following disambiguation). 
 
As with the LAS task, the measures gathered from the PSIS task was each child’s 
mean latency to shift to the target image on distractor-initial trials; a separate speed 
measure was gathered for each condition. PSIS SUPERLATIVE values ranged from 133.47 
to 1868.53 ms, with a median PSIS (SUPERLATIVE) of 764.76 ms (mean = 791.12 ms).19 
PSIS SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE values ranged from 340.34 to 1985.32 ms, with a median 
PSIS (SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE) of 1063.73 ms (mean = 1052.72 ms). 20 
                                                
19 As with the LAS task, we calculated separate median values for each condition of the 
Principle C task (see footnote 16). PSIS (SUPERLATIVE) values showed a median of 
798.13 ms in the REFLEXIVE condition (range = 133.47-1581.58 ms; mean = 819.15 ms) 
and 759.76 ms in the NAME condition (range = 225.23-1868.53 ms; mean = 763.43 ms). 
PSIS values did not differ significantly across conditions (t(63)=-1.176, p>0.5), so in the 
following analyses of the task, so we collapse across these multiple median split groups. 
 
20 PSIS SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE values showed a median of 1061.06 ms in the 
REFLEXIVE condition (range = 500.5-1584.92 ms; mean = 1039.71 ms) and 1063.73 ms in 
the NAME condition (range = 340.34-1985.32 ms; mean = 1065.73 ms). PSIS values did 





























In both conditions, we see increases in looking immediately preceding the 
disambiguation point (the target noun in the SUPERLATIVE condition and the target 
adjective in the SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE condition, marked in these graphs by the left 
edge of the window), consistent with children’s incremental interpretation of the 
adjective biggest. In the SUPERLATIVE condition, children primarily maintain looking to 
the largest item; this performance is consistent with accurate integration of train and 
successful interpretation of the target NP. In the SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE condition, 
children show a sharp decrease in looking to the largest item and corresponding increased 
looking to the medium item; this performance is consistent with accurate integration of 
red train and successful interpretation (or revision of interpretation) of the target NP. In 
this task, accurate interpretation and selection of the target object requires children to 
treat the test sentences as hierarchically structured phrases. We see that children are able 
to select the target item in both conditions, suggesting that at 30 months, children’s 
interpretations are hierarchically structured. 
Questions Answered 
(Q3)  Do children successfully interpret hierarchical structure in the PSIS task? 
(A3) Yes 
 
Processing Speed Analyses: Comparison of Covariate Measures 
Questions Addressed 
(Q2) To what can the vocabulary effect observed by LCL be attributed: grammatical 
knowledge, processing speed, or experimental design? 
                                                
analyses of the task, median split groups correspond to two separate median splits, one 
for each condition of the Principle C task 
 122 
(Q4) Does our new measure of syntactic processing speed capture something distinct 
from the (lexical) processing speed measure formalized by Swingley et al (1999)? 
From the LAS and PSIS tasks, we collected three measures of children’s 
processing speed, at the lexical and syntactic levels. As noted above, MCDI information 
was also collected for each child. Figure 14 shows comparisons between each of these 
measures; Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients and significance terms. In sum, 
none of these four measures are significantly correlated with each other (all p>0.1). 
 
 
Figure 14 Comparisons of covariate measures in Experiment 4.  
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 LAS PSIS  (superlative) 
PSIS  
(superlative + adj.) 
Vocabulary -0.17 p=0.169 -0.2 p=0.104 -0.2 p=0.113 
LAS   0.15 p=0.24 0.18 p=0.161 
PSIS 
(superlative)     -0.05 p=0.709 
 
Table 2 Correlations between covariate measures in Experiment 4 
 
Previous research has also analyzed results by comparing performance of children 
in two groups, defined by falling above or below the median value (such as the high 
vocabulary vs. low vocabulary analysis presented by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz). 
However, this analysis also fails to show any correlation between children who fall into 
the above-median or below-median groups. Table 3 presents the number of children 
whose values fall into each category across all measures; Table 4 presents the 
corresponding chi-squared tests. If any measure was correlated with another, we would 
expect children to fall predominantly into the boxes representing above-median on both 
measures or below-median on both measures (i.e. the shaded boxes in Table 3); however, 
the pattern we see is instead a roughly even distribution across all 4 possible boxes. Chi-
squared tests show none of the median split groups for any measure to be related to the 
median split groups for any other measure (all p>0.1), further confirming the results of 

















Vocabulary 14 17 19 12 15 16 
Low 
Vocabulary 15 18 13 20 17 16 
Fast  
LAS   14 15 18 11 
Slow  
LAS   18 17 14 21 
Fast PSIS 
(superlative)     13 19 
Slow PSIS 
(superlative)     19 13 
 
Table 3 Comparison of covariate measures by median split groups 
 
 LAS PSIS (superlative) 
PSIS 
(superlative + adjective) 
Vocabulary #
2 = 0.0518 
p = 0.8199 
#2 = 2.2522 
p = 0.1334 
#2 = 0 
p = 1 
LAS  #
2 = 0 
p = 1 
#2 = 2.27 
p = 0.1319 
PSIS 
(superlative) 
  #2 = 1.5625 
p = 0.2113 
 
Table 4 Chi-Squared distributions of median split groups. All #2(1, n=64) 
 
The lack of correspondence between any of these measures allows us to see more 
clearly two points about the nature of these processing speed measures, which have been 
suggested above. First, the lack of correlation between LAS and either measure of PSIS 
provides that the measures we have created for processing at the syntactic level are 
independent of processing at the lexical level. That is, interpretation in the PSIS task 
involves more than simply compounded lexical access, suggesting that children are in 
fact computing the structure of the sentence, or at least composing the meaning, in order 
to arrive at an interpretation.  
 125 
Second, the lack of a relation between the two measures of PSIS themselves 
suggests that the processing required in each condition varies; we take this difference to 
be indicative of the potential additional requirement in the superlative + adjective 
condition for children incrementally parsing the sentence to revise their initial 
interpretation. 
Further, two points of evidence here allow us to draw some interim conclusions 
related to our question of how vocabulary plays a role in children’s interpretations in 
Principle C contexts. First, the lack of correlation between MCDI vocabulary and LAS 
suggests that vocabulary may not be related to processing speed at the lexical level at 30 
months of age21. Second, the lack of correlation between MCDI vocabulary and either 
PSIS measure suggests that vocabulary may also be unrelated to processing speed at the 
syntactic level. Together, these points significantly weaken the argument that the 
vocabulary effect on children’s Principle C knowledge is a reflex of variation in 
processing speed, as vocabulary seems to be independent of lexical or syntactic 
processing at this age.  
Due to the lack of a relation shown between any of these measures, in the 
following analyses we treat each as an independent covariate measure. 
 
                                                
21 Of course, it is possible that 30 months is simply beyond the age range when 
vocabulary can be reliably linked to lexical processing speed. This could be due to either 
ceiling effects on the vocabulary measure, or to the fact that there is less variability in 
lexical processing than there is at younger ages. Additionally, one could raise the 
methodological issue that tasks measuring processing speed in the literature generally use 
more trials; while our task included 8 trials, most tasks in previous research have used 
upwards of 20 trials. Ongoing research aims to further explore the connection between 
vocabulary and various measures of processing speed with increased number of trials to 
facilitate having enough distractor-initial trials to form reliable measures. 
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Questions Answered 
(Q2) To what can the vocabulary effect observed by Lukyanenko, Conroy & Lidz 
(2014) be attributed: grammatical knowledge, processing speed, or experimental 
design? 
(A2) The effect in the NAME condition can be attributed to a task effect. The effect in 
the REFLEXIVE condition remains to be interpreted; it cannot be attributed to 
variation in processing speed in any clear way. 
(Q4) Does our new measure of syntactic processing speed capture something distinct 
from the (lexical) processing speed measure formalized by Swingley et al (1999)? 
(Q4) Yes. 
 
Growth Curve Analyses: Individual Differences in Speed of Interpretation 
Questions Addressed 
(Q2) To what can the vocabulary effect observed by LCL be attributed: grammatical 
knowledge, processing speed, or experimental design? 
(Q5) Which of these factors, if any, predict performance in Principle C contexts? What 
inferences can we therefore make about the mechanism driving Principle C 
effects? 
So far we have demonstrated that all children exhibit behavior consistent with 
knowledge of Principle C at 30 months. Our analysis of individual differences in 
processing seeks to determine what type of processing is implicated in this response, as a 
means to determine the underlying knowledge behind children’s performance pattern. If 
speed of interpretation is predicted by processing at the syntactic level, then we can infer 
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that the underlying knowledge driving behavior is structural in nature; this dependency is 
predicted if children are using accurate knowledge of Principle C. Alternatively, if speed 
of interpretation is predicted by processing at the lexical level, then we can infer that the 
underlying knowledge driving behavior is non-structural in nature.  
To examine speed of interpretation, we analyzed distractor-initial trials, as we did 
for the LAS and PSIS tasks in our generation of the processing speed measures. To 
ensure that response latency on distractor-initial trials is actually indicative of speed of 
interpretation of the test sentence, we compared performance to that of target-initial trials. 
If children rapidly shifted fixation equally often in both distractor-initial and target-initial 
trials, it would suggest that their fixation behavior is independent of interpretive 
processes and would not reflect a response to the target sentence, but rather some sort of 
behavior pattern technique that results from the nonlinguistic demands of the task and not 
to any property of the linguistic stimulus. Figures 15-16 present performance in each 
condition from the disambiguation point onwards comparing distractor-initial and target-
initial trials. A two-way ANOVA over the NAME condition shows a main effect of onset 
(distractor- vs. target-initial) (F(1,63)=19.39, p<0.001), while the corresponding ANOVA 




Figure 15 Onset-contingent looking behavior in Experiment 4 Principle C Task NAME 
condition. Performance measured from the shifted disambiguation point. 
 
 
Figure 16 Onset-contingent looking behavior in Experiment 4 Principle C Task 
REFLEXIVE condition. Performance measured from the shifted disambiguation point. 
 
This result suggests that the response latency value is not an effective measure of 
speed of interpretation in the REFLEXIVE condition, where the response is less closely 
time-locked to the linguistic stimulus. We discuss a number of possibilities to account for 






















































situation in which response latency is an effective measure of speed of interpretation, we 
therefore restrict our analysis to performance in the NAME condition. 
In order to most closely capture children’s response latency in the NAME condition 
trials, corresponding to their first shift in fixation from the distractor to the target, we 
restricted our analysis to the first 1500 ms post-disambiguation, as this is the window 
when the majority (over 85%) of first fixation shifts occur. We used growth curve 
analysis over the NAME condition distractor-initial trials in order to compare performance 
of individuals based on their values on the covariate measures (MCDI vocabulary, LAS, 
PSIS (SUPERLATIVE), and PSIS (SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE)). Looking behavior was 
modeled with fourth-order (quartic) orthogonal polynomials, fixed effects for each 
covariate measure (treated as continuous measures, each in a separate model), and 
random effects of participant on all time terms. Table 5 presents an analysis of model fit 
for each set of models. The deviance statistic -2LL provides a measure of model fit (with 
smaller values representing a better fit). Change in deviance is distributed as chi-square, 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters added to the model. The base 
model represents a model with no effect of covariate measures. When we observe an 
effect on one of the polynomial terms in any of the covariate measure models, this can be 
interpreted as significant improvement in model fit over the base model when that 
covariate measure is incorporated into the model. The polynomial term that bears the 
effect is indicative of the component of the looking behavior that is captured by 
integrating the covariate measure into the model. (I will address each effect we observe 
and how the effect might be interpreted in further detail below.) There was a significant 
effect of PSIS (SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE) on the intercept term (Estimate = -0.002023, 
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SE = 0.0008, p<0.05), indicative of overall greater proportion of looking to the non-
reflexive image in this time window by children with faster PSIS (SUPERLATIVE + 
ADJECTIVE). Additionally, there was a marginally significant effect of PSIS 
(SUPERLATIVE) on the linear term (Estimate = -0.01973, SE = 0.01, p=0.0556), and a 
marginally significant effect of vocabulary on the quadratic term (Estimate = -0.00118, 
SE = 0.00058, p=0.0506); effects on these terms are indicative of differences in speed to 
shift attention to the non-reflexive item. All other effects were non-significant. Model fits 
for each covariate measure model are shown in Figure 17. 
 
Model -2LL !LL p 
Base -2648 --- --- 
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Figure 17 Model fits to observed data for Experiment 4 Principle C Task. Observed data 
are represented by solid lines. Model fits are represented by dotted lines. 
 
These results show that by 30 months, speed of interpretation in Principle C 
















































































PSIS (superlative+adj) fast slow
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at least one measure of syntactic processing speed22. Differences in the linear component 
of performance, as indicated by an effect on the linear term of the model based in PSIS 
(SUPERLATIVE) differences, are a clear indication of differences in speed of interpretation. 
This finding is consistent with the prediction that if reaching the correct interpretation in 
the Principle C condition requires structure building, then performance in that condition 
would be linked to children’s speed of processing syntactic information. This finding thus 
suggests that by 30 months, children’s interpretation in Principle C contexts is driven by 
syntactic knowledge.  
An effect on the intercept term, as seen with the model including the effect of 
PSIS (SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE), is not directly indicative of a difference in speed 
(generally indicated by the rate of change, or slope). Rather, it indicates a difference in 
proportion of fixation shifts to the target which is constant across the entire time window; 
this is effectively the proportional measure derived from standard analyses of timecourse 
data which collapses across windows of time. That is, an effect on the intercept term is 
generally interpreted as corresponding to a difference in ‘accuracy’ (defined as fixation to 
the target image) rather than a difference in response speed. Because our analysis here 
encompasses only the first 1500 ms post-disambiguation, this is not an ideal measure to 
accurately estimate overall accuracy in this task. One might, however, consider one way 
in which even the intercept term, which does not take into account changes across the 
time window of analysis, might still be reflective of a difference in speed. Recall that the 
                                                
22 Recall that we predict that the PSIS measure gained from SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE 
trials may not be an effective measure of syntactic processing speed, as it potentially 
confounds two processes required for interpretation- integration of information into the 
structure, and revision of initial incorrect parses. Thus the lack of effect on a model term 
indicative of slope differences is in this case not surprising. 
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dependent measure for these analyses is the proportion of shifts in fixation (from the 
distractor to the target image). Additionally, this analysis has been measured exclusively 
over distractor-initial trials, in order to accurately assess shifts in fixation to the target 
image. In this subset of the data, behavior at time point 0 is consistent across the dataset- 
no shift in fixation has yet occurred on any trial. Given that all behavior is identical at the 
beginning of the window of analysis, a difference which is stable across the majority of 
the time window, being realized as an effect on the intercept term, could arise from a 
slight difference in slope at the beginning of the window that then levels off. In this way, 
an effect on the intercept term could even be interpreted as resulting from a difference in 
speed of response. Thus one might even interpret the effect seen in the PSIS 
(SUPERLATIVE + ADJECTIVE) analysis to reflect differences in speed of interpretation in 
Principle C contexts.  
We additionally found an effect on the quadratic term in the model examining the 
effect of vocabulary. An effect on this term also corresponds to differences in slope, but 
additionally captures variation in slope across the time window. While we did not predict 
vocabulary to affect speed of interpretation, it remains an open question what vocabulary 
may be indexing. It is possible that this effect arises because vocabulary is in part a 
consequence of syntactic knowledge, but in some way that is not captured by syntactic 
processing. It could be that children with better syntactic abilities in general have larger 
vocabularies, which in turn could yield an indirect effect on interpretation here. We 
discuss further possibilities with respect to the role of vocabulary size in Section 4.4. 
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Questions Answered 
(Q2) To what can the vocabulary effect observed by LCL be attributed: grammatical 
knowledge, processing speed, or experimental design? 
(A2) The effect in the NAME condition can be attributed to a task effect. The effect in 
the REFLEXIVE condition remains to be interpreted; it cannot be attributed to 
variation in processing speed in any clear way. However, given that vocabulary 
predicts speed of interpretation in Principle C contexts, it may be that vocabulary 
is related to a more global (i.e. combined) measure of syntactic competence or 
processing. 
(Q5) Which of these factors, if any, predict performance in Principle C contexts? What 
inferences can we therefore make about the mechanism driving Principle C 
effects? 
(A5) Syntactic processing predicts speed of interpretation in Principle C contexts. This 
effect is expected only if interpretation in Principle C contexts is dependent on 
structure building. MCDI Vocabulary size also affects speed of interpretation in 
Principle C contexts; the implications of this finding remain undetermined. 
 
4.4 General Discussion 
Summary of findings 
Using a 2000ms window of analysis, we find: 
(A) that children at 30 months show success in interpreting both Principle C and 
reflexive sentences; 
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(B) no effect of vocabulary on overall Principle C performance, unlike Lukyanenko, 
Conroy & Lidz (2014); 
(C) an effect of vocabulary on reflexive sentences, replicating the finding of LCL. 
In the analysis of covariate measures, we find: 
(A) no correlations between our measures of vocabulary, lexical processing and 
syntactic processing; 
(B) that response latency is not a useful measure for assessing interpretation in 
reflexive contexts; 
(C) that syntactic processing but not lexical processing predicts speed of interpretation 
in Principle C contexts. 
The research presented here shows several key findings. We replicate results of 
LCL, showing that by 30 months, children exhibit behavior consistent with adult-like 
knowledge of Principle C. We find a vocabulary effect, as Lukyanenko et al. did, 
however while vocabulary predicted performance in both conditions in their experiment, 
vocabulary only affected overall performance in the REFLEXIVE condition in our study. 
This difference is most likely related to differences in task design, in utilizing a between-
subjects design rather than within-subjects. Limiting comprehension to one sentence type 
may have made it easier for low vocabulary children in our study to interpret the 
structures of the test sentences. This suggests that at least in Principle C contexts, to 
vocabulary effect observed by LCL was likely due to extralinguistic factors; it may be 
these extralinguistic factors that contribute to word learning, which manifests as 
differences in vocabulary.  
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Components of our analysis are novel in two ways. First, we have developed a 
method for measuring processing speed at the syntactic level. Previous methods for 
assessing processing speed have targeted lexical information; our new syntactic 
processing speed task requires children to interpret a sentence compositionally, reflecting 
hierarchical syntactic structure. We demonstrate that the measures gained from this task 
are independent of lexical processing, suggesting that they successfully index speed of 
processing syntactic information. 
Most importantly, our analysis is novel in using individual differences at the level 
of deployment to suggest underlying similarities at the level of knowledge. Because we 
see a clear contribution of structure-building processes in predicting the time-course of 
success in the Principle C task, we can conclude that this success is driven by structural 
knowledge. Moreover, because speed of response in the Principle C task is not predicted 
by the speed of non-structural processes like lexical access, we gain further support for 
the role of structure in explaining children’s behavior. Finally, if children’s success with 
Principle C sentences were driven by non-structural heuristics for reaching adult-like 
interpretations, we would not expect differences in the speed of interpreting Principle C 
sentences to be correlated with the speed of building structure. Taken together, then, 
these findings suggest that children’s interpretations in these experiments are driven by 
Principle C, suggesting that this knowledge is in place at least by 30 months of age. 
 
Open Questions 
One question that remains to be answered is what the role of vocabulary in 
demonstration of Principle C knowledge may be. Because our between subjects-design 
 137 
failed to reveal an effect of vocabulary on performance, but the within-subjects design of 
LCL did show such an effect, it seems likely that the earlier vocabulary effect is likely 
due to nonlinguistic contributors to performance, rather than relating to grammatical 
development. Additionally, however, we see that vocabulary is predictive of speed of 
interpretation in Principle C contexts, but it does not correlate with any of our measures 
of processing speed. Thus exactly what contribution vocabulary makes to speed of 
interpretation remains unclear. It seems that MCDI vocabulary may index a simpler 
factor in children’s word-learning capabilities. We consider two possibilities: first, the 
vocabulary effect could be an effect not of children’s full vocabulary, but of their 
knowledge of the particular verbs used in these test sentences. However, we would 
expect this to affect performance in both conditions equally; instead, we see a vocabulary 
effect only in the REFLEXIVE condition. Alternatively, the effect could be evidence of 
children with smaller vocabularies being less adept at learning new words, making it 
more difficult for these children to process the names and relevant reference relations in 
these sentences. Again, however, it is unclear how this would manifest in one condition 
but not the other. More generally, vocabulary could be a type of composite measure 
which is indirectly tied to multiple aspects of grammatical and cognitive development. 
Essentially, this possibility is consistent with vocabulary being related to grammatical 
development without directly implicating any one specific factor of grammatical 
knowledge or grammatical processes. This possibility is appealing in light of previous 
research showing vocabulary’s relation to various measures of grammatical development, 
and given that our growth curve analysis found vocabulary to be predictive of speed of 
response in Principle C contexts. However, it is also somewhat loosely defined; closer 
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investigation is necessary to determine which aspects of grammatical development 
vocabulary is most likely to affect, as well as how alternative measures of grammatical 
development might be generated, in order to compare with vocabulary. 
An additional question relates to the differing timecourse of response in the 
REFLEXIVE condition as compared to the NAME condition. Behavior is closely time-locked 
to the linguistic stimulus in the NAME condition, such that children shift their attention to 
the target item within the first 2000 ms after hearing disambiguating information in the 
test sentence (in this case, the target direct object NP). Comparatively, behavior in 
response to linguistic stimulus is delayed in the REFLEXIVE condition, only appearing 
about 4000 ms after disambiguation. This pattern may relate to the nature of the 
constraints Principle C and Principle A, and differences in how reference is resolved in 
these differing contexts. The resolution of a pronoun’s referent in a Principle C context is 
a forward-looking process; in other words, a listener can predict that NPs in the c-
command domain of a pronoun will be disjoint in reference (Kazanina et al., 2006; c.f. 
discussion in Conroy et al., 2009). Contrastively, reference resolution for a reflexive 
requires accessing the antecedent from memory, in a backward-looking search (Sturt 
1999; Dillon 2010). Thus failure to predict performance in reflexive contexts may be a 
result of the antecedent retrieval process not being adequately indexed by eye movements 
in this task. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The research presented in this chapter sought to identify the specific character of 
knowledge which drives performance by examining the processes required to deploy this 
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knowledge in real time. I identified three possible factors which could contribute to 
interpretation in Principle C contexts: vocabulary, processing of lexical information, and 
processing of syntactic information. I show that speed of interpretation in Principle C 
contexts (performance) is predicted by processing speed at the syntactic level but not at 
the lexical level (deployment). This dependency between syntactic processing and 
performance suggests underlying knowledge which is based in phrase structure and the 
ability to perform computations over such structure (knowledge). The success of this 







A primary challenge in acquisition research is that while we aim to diagnose 
children’s underlying competence, we only have access to their performance. Beyond 
diagnosing simply whether competence is adult-like or not, it is also important to identify 
how this competence comes into place. Can we identify a pattern of children successively 
upgrading interpretive mechanisms that approximate the adult grammar before adult-like 
grammatical knowledge is available? Or is the pattern instead all-or-nothing, when 
children’s earliest performance consistent with adult grammatical knowledge seems to 
also be driven by adult-like competence? Understanding the developmental trajectory for 
a given linguistic phenomena is important to our understanding of how such a 
phenomena arises in the grammar. In this dissertation, I explored a case study of 
children’s early syntactic knowledge. My in-depth analysis of Principle C at 30 months 
has provided novel insights into diagnostics for underlying competence by utilizing two 
distinct methods of analysis which probe both children’s performance as well as the 
deployment processes required to implement underlying knowledge in performance. 
Additionally, this work has served to expand our understanding of the developmental 
trajectory of Principle C, which can contribute to debates about the origin of this 
constraint as part of the grammar. 
This dissertation has explored the developmental trajectory of Principle C through 
two primary analytic approaches. First, I explored children’s behavioral response across 
multiple linguistic contexts in which Principle C applies. This research demonstrated that 
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across contexts, other proposed interpretive mechanisms based in non-structural 
information cannot account for all of children’s behavior. Second, I used individual 
measures of processing as a predictor of performance. Because different interpretive 
strategies will require different processes to be deployed, I was able to use measures of 
these deployment processes as a diagnostic rather than a flaw in children’s performance 
to be controlled for. This research showed that syntactic processing predicts performance, 
implicating structural composition as a mechanism used in children’s early interpretations 
in Principle C contexts. Together, these findings have not only demonstrated new 
methods for interpreting children’s performance, but have also extended our knowledge 
of the developmental pattern that characterizes Principle C. 
In this conclusion, I will summarize the key findings presented in this dissertation, 
as well as their broader implications, by addressing and answering the questions 
originally posed in the Introduction.  
 
5.1 Key Findings 
Question 1: At what point in development are Principle C effects observable in children’s 
behavior?  
 Chapter 2 provided insight into the age at which Principle C effects emerge. 
Identifying the onset of behavior consistent with adults is critical to expanding our 
understanding of the developmental pattern of Principle C. This is the first step towards 
identifying the point in development at which we believe Principle C knowledge to be 
fully acquired. It is this point that can be taken as the end-point for whatever development 
occurs. It remains to be determined whether this development is characterized by growth 
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of knowledge through representational change or by recognition of knowledge through 
identifying some mapping between strings in the language and available representations. 
In order to answer this more complex debate, it will first be necessary to identify the 
period during which this development occurs, starting with the point at which it is 
completed. Previous research showed Principle C effects in children as young as 30 
months. In Chapter 2, I explored performance in 24 and 30 month-olds (Experiments 1 
and 2), showing that children exhibit a preference for a disjoint interpretation at 30 
months, but exhibit no such preference at 24 months. This finding suggests that the 
earliest age at which we can observe Principle C effects in children is somewhere 
between 25 and 30 months. It may be noted here that even this finding does not fully rule 
out Principle C knowledge at early ages. It is possible that 24 month-olds do have the 
underlying knowledge available but are not able to display that knowledge within the 
context of our task. In fact, children could potentially have adult-like knowledge, or even 
an alternative interpretive mechanism such as those discussed in Chapters 2 and 3; but if 
this is the case then at this point in development they are not able to exhibit that 
knowledge outwardly in a way that we can measure. The ability to deploy whatever 
knowledge drives early Principle C effects seems to arise sometime between 25-30 
months. Now that we have an idea of when Principle C effects emerge in the 
developmental timeline, we can begin to explore whether these are actually caused by 
Principle C. That is, we will investigate whether children’s early interpretations in 
Principle C contexts could be driven by some other non-structural interpretive strategies. 
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Question 2: Are early Principle C effects attributable to knowledge of Principle C, or 
does this early behavior arise from an alternative interpretive mechanism?  
 We have now established a potential “end point” of acquisition of Principle C as 
30 months; this is the earliest age at which we are able to identify the preference for 
disjoint interpretations consistent with knowledge of Principle C. Now that we have 
identified the onset of adult-like behavior, we want to probe what type of knowledge 
drives this early behavior. Do children really know Principle C at 30 months? Or are they 
using some “cheating strategy”—an interpretive mechanism based in some non-structural 
knowledge. Chapters 2 and 3 identified two possible interpretive mechanisms which have 
been proposed as alternatives to Principle C in young children to account for early 
Principle C effects. Chapter 2 began with the possibility that children could use transitive 
syntax as a cue to a disjoint interpretation. Research from the literature on syntactic 
bootstrapping has robustly shown that children interpret sentences with transitive syntax 
as corresponding to events with two participants. Because initial studies used the basic 
transitive X VERBs Y structure, it is possible that children could employ this bias to 
interpret reference as an initial strategy rather than Principle C. To identify which 
mechanism is responsible for children’s behavior, I identified a linguistic context where 
these mechanisms predict differing performance. Experiments 1 and 2 investigated 
children’s interpretations of sentences such as (81) and (82).  
 
(81) She’s patting Katie’s head. 
(82) She’s patting her head. 
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Both of our specifications of a transitivity bias are formalized as relations between 
transitive syntactic frames and a particular interpretation. These transitivity biases only 
predict different interpretations for transitive and intransitive structures; they do not take 
into account the content of the NP arguments, only the number of arguments. By these 
biases sentences (81) and (82), both being transitive clauses, should be interpreted in the 
same manner and interpretations should not vary across sentence types. Unlike these 
transitivity biases, Principle C takes into account the type of nominal element in the 
argument NPs. Principle C predicts only one possible interpretation for (81), but two 
possible interpretations for (82), and thus expects a divergence in performance across 
sentence types. Experiment 1 showed that at 30 months, children’s behavioral pattern 
differs by sentence type. This performance is consistent with knowledge of Principle C, 
and cannot be accounted for by a bias based in transitive syntax. 
 Chapter 3 explored the possibility that children could use linear precedence of a 
pronoun over an R-expression as a cue for a disjoint interpretation. Because we know that 
children use linear order as an initial interpretive strategy before they fully comprehend 
sentence structure, it is possible that are utilizing this strategy rather than syntactic 
knowledge in their early interpretation of reference relations. This study investigated 
children’s interpretations of sentences such as (83) and (84).  
 
(83)  She’s painting the house that’s in Katie’s lap. 
(84) The house that she’s painting is in Katie’s lap. 
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A linear bias predicts that interpretations should not vary across sentence types, as the 
linear order of the pronoun preceding the R-expression is maintained across sentence 
types. Because c-command of the pronoun over the R-expression obtains in (83) but not 
(84) Principle C predicts only one possible interpretation for (83), but two possible 
interpretations for (84), and thus expects a divergence in performance across sentence 
types. Experiment 3 showed that at 30 months, children’s response pattern is consistent 
with knowledge of Principle C, and cannot be explained by a bias based in linear order. 
 Together, these experiments show that across all tested contexts, Principle C is the 
only interpretive mechanism which is able to account for behavior in all cases. While 
these results do not conclusively identify Principle C as 30 month-olds’ interpretive 
mechanism, they definitely serve to narrow the field of possible alternatives. These 
findings also serve to expand the linguistic contexts in which 30 month-olds exhibit 
behavior consistent with knowledge of Principle C. 
 
Question 3: What are the processing mechanisms through which children’s knowledge is 
deployed? 
 One monumental challenge to investigating children’s competence is that it is 
mediated by performance. Further, performance is dependent not only on children’s 
knowledge, but also on any processes required to implement that knowledge. Rather than 
attempting to filter out the effects of these processes, we have instead taken advantage of 
these processes as a means of diagnosing the underlying knowledge requiring these 
processes. In Chapter 4 I compared the predictiveness of different measures of processing 
speed. Because we know that interpretation via Principle C will require syntactic 
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composition, we expect that speed of interpretation in a Principle C task should be 
dependent on a child’s speed of processing syntactic information. Experiment 4 showed 
that individual variance in syntactic but not lexical processing speed predicts individual 
variance in the speed of interpretation in Principle C contexts. This dependency suggests 
that whatever strategy is responsible for interpretation in Principle C contexts must 
incorporate syntactic structure building. This result serves to once again narrow the realm 
of possible alternative interpretive strategies to account for early Principle C effects; 
because performance is predicted by syntactic processing speed, the interpretive strategy 
must be structural in nature.  
 
Question 4: How did children arrive at the knowledge state that drives their early 
Principle C effects? Can we contribute to the innate vs. learned debate? 
 Constraints on interpretation pose an interesting learning problem, as there is 
inherently no information in the child language learner’s input which gives explicit 
positive evidence for such a property. Computational models can be implemented to 
show that learning from indirect negative evidence is possible (e.g. Regier & Gahl, 2004; 
Pearl & Lidz, 2009; which provide accounts for the findings of Lidz, Waxman & 
Freedman, 2003). The first task, however, is to define the space in which learning might 
take place, and identify what evidence children might use. While I do not attempt to 
provide an ultimate answer to the innate vs. learned question for Principle C, the research 
presented here does take several steps toward identifying a solution. 
 First, as discussed above, this dissertation has narrowed in on defining the end 
point of learning. These results suggest the earliest age at which Principle C effects are 
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present in children’s performance. Further, the elimination of the most likely alternative 
interpretive mechanisms show that we do not find any point at which we can confirm that 
children use a non-adult interpretive strategy in Principle C contexts. We implicate 
syntactic processing in interpretation in Principle C contexts; this finding eliminates the 
possibility that interpretation is based in any non-structural mechanism. While these 
results still do not concretely identify Principle C as the driving force behind these 
earliest Principle C effects, they have significantly narrowed the field of possibility for 
viable alternatives. 
 Second, I offer a brief analysis of the input that children might use to recognize 
Principle C if a learning account were implemented. Consider the set of sentences in (85-
89). 
 
(85) a.  He1 saw [NP John2] 
 b.  John1 saw [NP himself1] 
(86) a.  He1 saw [NP John’s2 mother] 
 b.  John1 saw [NP his1/2 mother] 
(87) a.  [NP His1 mother] saw John1/2 
 b.  [NP John’s1 mother] saw him1/2 
(88) a.  He1 thought [CP that John2 was being nice] 
 b.  John1 thought [CP that he1/2 was being nice] 
(89) a.  [CP That he1 was being nice] pleased John1/2 
 b.  [CP That John1 was being nice] pleased him1/2 
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These sentences constitute a sampling of the types of sentences that children 
might encounter. While all of the sentences contain a pronoun and an R-expression, only 
three of the ten are such that the pronoun c-commands the R-expression (85a, 86a, and 
88a). Thus it seems clear already that the subset of sentences over which Principle C will 
even apply is not necessarily a large portion of the potential input. Importantly, however, 
it is exactly this type of sentence which children would need to receive as input in order 
to learn Principle C. That is, children would need to recognize that when a pronoun c-
commands an r-expression, the interpretation of such sentences is never such that the 
pronoun co-refers with the r-expression. 
 In order to examine the availability of input relevant to the acquisition of 
Principle C, I compared data from two corpora in CHILDES, a databank of transcribed 
corpora of child-directed speech databank (MacWhinney, 2000): the Home-School Study 
of Language and Literacy Development corpus, and the NewEngland corpus, both of 
which are composed of transcribed interactions between parents and children.  Together, 
they comprise data from input to 116 children ages 2;3-5;0, with a total of 26,210 parent-
to-child utterances. 
 In my search of these corpora, I focused on three types of sentences. First, as we 
have noted that even with innately specified knowledge of Principle C it will be 
necessary to determine which lexical items act as pronouns in a given language, I tallied 
the number of utterances that contained pronouns. As Principle C will most naturally 
apply over sentences with 3rd person singular pronouns, I restricted my search to this 
subset of pronouns23. Next, from this set of sentences, I recorded the subset which also 
                                                
23 Due to the first-pass nature of this analysis, I also excluded it from these counts. 
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contained an R-expression. Finally, I tallied the subset within this set of sentences where 
the R-expression was c-commanded by the pronoun. Recall that it is this final sentence 
type which is critical for a learning theory of Principle C where the set of considered 
hypotheses is not innately restricted. 
Table 6 shows the results of the corpora search, in terms of the number of 
occurrences of the relevant sentence types as well as the proportion of the corpora that 
they represent. Even the simplest sentence type, considering all sentences in which a 3rd 
person pronoun is used, comprises under 5% of the input. Sentences with both a 3rd 
person pronoun and an r-expression occurred in less than 1% of the input in both corpora, 
and of these, sentences where the pronoun c-commanded the r-expression made up less 
than one tenth of a percent of children’s input. 
 
Sentence Type Input Available 
Pronoun (he, she, him, her) 983 3.75% 
Pronoun + R-expression (any order) 28 0.11% 
Pronoun + c-commanded R-expression  11 0.04% 
 
Table 6 Frequency information from two corpora. Numbers reported: occurrences of 




 Additionally, across both corpora, I found no sentences exhibiting backwards 
anaphora (cases where a pronoun linearly precedes but does not c-command an R-
expression)24. Thus even if children were able to take advantage of the rare cases of the 
critical sentence type, the sentence type which would disambiguate the correct Principle 
                                                
24 Thus sentences which contained both a pronoun and an r-expression where the pronoun 
did not c-command the R-expression were cases where the R-expression preceded the 
pronoun linearly. 
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C generalization from a linear constraint is not present in the input. This point is further 
evidence, then, that the available evidence from which children would be able to 
generalize Principle C is extremely rare. 
 One assumption we have made thus far is in thinking that 1% of the input 
available to the child is negligible enough that learning from it is not plausible. But is 1% 
really that small? First, consider the total amount of speech input that children might be 
exposed to. Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven & Tomasello (2003) analyzed interactions 
between 12 parent-child dyads from the Manchester corpus (Theakston et al., 2001) in 
the CHILDES database. They estimate that children are exposed to approximately 7,000 
utterances in the course of a day. Note, however, that input estimates often vary widely. 
Hart & Risley (1995) showed that Socio-Economic Status (SES) has a serious impact on 
the quantity of language input that children are likely to receive. They estimate that 
children from high-SES families hear about 11,000 utterances per day, while children 
from low-SES families may only hear around 700 utterances per day.  
 Once we are able to estimate children’s input, we need to estimate the duration of 
time across development when children’s input would be relevant to learning Principle C. 
This will allow us to estimate the total amount of utterances that a child might hear which 
would provide relevant input to generalizing Principle C. As discussed above, the 
research presented in this dissertation suggests that 30 months is a likely end point to the 
acquisition process. All available evidence suggests that behavior at 30 months is 
consistent with knowledge of Principle C; further, no alternative interpretive mechanism 
yet studied has been able to account for children’s performance at this age. We can 
therefore limit ourselves to the input that children receive by 30 months old. 
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We have paid comparatively little attention to when the starting point of 
acquisition might be. We certainly don’t want to start the clock at birth; children must 
minimally have the building blocks required to encode the speech input in a meaningful 
way for solving this problem. That is, children are not likely to be gathering data about 
syntactic phenomena before they are able to accurately segment words, or in the case of 
Binding Theory, before they have an accurate grasp of which words of their language 
correspond to pronouns, anaphors, and R-expressions. So when do children show early 
comprehension of pronouns? Children begin to produce pronouns, starting with first 
person, by 15 months (Macnamara, 1982). However, the time course for comprehension 
of third person pronouns, which are most relevant for the Principle C context sentences 
we are concerned with, remains unresolved. Several studies have shown that both 
comprehension and production of third person pronouns lag behind those of first and 
second person pronouns, showing limited comprehension even at 30 months (Charney, 
1980; Strayer, 1977). These early results contrast with the research presented herein, 
which shows that children have enough of a grasp of pronouns to succeed in interpreting 
Principle C sentences by this age. The present scarcity of evidence to accurately pinpoint 
the onset of pronoun knowledge in children’s grammar limits us from estimating when 
accurate encoding for Principle C might be in place. 
Another component of knowledge children will need for speech input to be 
effectively encoded is syntactic comprehension in order to accurately compute the 
relevant c-command relations. Although we don’t have a direct estimate of when children 
are able to compute c-command relations, we could take as a start the age when children 
begin to use syntactic structure to interpret sentences.  Previous research suggests that 
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this time point may fall between 21 and 24 months. As discussed in Section 3.2, Gertner 
& Fisher (2012) showed that 21 month-olds rely on order of NPs to interpret sentences 
before they have access to full sentence structure. They found that 21 month-olds 
interpret conjoined subject intransitive sentences like (90) as having the same 
interpretation as a transitive structure like (91). 
 
(90) The boy and the girl are gorping! 
(91) The boy is gorping the girl! 
 
By 24 months, children no longer use this word order strategy, but rather rely on 
syntactic cues to interpret similar sentences (Naigles, 1990). Based on these findings, it 
seems that the ability to compute syntactic relations to interpret sentences arises around 
24 months of age. If we take this time point as the rough starting point when children 
have available the necessary component knowledge to reliably encode the input relevant 
to Principle C, it would mean that any learning that might take place occurs in roughly a 
six month period, from 24 to 30 months. 
If we take these estimates of the number of sentences a child may hear in a day 
and the time period when these sentences could be encoded appropriately, we can now 
estimate the raw amount of relevant input children may receive from which to generalize 
Principle C. Six months of 7,000 utterances a day would stack up to 1,277,500 utterances. 
How many of these sentences would actually help a child generalize a constraint on 
interpretation like Principle C? In the corpus analysis presented above, sentences which 
contained a pronoun that c-commanded an R-expression made up only 11 of 26,210 
 153 
utterances25. With these two sets of numbers, we can now estimate that children might 
see approximately 536 data points relevant to Principle C. In real numbers, our original 
estimate of 1% of the input seems less negligible.  
 One way to determine whether this level of data available in the input is enough 
to learn from is by comparison to similarly frequent (or similarly rare) items. We can 
investigate the age of acquisition for words of similar frequency to determine whether 
comprehension at 30 months with this limited input is really plausible. The SUBTLEXUS 
corpus is comprised of 51.0 million words transcribed from American film subtitles 
(Brysbaert & New, 2009). A sample of words in this corpus that have similarly low 
frequencies comparable to our estimated Principle C-relevant input (420 per million, 
around 21,400 occurrences in this 51 million-word corpus) are presented in Table 7. To 
determine whether words of this frequency have been acquired by children by 30 months, 
I included the proportion of 30 month-olds that are reported to produce this word (as 
reported in the MCDI Lexical Norms Database). 
  
                                                
25 Recall, however, that while this sentence type potentially exhibits Principle C 
constraints, it is also consistent with alternative interpretive hypotheses, such as a Linear 
Bias. Backward anaphoric sentences where a pronoun precedes but does not c-command 
an R-expression were entirely absent from this dataset. 
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Word Raw Frequency Frequency  Per Million 
Reported Production  
at 30 Months 
mom 21950 430.39 98.8% 
friend 21384 419.29 81.3% 
move 21325 418.14 n/a 
same 21276 417.18 45.0% 
job 21063 413.00 n/a 
tonight 21047 412.69 52.5% 
went 20987 411.51 n/a 
son 20949 410.76 n/a 
 
Table 7 Frequency information from the SUBTLEXUS database and corresponding rates 
of production in child speech for relevant low frequency words. 
 
In order to examine whether the limited amount of relevant data available to 
children could be enough to learn from, I examined individual lexical items which are 
similarly rare in speech. Only half of the sample words in this frequency range are 
included on the MCDI; those that are included are reported to be produced by many to 
most 30 month-olds. Even those that are not seem intuitively to be simple enough that 
they may also be in some children’s vocabularies by 30 months. So, if words with 
similarly low frequencies to the relevant Principle C structures can be learned by 30 
months, is it possible that the infrequent Principle C structures could be enough to form a 
generalization from? We consider next some challenges to this comparison. 
One concern to be raised here is that this is a comparison of two different kinds of 
frequency. In one case, we have the frequency of sentences that exhibit a particular 
syntactic construction; in the other case, we have the frequency of a lexical item. 
Generalizing over multiple pronunciations of a lexical item to determine the meaning 
seems to be a fairly different task than generalizing over a set of sentences to determine 
which interpretations are and are not available. When considering the type of encoding 
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and memory processes involved for learning from each of these sets of data, it becomes 
clear that the learning process for each may be quite different (and thus, comparison 
between the two a less compelling argument).  
 Another concern with this comparison between low-frequency words and low-
frequency backward anaphoric structures is the asymmetry in the type of evidence 
available to the child in each case. As noted above, learning a word will occur via 
positive evidence—that is, children hear a word uttered, and thus have evidence that it is 
a well-formed, grammatical element in the language they are learning. Their task is then 
to form a mapping between this form they have observed and its meaning. In the case of 
interpretive constraints, children have to rely on indirect negative evidence—that is, 
children must recognize that a coreferential interpretation is never available for sentences 
with a particular structure. Children must then infer that such an interpretation never 
occurs because it is ungrammatical. Learning via indirect negative evidence requires an 
additional level of inference, and thus could prove to be more challenging or time-
consuming for the language learner. Although comparison to the acquisition of low-
frequency words would suggest that learning from such limited data could be possible, 
the differences in what must be learned in each case makes this comparison ultimately 
ineffectual. 
 In conclusion, we have shown here some initial estimates for the quantity of data 
available to children for generating interpretive constraints such as Principle C. The low 
frequency of relevant input and limited developmental time span during which such 
learning could take place serve as restrictions on any proposed learning mechanism. 
While I will leave it to the reader to come to their own conclusion about the possible 
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innateness of Principle C or the viability of a learning account, it should be clear that the 
research presented here has significantly narrowed the field in terms of how a learning 
account would be applied. 
  
Question 5: Do children’s early Principle C effects contribute to identifying the nature of 
Principle C as a primitive of grammar? 
Much of the exploration of the acquisition of Principle C has been with the goal 
of furthering our understanding of the nature of Principle C. Is Principle C a primitive of 
the grammar as the standard view of Binding Theory suggests? Some researchers have 
proposed alternative ways of accounting for Principle C effects, suggesting that a formal 
specification of Principle C is unnecessary because effects are accounted for by existing 
pragmatic principles. This research presents considerable challenges to these views, 
suggesting that Principle C effects likely cannot be derived from pragmatic sources. We 
examine two pragmatic accounts here, and show how this research casts doubt on each. 
Reinhart (1983) proposes a modified account of Binding Theory based in the 
observation that standard Binding Theory restrictions fail to capture cases like (92-93), 
adapted from Grodzinsky & Reinhart (1993), which seem to allow coreference in 
Principle C contexts.  
 
(92) A: Who is that? 
B: He is Colonel Weisskopf. 
(93) Everyone knows that Oscar is incompetent. Even he finally realized that 
Oscar is incompetent. 
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Reinhart’s account is that the interpretation of pronouns can be derived in two 
ways: via a bound-variable interpretation, where the pronoun receives its interpretation 
anaphorically; and via coreference, where syntactic binding does not apply due to a lack 
of co-indexation, but both indices are interpreted as referring to the same entity. This 
system, which assumes that constraints on coreference hold only over bound variable 
interpretations, accounts for the possible coreferential interpretation in cases like (92-93). 
Reinhart’s approach essentially acts as a reduced version of standard Binding Theory; she 
assumes a condition on interpretation of each type of pronominal element (that anaphors 
must be bound within their governing category, as with standard Principle A, and that 
pronouns must be free in their governing category, as with standard Principle B). Under 
an account where syntactic binding conditions only apply to cases of variable binding, 
however, a condition on coreference with R-expressions is unnecessary, as bound 
variable interpretations are only possible when the bound element occurs in the c-
command domain of the binder. Thus classic cases of Principle C contexts, such as 
speaker B’s utterance in (90), must only derive from a free variable interpretation. Such 
an account therefore allows a means by which sentences (92-93) are grammatical on the 
coreferential interpretation; a standard Binding Theory account predicts these sentences 
to be ungrammatical, although they seem to be perfectly acceptable in certain contexts. 
However, it is important to note that coreferential interpretations obviating binding 
conditions are not permissible just anywhere, even under Reinhart’s account; compare 
(93) above to (94).  
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(94) Oscar is sad. *He thinks that Oscar is incompetent. 
 
Reinhart’s analysis derives appropriate restrictions on coreferential interpretations 
through application of an interpretive rule, stated in (95). With this rule, over-generation 
of coreferential interpretations are eliminated, in that coreference without variable 
binding is only licensed in specialized pragmatic contexts, when it conveys different 
information to the hearer than a bound variable interpretation would. This idea of 
conveying a particular meaning relevant to the context is exemplified by the discourse 
excerpt in (96).  
 
(95) Rule I: NP A cannot corefer with NP B if replacing A with C, C a variable 
A-bound by B, yields an indistinguishable interpretation. 
(96) A: Is that John? 
 B: It must be. He’s wearing John’s coat. (Conroy et al., 2009:17) 
 
Here, a coreferential interpretation of speaker B’s utterance is possible, rather 
than necessitating the bound variable counterpart John’s wearing his coat, because it 
conveys different information. Namely, it is a remark about a particular salient but 
unidentified individual wearing John’s coat, which is distinct from a remark about a 
known individual (John) wearing their own coat, as conveyed by the bound variable 
counterpart.  
Reinhart’s approach suggests an alternate interpretation of the results observed by 
LCL as well as ours, in which children arrive at a non-reflexive interpretation by 
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pragmatic inference of the sentence used to describe the scene. Consider again sentences 
like (97) and (98).  
 
(97) She’s patting herself! 
(98) She’s patting Katie! 
 
By Reinhart’s analysis, (98) must derive from a free variable interpretation, 
because her analysis does not specify binding conditions for R-expressions. Because a 
reflexive interpretation where a girl pats herself could be generated from a bound variable 
utterance like (97), Rule I can be used to infer that a sentence like (98) must therefore 
have an interpretation distinct from the reflexive interpretation possible by (97).  
Is this a plausible interpretation strategy for children to utilize? Beyond 
recognition of the sentence structure and potential interpretations, children must also 
employ some hefty pragmatic inference. When children hear a sentence such as (98), they 
need to be able to understand several important elements. First, they need to recognize 
that (under Reinhart’s analysis) there are two syntactically licensed interpretations 
available for (98): a coreferential interpretation and a disjoint interpretation. Next, 
children need to identify a case where replacing the object NP of (98) yields a bound 
variable interpretation. In this case, this requires replacing the R-expression Katie with 
the reflexive herself, as in (97). The way Rule I is specified requires recognizing the 
interpretations of both of these sentences, even though only one appears in the discourse. 
Additionally, children must be aware of the discourse context in which the sentence (98) 
occurs in order to verify that the coreferential interpretation of (98) is indistinguishable 
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from the bound variable interpretation of (97). Indeed, in the minimal context provided in 
the Principle C tasks presented here, there is no special context which would create a 
difference between a coreferential interpretation of (98) and (97). In essence, children 
need to be able to understand and compare the interpretations of both (97) and (98). 
Then, children must be able to recognize that the speaker could have uttered (97) if a 
coreferential interpretation was intended, but they did not. From this, children must then 
infer that because the speaker chose not to utter (97) and give a bound variable (and 
coreferential) interpretation, then a coreferential interpretation must not be intended. 
One concern for this account of children’s interpretations is that the application of 
Rule I requires these complex pragmatic inferences. In order to compute the intended 
interpretation of (98), children need to be able to compute Gricean inference to determine 
that the interpretation must be different from that of (97). The Gricean Maxim of 
Quantity requires a speaker to be as informative as possible. When a speaker utters (98), 
the listener uses the Maxim of Quantity to assume that this statement is as informative as 
possible. Given that if a coreferential interpretation is intended, (97) is a more directly 
informative utterance than (98), the listener uses the Maxim of Quantity to infer that (97) 
must not be true, and thus a coreferential interpretation was not intended for (98). Is it 
likely that children are able to use this Gricean reasoning to make this comparison? 
Research on children’s comprehension of scalar implicatures may suggest otherwise.  
Comprehension of scalar implicatures requires a surprisingly similar set of 
inferences. Scalar implicatures attribute implicit meaning beyond the literal meaning of 
an utterance, as demonstrated in (99). 
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(99) Some girls like cheese. 
 ' It is not the case that all girls like cheese. 
 
The quantifiers some and all are part of a set of scalar expressions which are 
ranked in order of informativeness. The scale for quantifying expressions is made up of 
the expressions in (100). 
 
(100)  <all, most, many, some, few>. 
 
When a speaker chooses to use less informative expression on the scale, it can be 
inferred that a more informative expression would be false. Thus to compute a sentence 
like (99) a listener must recognize both the interpretation of (99), and the interpretation of 
a sentence like (101), which includes the more informative expression, all. 
 
(101) All girls like cheese. 
 
The listener must then infer that because the speaker chose not to utter (101), that 
(99) must be the most informative; here arises the implicature that (101) must be false. If 
you recall, this line of reasoning is very similar to that required by Reinhart’s Rule I. In 
both cases, the listener must (a) identify a sentence which would be more informative but 
was not uttered; (b) use the Maxim of Quantity to recognize that the speaker would have 
used the other, more informative sentence if it were possible, but they did not; and (c) 
infer that the speaker did not intend the meaning of the more informative (un-uttered) 
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sentence. Thus it seems like the case of scalar implicatures offers a close comparison for 
the type of inference that children would need to be competent with to be able to compute 
Reinhart’s Rule I. However, evidence from research on children’s comprehension of 
scalar implicatures suggests that children do not successfully complete this type of 
inference until 5-6 years old (Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Skordos, to appear). If the 
inference required to enact Rule I is not available until children are much older, it seems 
that Reinhart’s analysis may not be able to account for the behavior of 30 month-olds. 
 An alternative pragmatic account has been invoked by researchers in the domain 
of discourse pragmatics and information structure. Researchers in this domain have taken 
the preferences for disjoint interpretation in backward anaphoric structures which are not 
predicted by syntactic restrictions alone as evidence that coreference possibilities might 
be better accounted for by some other mechanism than syntactic theory. (Note that we 
have already identified that many of these effects are ameliorated with appropriate 
discourse context.)  
A recent account by Ambridge, Pine & Lieven (in press) argues that “[Principle 
C] is successful only to the extent that it correlates with principles of discourse and 
information structure.” APL identify the following principles of information structure 
which are suggested to account for the set of available interpretations. 
 
(102) “Most utterances have a topic (or theme) about which some new information (the 
focus, comment, or rheme) is asserted.” These notions can be compared to those 
of the subject and predicate. 
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(103) New topics are expressed with indefinite or full NPs, while topics already 
established in the discourse are expressed with zero-marking or pronouns. 
(104) Elements such as relative clauses and adjuncts serve to add background 
information, and are distinct from the central assertion of the utterance. 
 
 Together, these principles could provide one way of accounting for the 
interpretations available for (97) and (98). Let’s first consider (97); in this case, the topic 
(or subject) of the sentence is identified with the pronoun she, and the R-expression Katie 
occurs in the assertion made about the topic, i.e. the predicate. According to APL, “it 
makes pragmatic sense to use a lexical NP… as the topic about which some assertion is 
made, and a pronoun in a part of the sentence containing information that is secondary to 
that assertion, but not vice versa.” In other words, APL identify a restriction on the 
intersection of pronouns in topic positions and R-expressions in backgrounded 
information such as relative clauses or adjuncts. Specifically, this restriction prohibits a 
single referent from being both topical and backgrounded unless it is new information, in 
which case the first reference to that entity must be a name and not a pronoun. 
 This generalization would technically account for Principle C effects in the set of 
sentences we probed in Experiment 4, repeated here as (105) and (106). 
  
(105)  She’s painting the house that’s in Katie’s lap. 
(106) The house that she’s painting is in Katie’s lap. 
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However, as a generalization to account for all Principle C effects, it fails, as it is 
limited by being defined over ‘backgrounded information.’ This generalization cannot 
account for Principle C effects in single clauses, like those tested by LCL or Experiment 
4, repeated here as (107) and (108). 
 
(107) She’s patting Katie. 
(108) She’s patting herself. 
 
 APL utilize a different generalization to account for Principle C effects in single 
clause utterances: “if a pronoun is used as the topic, this indicates that the referent is 
highly accessible, rendering anomalous the use of a full NP anywhere within the same 
clause.” So although APL have managed to capture most Principle C effects, their 
pragmatic account requires two separate generalizations to do so.  
 We can consider the plausibility of this account given our findings presented here. 
This research has significantly lowered the age at which Principle C effects are observed, 
thus lowering the age at which children would need to have command of the pragmatic 
concepts relevant to implementing APL’s generalizations. If early Principle C effects are 
to be accounted for by APL’s pragmatic account, then children need to have an adequate 
understanding of the concepts of topic and focus, as well as having access to the 
pragmatic principles which govern when pronouns vs. R-expressions are likely to be 
used. Research suggests that children fail to understand pronouns in the same way as 
adults far later than our lower bound of 30 months. Jennifer Arnold and colleagues have 
showed that children fail to use discourse cues to interpret pronouns through age 5; 
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children do not expect a subject pronoun to refer to the subject of the previous sentence 
(Arnold et al., 2001; Arnold et al., 2004). Because children seem to still lack some 
pragmatic cues that would be necessary to implement APL’s generalization as late as 5 
years old, it seems highly unlikely that they would be able to utilize such a generalization 
to drive interpretation at 30 months. 
 In considering pragmatic implementations designed to account for Principle C 
effects, the results presented here serve to act as a gauge for when children would need to 
have access to the pragmatic principles in order to attribute children’s behavior to such 
implementations. Independent research shows in both cases we have explored here that 
children do not have access to the relevant pragmatic components until much later. This 
suggests that Principle C effects at 30 months (and consequently, any age) should not be 
attributed to pragmatic effects. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 The research presented in this dissertation has explored the developmental 
trajectory of Principle C by comparing to other potential interpretive mechanisms as well 
as by identifying the component processes implicated in interpretation in Principle C 
contexts. Taken together, the results suggest knowledge of Principle C as the most likely 
mechanism to drive Principle C effects as young at 30 months.  
While the research presented here does not directly contribute to the debate 
surrounding the nature of such constraints, it does provide evidence about two aspects of 
the acquisition pattern which could potentially further restrict a learning account of 
Principle C knowledge. First, our work continues to extend downward the age at which 
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Principle C effects have successfully been demonstrated to even younger children than 
the majority of previous research. This narrowing of the age range when Principle C may 
become active in the child grammar effectively serves to limit the amount of time across 
development in which the constraint could be learned. Second, this research explores the 
mechanisms by which children at these youngest ages implement the knowledge 
responsible for their interpretations, with the aim to diagnose early Principle C behavior 
as stemming from knowledge of Principle C rather than an alternate interpretive heuristic. 
Finally, I identified a cursory examination of the input available to children that might 
allow learning a generalization to take place, showing it to be exceedingly rare. Together, 
these factors all speak to the feasibility of a learning account, putting us closer on the 
path to identifying the nature of the Principle C constraint. 
The research presented herein serves to provide new insights into methods for 
exploring early linguistic competence. Because children’s competence is not directly 
observable, we must rely on observation of performance, which is confounded by 
multiple factors. My research has identified two distinct methods for diagnosing 
competence. First, comparison of performance across many linguistic contexts can be 
used to differentiate between multiple potential interpretive mechanisms. Additionally, I 
introduced a novel approach, which utilizes independent measures of children’s 
processing speed. By creating a proxy for some of the component processes required to 
implement grammatical knowledge, we are able to compare this to children’s observed 
behavior. In this way, we are able to identify which deployment processes are most 
relevant to predicting children’s performance. Because we know that different knowledge 
states require different component processes to be implemented, this research allows us 
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to diagnose underlying competence by examining these deployment processes. Together, 
these methods of analysis serve to provide new depth to our investigations into children’s 
early syntactic competence. Although we face the challenge of not being able to directly 
detect underlying competence, these methods of analysis provide ways by which we can 
infer competence from our careful observation of performance. 
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Appendix A : Experiment 1 & 2 Stimuli 
Lexical Norms for Selected Lexical Items 
Lexical Item Rate of production  at 24 months 
Rate of production  
at 30 months 
cover 28.1% 60% 
dry 37.8% 82.5% 
fan n/a n/a 
paint 31.9% 73.8% 
pat n/a n/a 
spin n/a n/a 
squeeze n/a n/a 
wash 63.7% 93.8% 
arm 70.4% 100% 
body n/a n/a 
chair 76.3% 95% 
face 60.7% 91.3% 
head 69.6% 96.3% 
shoulders 34.8% 68.8% 
 
Schematic of Task 
Phase Video Audio 
Filler abstract classical music 
Character Intro Katie Oh look! There’s Katie. Katie’s standing. 
Character Intro Katie Oh wow! Look at what Katie’s doing now. Katie’s waving! Look at Katie waving. 
Character Intro Anna Oh, there’s Anna! Anna’s standing too. 
Character Intro Anna Look! Look at what Anna’s doing now. Anna’s waving! Look at Anna waving. 
Character Intro Anna Wow, there’s Anna again. 
Character Intro Katie Oh look- there’s Katie! 
Face Check 1 Anna Katie Wow- there they are! Do you see Katie? Where’s Katie? 
Character Intro Katie Yay! There’s Katie dancing. 
Face Check 2 Anna Katie There they are again! Do you see Anna? Where’s Anna? 
Character Intro Anna Yay! There’s Anna stretching. 
Anna dries Anna Oh wow- there’s Katie and Anna!  It looks like Anna’s body is getting dried!  Familiarization 1 









Oh look! Now they’re different. She’s drying 
Anna’s/her body. Find the one where she’s 
drying Anna’s/her body. 
Face Check 3 Katie Anna Oh look- they’re jumping! Do you see Katie? Where’s Katie? 
Filler abstract classical music 
Face Check 4 Katie Anna Oh look- they’re jumping again! Do you see Anna? Where’s Anna? 
Anna pats Katie Oh wow- there’s Anna and Katie!  It looks like Katie’s head is getting patted!  Familiarization 2 








Oh look! Now they’re different. She’s 
patting Katie’s/her head. Find the one 
where she’s patting Katie’s/her head. 
Character Intro Katie Hey- there’s Katie marching! Do you see her marching? 
Katie paints Anna Oh wow- there’s Katie and Anna!  It looks like Anna’s face is getting painted!  Familiarization 3 








Oh look! Now they’re different. She’s 
painting Anna’s/her face. Find the one 
where she’s painting Anna’s/her face. 
Character Intro Anna Wow- there’s Anna hopping! Do you see her hopping? 
Anna fans Anna Oh wow- there’s Katie and Anna!  It looks like Anna’s face is getting fanned!  Familiarization 4 








Oh look! Now they’re different. She’s 
fanning Anna’s/her face. Find the one 
where she’s fanning Anna’s/her face. 
Face Check 5 Anna Katie Look- there they are again! Do you see Anna? Where’s Anna? 
Anna washes Katie Oh wow- there’s Anna and Katie!  It looks like Katie’s arm is getting washed!  Familiarization 5 








Oh look! Now they’re different. She’s 
washing Katie’s/her arm. Find the one 
where she’s washing Katie’s/her arm. 
Filler abstract classical music 
Character Intro Anna Hey- there’s Anna stretching! Do you see her stretching? 
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Anna spins Anna Oh wow- there’s Katie and Anna!  It looks like Anna’s chair is getting spun!  Familiarization 6 








Oh look! Now they’re different. She’s 
spinning Anna’s/her chair. Find the one 
where she’s spinning Anna’s/her chair. 
Character Intro Katie Wow- there’s Katie dancing! Do you see her dancing? 
Katie squeezes 
Katie 
Oh wow- there’s Anna and Katie!  
It looks like Katie’s shoulders are getting 
squeezed!  Familiarization 7 
Anna squeezes 
Katie 
Hey look- there they are again!  









Oh look! Now they’re different. She’s 
squeezing Katie’s/her shoulders. Find the 
one where she’s squeezing Katie’s/her 
shoulders. 
Face Check 6 Anna Katie Look- now they’re waving! Do you see Katie? Where’s Katie? 
Anna covers Katie Oh wow- there’s Anna and Katie!  It looks like Katie’s body is getting covered!  Familiarization 8 








Oh look! Now they’re different. She’s 
covering Katie’s/her body. Find the one 
where she’s covering Katie’s/her body. 




Appendix B : Experiment 3 Stimuli 
Lexical Norms for Selected Lexical Items 


















Schematic of Task 
Phase Video Audio 
Filler abstract classical music 
Character Intro Katie Oh look! There’s Katie. Katie’s standing. 
Character Intro Katie Oh wow! Look at what Katie’s doing now. Katie’s waving! Look at Katie waving. 
Character Intro Anna Oh, there’s Anna! Anna’s standing too. 
Character Intro Anna Look! Look at what Anna’s doing now. Anna’s waving! Look at Anna waving. 
Character Intro Anna Wow, there’s Anna again. 
Character Intro Katie Oh look- there’s Katie! 
Face Check 1 Anna Katie Wow- there they are! Do you see Katie? Where’s Katie? 
Character Intro Katie Yay! There’s Katie dancing. 
Face Check 2 Anna Katie There they are again! Do you see Anna? Where’s Anna? 
Character Intro Anna Yay! There’s Anna stretching. 
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Anna opens box Oh wow- there’s Katie and Anna!  Anna’s opening a box!  Familiarization 1 








What’s happening now? The box that she’s 
opening is in Katie’s lap. Look! The box 
that she’s opening is in Katie’s lap. / She’s 
opening the box that’s in Katie’s lap. Look! 
She’s opening the box that’s in Katie’s lap. 
Face Check 3 Katie Anna Oh look- they’re jumping! Do you see Katie? Where’s Katie? 
Filler abstract classical music 
Face Check 4 Katie Anna Oh look- they’re jumping again! Do you see Anna? Where’s Anna? 
Katie hugs frog Oh wow- there’s Anna and Katie!  Katie’s hugging a frog!  Familiarization 2 








What’s happening now? The frog that she’s 
hugging is in Anna’s lap. Look! The frog 
that she’s hugging is in Anna’s lap. / She’s 
hugging the frog that’s in Anna’s lap. Look! 
She’s hugging the frog that’s in Anna’s lap. 
Character Intro Katie Hey- there’s Katie marching! Do you see her marching? 
Anna paints house Oh wow- there’s Katie and Anna!  Anna’s painting a house!  Familiarization 3 








What’s happening now? The house that 
she’s painting is in Katie’s lap. Look! The 
house that she’s painting is in Katie’s lap. / 
She’s painting the house that’s in Katie’s 
lap. Look! She’s painting the house that’s in 
Katie’s lap. 
Character Intro Anna Wow- there’s Anna hopping! Do you see her hopping? 
Katie feeds dog Oh wow- there’s Katie and Anna!  Katie’s feeding a dog!  Familiarization 4 









What’s happening now? The dog that she’s 
feeding is in Anna’s lap. Look! The dog that 
she’s feeding is in Anna’s lap. / She’s 
feeding the dog that’s in Anna’s lap. Look! 
She’s feeding the dog that’s in Anna’s lap. 
Face Check 5 Anna Katie Look- there they are again! Do you see Anna? Where’s Anna? 
Katie cuts cake Oh wow- there’s Anna and Katie!  Katie’s cutting a cake!  Familiarization 5 








What’s happening now? The cake that she’s 
cutting is in Anna’s lap. Look! The cake that 
she’s cutting is in Anna’s lap. / She’s cutting 
the cake that’s in Anna’s lap. Look! She’s 
cutting the cake that’s in Anna’s lap. 
Filler abstract classical music 
Character Intro Anna Hey- there’s Anna stretching! Do you see her stretching? 
Anna reads book Oh wow- there’s Katie and Anna!  Anna’s reading a book!  Familiarization 6 








What’s happening now? The book that she’s 
reading is in Katie’s lap. Look! The book 
that she’s reading is in Katie’s lap. / She’s 
reading the book that’s in Katie’s lap. Look! 
She’s reading the book that’s in Katie’s lap. 
Character Intro Katie Wow- there’s Katie dancing! Do you see her dancing? 
Anna tickles bear Oh wow- there’s Anna and Katie! Anna’s tickling a bear!  Familiarization 7 








What’s happening now? The bear that she’s 
tickling is in Katie’s lap. Look! The bear 
that she’s tickling is in Katie’s lap. / She’s 
tickling the bear that’s in Katie’s lap. Look! 
She’s tickling the bear that’s in Katie’s lap. 
Face Check 6 Anna Katie Look- now they’re waving! Do you see Katie? Where’s Katie? 
Katie washes truck Oh wow- there’s Anna and Katie!  Katie’s washing a truck!  Familiarization 8 









What’s happening now? The truck that she’s 
washing is in Anna’s lap. Look! The truck 
that she’s washing is in Anna’s lap. / She’s 
washing the truck that’s in Anna’s lap. 
Look! She’s washing the truck that’s in 
Anna’s lap. 
Filler abstract classical music 
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Appendix C : Experiment 4 Stimuli 
Lexical Norms for Selected Lexical Items 
































Schematic of Lexical Access Speed Task 
Trial Video Audio 
1 bird train Where’s the bird? See the bird? 
2 spoon keys Where are the keys? See the keys? 
 176 
3 book cup Where’s the cup? See the cup? 
4 shoe hat Where’s the shoe? See the hat? 
5 ball flower Where’s the flower? See the flower? 
6 dog cat Where’s the dog? See the dog? 
7 horse chair Where’s the horse? See the chair? 
8 cookie fish Where’s the fish? See the fish? 
 
Schematic of Phrase Structure Integration Speed Task 
Trial Video Audio 
Filler abstract classical music 
large green 1 small red medium red 
Hey look- there are some shirts! 
Where’s the biggest shirt? 
medium yellow 2 small yellow large blue 
Oh- do you see the boats? 
Where’s the biggest boat? 
small yellow 3 medium yellow large blue 
Oh hey- look at those cats! 
Where’s the biggest yellow cat? 
medium red 4 small red large green 
Hey look- there are some chairs! 
Where’s the biggest red chair? 
small yellow 5 medium yellow large green 
Oh wow- look at those hands! 
Where’s the biggest hand? 
medium red 6 large blue small red 
Now there are some bikes! 
Where’s the biggest red bike? 
small green 7 large blue medium green 
Oh hey- look at those books! 
Where’s the biggest book? 
large red 8 medium yellow small yellow 
Wow- look at those hats! 
Where’s the biggest hat? 
Filler abstract classical music 
small green 9 large red medium green 
Now there are some shoes! 
Where’s the biggest green shoe? 
large yellow 10 medium green small green 
Oh wow- look at those houses! 
Where’s the biggest house? 
small blue 11 large green medium blue 
Hey- look at those cars! 
Where’s the biggest car? 
medium yellow 12 large red small yellow 
Wow- look at those boxes! 
Where’s the biggest yellow box? 
large yellow 13 medium green small green 
Now there are some cups! 
Where’s the biggest green cup? 
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medium red 14 small red large blue 
Hey look- do you see those trucks? 
Where’s the biggest truck? 
large green 15 medium yellow small yellow 
Oh hey- look at the bears! 
Where’s the biggest yellow bear? 
small blue 16 large yellow medium blue 
Hey look- do you see those dogs? 
Where’s the biggest blue dog? 
Filler abstract classical music 
medium blue 17 large red small blue 
Oh wow- look at those buses! 
Where’s the biggest bus? 
large green 18 small blue medium blue 
Oh hey- look at the plates! 
Where’s the biggest blue plate? 
small red 19 medium red large yellow 
Oh- look at those trains! 
Where’s the biggest red train? 
small blue 20 medium blue large yellow 
Wow- now there are some balls! 
Where’s the biggest ball? 
medium blue 21 small blue large red 
Hey look- do you see the horses? 
Where’s the biggest blue horse? 
medium green 22 large red small green 
Oh- look at those dolls! 
Where’s the biggest doll? 
large yellow 23 small red medium red 
Wow- now there are some blocks! 
Where’s the biggest block? 
large blue 24 small green medium green 
Oh wow- look at those bowls! 
Where’s the biggest green bowl? 
Filler abstract classical music 
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Appendix D : Findings Relating Vocabulary and Processing Speed 
Study Method/ design Age (months) Significant relation? 
Swingley, Pinto &  
Fernald (1999) Word recognition 24 No 
Swingley & Aslin 
(2000) Word recognition 18-23 No 
18 Fernald, Swingley 
& Pinto (2001) 
Word recognition 
(whole/ partial word) 21 
Yes* 
(whole words only) 
Fernald (2002) unknown 26 Yes* (data not published) 
12 Yes 




Fernald, Perfors & 
Marchman (2006) Word recognition 
25 Yes 
Hurtado, Marchman 
& Fernald (2007) 
Word recognition 
(Spanish monolinguals) 15-37 
No* 
(no unique variance)26 
18 No Hurtado, Marchman 





& Hurtado (2009) 
Word recognition 
(Spanish-English bilinguals) 29-34 
Yes* 
(within language only) 
 
                                                
!" Hurtado, Marchman & Fernald (2007) found that while age and vocabulary together 
accounted for a significant portion of the variance in children’s reaction times, 
vocabulary did not contribute any unique variance in addition. This may stem from the 
extremely large age range across which data was collected. 
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